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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 Agency theory embeds the influential relationship that exists between managers and 
shareholders of firms. This relationship has the potential to influence decision-making in the 
firm that in turn has potential impacts on firm characteristics such as firm value. Prior 
evidence has demonstrated an association between ownership structure, capital structure, 
and firm value. 
 This thesis extends the literature by proposing a further link between ownership 
structure and capital structure in term of post Asian Financial Crisis that is rarely investigated. 
Using an agency framework, I argue that the distribution of equity ownership among 
corporate managers and external block holders has a significant relationship with leverage 
and firm performance, and there is reverse causality effect between ownership structure, 
capital structure, and firm performance. The paper tests eleven hypotheses that explore 
various aspects of this relationship. This study uses 532 East Asian companies, which are 
located in seven most affected countries when the crisis took place during period 1996-1997. 
The time frame of analysis is 2000-2001 period that is believed as a start of recovery period. 
Statistic methods used for testing the hypothesis are T-test and multivariate regression 
model.  
 The empirical results provide support for a positive relationship between external 
block holders and leverage, a curvilinear relationship between the level of managerial share 
ownership and leverage and finally, the results are expected that the relationship between 
external block ownership and leverage varies across the level of managerial share ownership. 
These results parallel and are consistent with the “active monitoring hypothesis”, 
“convergence-of-interests” and the “entrenchment” hypotheses which have been proposed in 
a different context. Meanwhile, the test of reverse causality between ownership structure, 
capital structure, and firm performance indicates some argument, such as the efficiency-risk 
hypothesis and incentive signaling approach (relation between capital structure and 
performance), and the profit-debt-ownership argument in relation between ownership 
structure and performance. 
 
 
Key words: Agency Cost, Ownership Structure, Capital Structure, Firm Performance 
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 RESUMEN 
 
La teoría de agencia encaja la relación influyente que existe entre gerentes y los accionistas 
de empresas. Esta relación tiene el potencial para influir en la toma de decisiones en la 
empresa que a su turno tiene impactos potenciales sobre características de empresas como 
el valor de empresa. La evidencia previa ha demostrado una relación entre la estructura de 
propiedad, endeudamiento, y el valor de empresa. 
  Esta tesis amplía la literatura proponiendo un nexo entre la estructura de propiedad 
y la estructura de capital después de la crisis financiera asiática que pocos estudios han 
analizado esta relación. Usando teoría de la agencia, el argumento que la distribución de 
propiedad corporativa entre directivos y accionistas externos tiene una relación significativa 
con el apalancamiento y el desempeño de empresa, y hay efecto de causalidad inverso entre 
la estructura de propiedad, la estructura de capital, y el desempeño de empresa. Esta tesis 
prueba once hipótesis que exploran varios aspectos de esta relación. Este estudio analiza 532 
empresas del sudeste asiático, que están localizadas en los siete países más afectados 
cuando la crisis ocurrió durante el período 1996-1997. El periodo de tiempo de análisis es 
2000-2001; muestra el principio de recuperación. Los métodos estadísticos utilizados para 
probar las hipótesis son «T-test» y el modelo de regresión multivariante.  
  Los resultados empíricos proporcionan el apoyo para una relación positiva entre 
accionistas externos y apalancamiento, una relación curvilínea entre el nivel de propiedad de 
directivos corporativos y el apalancamiento y finalmente, los resultados muestran que la 
relación entre la propiedad del accionista externo y el apalancamiento varía a través del nivel 
de propiedad de directivos corporativos. Estos resultados son compatibles con «la hipótesis 
de supervisión activa», «la convergencia-de-intereses» y las hipótesis «de atrincheramiento» 
y con los que han sido propuesto en un contexto diferente. Mientras tanto, la prueba de 
causalidad inversa entre la estructura de propiedad, la estructura de capital, y el desempeño 
de empresa indica algún argumento, como la hipótesis de riesgo eficacia y el «incentive 
signaling approach» (la relación entre la estructura de capital y el desempeño de empresa), y 
el argumento «profit-debt-ownership» en la relación entre la estructura de propiedad y el 
desempeño de empresa. 
 
Palabra clave: el coste de agencia, estructura de propiedad, apalancamiento, desempeño 
de  empresa 
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 RESULTS SUMMARY 
 
 
 
Generally, the multivariate regression results support the prior researches. As the 
thesis has predicted it before, the external block ownership affects companies’ capital 
structure in East Asia countries after the crisis. Firms with a higher level of external block 
holdings are likely to have a higher debt ratio, ceteris paribus, and it is statistically significant. 
 In the effect of managerial share ownership on financing decision, the result has the 
same direction of influence with some previous studies, that is, when the level of managerial 
share ownership is low, an increase in managerial share ownership has the effect of aligning 
management and shareholders’ interests. Consequently, as managerial share ownership 
increases from a low level, managers have less incentive to reduce the debt level, resulting in 
a higher level of debt (but at a decreasing rate). 
 In the relationship between external block ownership and leverage at different levels 
of managerial share ownership, the thesis indicates that the relationship between external 
block ownership and leverage is different at high and low levels of managerial share 
ownership. Specifically, the slope coefficient for the relationship between external block 
ownership and leverage at high levels of managerial share ownership is approximately zero. 
It is argued that the negative entrenchment effect arising from high levels of managerial 
share ownership is offset by the positive monitoring effect of external block holders. 
In the relationship between leverage (as endogenous variable) and firm performance 
and the probability of its non-monotonic relationship under the framework of agency theory, 
this thesis find that the East Asian companies after the crisis apply the efficiency-risk 
hypothesis. It indicates that higher profit efficiency has generated a higher expected return 
for those companies in a given capital structure, and the higher efficiency has substituted to 
some degree for equity capital in protecting the firm against future crises. 
Meanwhile, a positively and significantly relation between leverage and Tobin’s Q, 
which performance measure is endogenous variable, is consistent with the incentive signaling 
approach, which debt can be used to signal the fact that firm has prospect and equity issues 
may be interpreted as a negative signal. It also indicates that a firm with better prospects 
can issue more debt than one with lower prospects, because the issue of debt by the latter 
will result in a higher probability of bankruptcy because of debt-servicing costs, which is a 
costly outcome to management. 
Finally, in the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance, a 
positively and significantly relation between EBO and Tobin’s Q can be interpreted that the 
xi 
 East Asian companies large owners are more capable of monitoring and controlling the 
management, thereby contributing to corporate performance. It indicates that ownership 
concentration has been able to increase the cost-efficiency of monitoring in the post-crisis 
period and due to this higher incentive has enhanced its usage. 
Regarding to the reverse causality, a positively and significantly influence of Tobin’s 
Q on EBO can be interpreted that the East Asian companies large owners are better informed 
than minority shareholders or potential investors, therefore, they use their knowledge about 
the firm’s prospects to maximize his wealth. This finding is also consistent with the profit-
debt-ownership argument. 
Meanwhile, in measuring the influence of firm performance on insider ownership, the 
regression model shown statistically insignificant results, even though the model has a 
significant F-value that indicates a valid model. What becomes an interesting result is the 
sign of performance’s coefficient is consistent with some previous studies, which showed the 
relationship between executive compensation and performance is contingent upon the firm’s 
strategic context and those studies supported the idea that corporate value affected 
ownership structure. 
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 RESUMEN DE RESULTADO 
 
Generalmente, los resultados de regresión multivariante apoyan las investigaciones previas. 
Como la tesis ha predicho, la propiedad del accionista externo como grupo afecta a la 
estructura de capital de las empresas en países de sudeste asiáticos después de la crisis. Las 
empresas con un nivel más alto de propiedad del accionista externo probablemente van a 
tener una proporción más alta de deudas, ceteris paribus, y esto es estadísticamente 
significativo. 
  El efecto del accionariado de directivos corporativos en la decisión de financiación, 
tiene la misma dirección de influencia con algunos estudios anteriores, es decir, cuando el 
nivel del accionariado de los directivos es bajo, un aumento en dicho nivel tiene el efecto de 
alinear los intereses de los accionistas y la dirección. Por consiguiente, como aumentos del 
accionariado de directivos de un nivel bajo, los directores tienen menos incentivos para 
reducir el nivel de deudas, terminando en un nivel más alto de deuda (pero a una tasa que 
disminuye). 
  En la relación entre la propiedad del accionista externo como grupo y el 
apalancamiento en los niveles diferentes de los directivos en el accionariado, la tesis indica 
que la relación entre la propiedad del accionista externo y el apalancamiento es diferente en 
los niveles altos y bajos en el cuyo de los directivos accionariados. Expresamente, el 
coeficiente de regresión para la relación entre la propiedad del accionista externo como 
grupo y el apalancamiento en los niveles altos de directivos en el accionariado es 
aproximadamente cero. Esto se argumenta que el efecto de atrincheramiento negativo que 
proviene de los niveles altos de los directivos en el accionariado es compensado por el efecto 
de supervisión positivo de accionistas externos. 
En la relación entre el apalancamiento (como la variable endógena) y el desempeño 
de empresa y la probabilidad de su relación no es monótona bajo la teoría de agencia. Esta 
tesis encuentra que las empresas del sudeste asiático después de la crisis aplican la hipótesis 
de riesgo-eficacia. Esto indica que la eficacia del beneficio ha generado un retorno esperado 
más alto para aquellas empresas en una cierta estructura de capital, y la eficacia más alta ha 
sustituido en algún grado al capital en la protección de la empresa contra crisis futuras. 
Mientras tanto, una relación positiva y significativa entre el apalancamiento y la Q de 
Tobin, que mide el desempeño es la variable endógena, es compatible con el «incentive 
signaling approach», el que la deuda puede ser usada como señal de que la empresa tiene la 
perspectiva y la emisión de acciones pueden ser interpretadas como una señal negativa. Esto 
también indica que una empresa con mejores perspectivas puede emitir más deuda que la 
xiii 
 con perspectivas inferiores, porque la emisión de deuda por el éste terminará en una 
probabilidad más alta de bancarrota debido a gastos de deuda, que es un resultado costoso 
por la dirección. 
Finalmente, la relación entre la concentración de propiedad y el desempeño de 
empresa, una relación positiva y significativa entre EBO y la Q de Tobin puede ser 
interpretada que las empresas del sudeste asiático con mayor grado de accionista externo 
son más capaces de supervisar el control de la dirección, y a la contribución a al desempeño 
corporativo. Esto indica que la concentración de propiedad ha sido capaz de aumentar la 
eficacia del coste de supervisión en el período post-crisis y debido a este incentivo más alto 
se realza más su utilización. 
En cuanto a la causalidad inversa, una influencia positivamente y significante de la Q 
de Tobin sobre EBO (los accionista externos como grupo) puede ser interpretada como que 
las empresas del sudeste asiático con mayor grado de accionistas externos están mejor 
informados que los accionistas de minoría o inversionistas potenciales, por lo tanto, ellos 
usan su conocimiento sobre las perspectivas de la empresa para maximizar su riqueza. Este 
encuentro es también compatible con el argumento «profit-debt-ownership». 
Mientras tanto, en la medición de la influencia de desempeño de empresa sobre los 
directivos en el accionariado, el modelo de regresión demuestra resultados estadísticamente 
insignificantes, aun cuando el modelo tenga un valor de F significativo que indica un modelo 
válido. Un resultado interesante es el signo del coeficiente del desempeño que es compatible 
con algunos estudios anteriores, que mostraron la relación entre la compensación de los 
directivos y el desempeño que es contingente sobre el contexto estratégico de la empresa y 
aquellos estudios apoyaron la idea el que el valor corporativo afecta la estructura de 
propiedad. 
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Ownership Structures, Capital Structure, and Firm Performance: 
An Analysis of Post East Asian Financial Crisis  
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 PROBLEM BACKGROUND 
 
 
The Asian economic crisis has exposed critical deficiencies in financial systems throughout Asia 
and has also highlighted the problem of corporate governance among South East Asian 
corporations. The principal focus of post-crisis research has attempted to link these deficiencies 
to specific causes such as over-leveraged domestic financial markets, overexposure to foreign 
exchange risks and monopolistic market structures. Underlying all these issues is a fundamental 
lack of control. Poor corporate governance is indicative of this problem. Indeed, ‘corporate 
governance provides at least as convincing an explanation … as any or all of the usual 
macroeconomic arguments’.1
 
Corporate governance developed as a way of ensuring that investors receive a return on their 
investment by protecting against management expropriation or use of the investment capital to 
finance poor projects. Specifically, corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers 
of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment 
[Shleifer/Vishy 1997: 737]. However, the inability to create perfect contracts, as Hart [1995] 
suggests, necessitates the need for corporate governance. That is, corporate governance issues 
arise wherever contracts are incomplete and agency problems exist.  
 
Corporate governance can best be interpreted as the set of mechanism – both institutional and 
market based – that induce self-interested managers (controllers of the firm) to make decision 
that maximize the value of the firm to its shareholders (owners of the firm).2 The aim of these 
mechanisms, of course, is to reduce the agency costs that arise from the principle-agent 
problem; and they could be internal and/or external in nature.3 Internal mechanisms deal with 
the composition of the board of directors, such as the proportion of independent outsiders in its 
membership and the distinction between the CEO and the chairperson. Another important 
internal mechanism is ownership structure, or the degree at which ownership by managers 
                                               
1 See Wong [2000]  
2 One could also add, "to promote society’s interest and economic growth in the process". See Dennis /McConnell [2003]. 
3 For more on these mechanisms and the evidence relating to the agency problem, see Dennis/McConnell [2003]. 
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obviates the trade-off between alignment and entrenchment effect.4 External mechanisms, on 
the other hand, rely on the takeover market in addition to the legal/ regulatory system, whereby 
the takeover market acts as a threat to existing controllers in that it enables outsiders to seek 
control of the firm if bad corporate governance results in a significant gap between the potential 
and the actual value of the firm. 
 
Related to this issue, the recent study commissioned by the Asian Development Bank [2000b] 
reports that ownership structure determines the governance problem. It explains that the two 
key features of corporate ownership structure are concentration and composition. First, Asian 
firms are perceived to be highly concentrated, family-dominated corporations.5 It is possible to 
determine the nature of the agency problem by the degree of dispersion between management 
and ownership. High dispersion (low concentration) occurs when the majority of ownership is 
held by a large number of individual, minority shareholders. The problem then is that between 
management and minority shareholders. Low dispersion (high concentration) is the condition of 
the majority of ownership is controlled by a small number of large shareholders. The problem 
then is between majority and minority shareholders. 
 
From Table 1.1 it is clear that the primary crisis economies all have concentrated ownership. On 
average, the five largest shareholders, combined, own 55% of each firm in crisis economies. 
Indonesia, with 67%, is the largest and Korea, with 38%, the lowest concentration. Thus, with 
low ownership dispersion the agency problem arises between majority and minority shareholders. 
 
The second part of ownership structure is its composition. Ownership composition essentially 
means who owns the corporation—who the shareholders are. Examples of shareholders include 
individuals, a family or family group, a holding company, a bank, an institutional investor or a 
non-financial corporation [ADB 2000b: 7]. Importantly for governance, it must be determined if 
any owners form a controlling group(s). Table 1.1 also provides information on the composition 
of Asian corporations. From it, we can see that Asia consists primarily of family-based ownership. 
There is a tentative link between composition and concentration. That is, it may be credible to 
assume that ownership composition is a result of ownership concentration because corporations 
are often established by founding families. 
 
                                               
4 Equity ownership by insiders can align insiders’ interests with those of other shareholders, thereby leading to greater 
firm value. However, higher ownership by insiders may result in a greater degree of managerial control, potentially 
entrenching managers. Wan [1999] finds that management ownership does in fact exhibit an inverted U-shaped relation 
with Tobin’s Q-ratio. 
5 See Claessens et al. [1999, 2000] 
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Table 1.1 
Ownership Concentration in Asia 
 
Source: Lu, Justin and Jonathan Batten, “The implementation of OECD Corporate Governance Principles in Post-Crisis       
Asia,” JCC 4 Winter [2001], p. 54. 
 
On the other side, the Asian Crisis itself has supported previous theoretical and applied literature 
that has highlighted the complex nature of the relationship between ownership structure, capital 
structure, and firm performance. Existing literature highlights the agency problems between 
managers and shareholders. In an attempt to ensure the continued viability of the firm, the latter 
may result in a generally lower leverage ratio below the optimum level.  
 
For example, Jensen/Meckling [1976] argue that introduction of managerial share ownership may 
align the interests of managers and shareholders and thus reduce these agency problems. 
Extending this idea, Brailsford et al. [2002] suggest that the relationship between managerial 
share ownership and leverage may in fact be non-linear. Stulz [1988] formalized a concave 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm valuation too; with increase in managerial 
ownership and control, the negative effect on firm value associated with entrenchment starts to 
exceed the incentive benefits of managerial ownership. Empirically, Shleifer/Vishny [1986] 
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suggest that concentration of ownership may improve firm performance while Morck et al. [1988] 
argue that it may even deteriorate firm performance. 
 
Another problematic issue of most studies in this theme is the origin of their data, which are 
mainly the USA and the UK. The ownership structure in these two countries differs drastically 
from those in continental Europe or Asia. Apart from a generally low applicability of the results to 
other countries, both the US and the UK data have two further shortcomings. First, since both 
countries show the lowest ownership concentration worldwide, they provide little data of highly 
concentrated companies. Consequently, those studies yield good results for low concentrated 
firms, but fail in significance for higher concentration, since they cannot provide a large enough 
sample of those firms. Second, with the evolution of stock markets, shareholdings become 
increasingly complex through multiple control chains, pyramiding, and crossholdings. These 
complex ownership structures have a strong impact on the separation of ownership and control 
and the resulting agency conflicts. While these structures are prominent for most countries, they 
are little found in the USA and the UK. 
 
Meanwhile, recent studies about ownership, capital structure, and firm performance that are 
done in East Asia countries mainly focus on the period pre-crisis. There are such as Claessens et 
al. [2000] examine the pattern of ownership in seven East Asian countries, Claessens et al. 
[2002] investigate the effect of large shareholding on firm valuation, and Lemmon/Lins [2003] 
further link ownership structure to stock returns in these countries. None of these recent studies 
however considers the effect of ownership structure on capital structure and firm performance 
and the possible interaction between capital structure and firm performance. In other words, a 
clear understanding of the effects of ownership structure on capital structure and firm 
performance remains much unexplored, especially an analysis of the post-crisis period. 
 
This condition, of course, triggers a curiosity about the effect of Asian Financial Crisis to the 
company performance, especially how the Asian corporations react to it, in term of improving 
their corporate governance practices. Research that concerned about ownership structure, capital 
structure and firm performance of East Asian countries, which are affected by the crisis, is one of 
research efforts in topic “corporate governance", in term of post-crisis analysis. This research 
constituted former investigations in topic corporate governance, which many result of empiric 
researches show immeasurable finding how a certain event (e.g. crisis, economic recession, or 
shock) is able to make a decisive change. 
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By employing the rationale underlying the agency theory framework, theoretical and empirical 
studies have suggested that managers, who have non-diversifiable human capital invested in the 
firm, have incentives to reduce their non-diversifiable employment risks by ensuring the 
continued viability of the firm [Amihud/Lev 1981]. One method of reducing the non-diversifiable 
employment risk is by decreasing the firm’s debt holdings [Friend/Lang 1988]. 
 
Recent developments in agency theory also suggest that the structure of corporate ownership 
can affect firm performance by mitigating agency conflicts between management and 
shareholders [Putterman 1993]. These recent researches find that firms differ in terms of the 
degree to which ownership is concentrated among corporate insiders and external investors. 
Moreover, the distribution of ownership among different groups can influence managerial 
opportunism, which subsequently has implications for managerial behavior and corporate 
performance. 
 
As it has been hypothesized by Jensen/Meckling [1976], Shleifer/Vishny [1986], Stein [1989], 
and James [1998], concentrated ownership – whether by insider or outsider investors – lead to 
better performance, worse performance, or to have no observable effect on performance.6 
Increased ownership by insiders or the presence of a large block holder can lead to better 
performance due to three main reasons. First, Jensen/Meckling [1976] argue that greater equity 
ownership by insiders improves corporate performance because it better aligns the monetary 
incentives of the manager with other shareholders, since the principal-agent conflict disappears 
when the manager is also the majority shareholder. Second, Shleifer/Vishny [1986] argue that 
even when controlling block holders are not involved in management, they are, nonetheless, more 
capable of monitoring and controlling managers, thereby contributing to better corporate 
performance.7 Third, Stein [1989] and James [1998] argue that family-owned firms may 
make better investment decisions, since families are less myopic and have longer investment 
horizons, with less emphasis on short-term results. The longevity of the family owner’s 
interaction with the firm also implies a higher degree of firm knowledge, better decision making, and 
less shirking, thus leading to better performance. 
 
Concentrated ownership by insiders or an outsider can have a negative effect on firm 
performance due to four principal reasons. First, while high levels of control increase the 
alignment of interests between controlling and minority shareholders, Stulz [1988] and 
                                               
6 There are over 100 studies of firm performance and ownership. Mathiesen [2002] provides a comprehensive review of 
the literature prior to 2002. 
7 Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer [2003] predict that this effect will be even more important in countries with lower investor 
protection where the private benefits of control are greater. 
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Barclay/Holderness [1989] argue that low and intermediate levels of control reduce the 
probability of a takeover and entrench poor managers. Second, managers or controlling 
shareholders may pursue actions that maximize their personal utility but lead to suboptimal 
policies for the firm, such as the consumption of perquisites [Shleifer/Vishny 1986; Morck, 
Shleifer/Vishny 1988; Anderson/Reeb 2003; Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung 2005]. For example, 
family-owners who manage a firm may pay themselves excessive compensation, or the family 
may appoint its members to positions in management over better-qualified external candidates. 
Third, due to the concentration of family wealth in the business and the concern for the family 
legacy, Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung [2005] argue that family-owned firms may display excessive 
risk-aversion and forego profitable expansion strategies or mergers. And lastly, the use of control-
enhancing mechanisms to separate control rights from cash-flow rights weakens the alignment 
between controlling and minority shareholders and increases the incentives for controlling 
shareholders to extract private benefits [DeAngelo/DeAngelo 1985; Johnson et al. 2000]. 
 
Finally, concentrated ownership may have no observable effect on firm performance due to 
endogeneity. Demsetz [1983], Demsetz/Lehn [1985] and Kole/Lehn [1997] argue that ownership 
and firm performance are endogenous and should vary systematically by firm and by industry in 
ways that are consistent with value maximization. Efficient markets will lead to the best firm-
specific ownership structure, as firms with inefficient ownership structures will fail to survive in 
the long run. As a result, there should be no statistical relationship between ownership and firm 
performance, as the observed ownership structure will balance the marginal advantages and 
disadvantages to the firm’s shareholders. Table 1.2 summarizes the mixed results from the 
voluminous empirical literature on ownership and firm performance.  
 
Early studies beginning with Morck, Shleifer and Vishny [1988] document a non-monotonic 
(hump-shaped) relationship between ownership and Tobin’s q ratios that reflects the relative 
importance of alignment and entrenchment effects. They find that valuations increase until 
ownership reaches 5%, then declines until 25%, before increasing again with larger ownership 
stakes. Others find document similar patterns with different break points. The interpretation is 
that either low or high levels of ownership increase alignment and are associated with increasing 
Tobin’s q ratios, while intermediate levels of ownership increase entrenchment and the private 
benefits of control, and are associated with declining Tobin’s q ratios.8 Most studies find no 
relationship when using accounting measures of performance. Other studies beginning with 
Demsetz/Lehn [1985] find no statistically significant relationship between ownership and firm 
                                               
8 This pattern is referred to the trade-off between the alignment and the entrenchment effects [Claessens et al. 2002] 
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performance, consistent with the view that they are endogenous. Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia 
[1999] partly explain these inconsistent results by suggesting that many studies failed to address 
potential reverse-causality between ownership and performance, leading to biased results due to 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
Table 1.2 
Summary of Empirical Literature (Ownership and Performance) 
 
Source: King, Michael R. and Eric Santor. “Family Values: Ownership Structure, Performance and Capital Structure of 
Canadians Firms” Working Paper, Bank of Canada [2007 - 40], p. 30. 
 
The concept that the general characteristics of a firm’s ownership structure can affect 
performance has received considerable attention but few studies have looked at the relationship 
between ownership structure and capital structure. Modern empirical contributions on ownership 
structure and performance include Morck et al. [1988], McConnell/Servaes [1990], 
Hermalen/Weisbach [1991], McConnell/Servaes [1995], Himmelberg et al. [1999] and Cho 
[1999]. This is despite good reasons to believe that there may be interrelations between the 
structures of ownership and capital. Specifically, the managerial approach to capital structure and 
the managerial self-interests hypothesis suggest that corporate financing decisions are influenced 
by managers’ adverse incentives and the incentive for managers to act opportunistically can be 
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influenced by the structure of equity ownership [Demsetz 1983, Shleifer/Vishny 1986, 
Agrawal/Mandelker 1990, and Prowse 1994]. Consequently, the distribution of equity ownership 
may be related to capital structure. 
 
On the other side, the topic of optimal capital structure in influencing the firm performance has 
been the subject of many studies. It has been argued that profitable firms were less likely to 
depend on debt in their capital structure than less profitable ones. It has also been argued that 
firms with a high growth rate have a high debt to equity ratio. Firms are willing to maximize their 
performance, and minimize their financing cost, by maintaining the appropriate capital structure 
or the optimal capital structure.9 In practice, firm managers who are able to identify the optimal 
capital structure are rewarded by minimizing the firm’s cost of finance thereby maximizing the 
firm’s revenue. If a firm’s capital structure influences a firm’s performance, then it is reasonable 
to expect that the firm’s capital structure would affect the firm’s health and its likelihood of 
default. In short, the issue regarding the capital structure and firm performance are important for 
both academics and practitioners. 
 
1.2 PROBLEM DISCUSSION, PURPOSE AND DELIMITATION 
 
Earlier research indicates, relative to the United States and many other well-developed 
economies [La Porta et al. 1999, Claessens et al. 2000, and Lins 2003], that the widespread use 
of pyramidal ownership structures and cross-holdings in East Asia allows insiders to exercise 
effective control over a company, despite owning relatively few of its cash flow rights. Moreover, 
La Porta et al [1998] argue that the absence of strong legal protections and other external 
governance mechanisms (such as takeovers) in many emerging economies further increases the 
severity of agency problems between controlling insiders and outside investors. 
 
The ADB [2000b: 6] finds that, in ‘East Asian countries... where corporate ownership is 
concentrated, corporate management is usually in the hands of controlling shareholders’. Indeed, 
Dyck [2000: 29] comments, in the case of family controlling shareholders, ‘the distinction 
between owners and managers is eliminated in most cases’. Using the Claessens et al. sample for 
East Asia, Dyck [2000] calculates that family controlling shareholders directly participate in 
management 67% of the time. Given this link, protecting minority shareholders from the abuse 
of controlling shareholders becomes the fundamental problem. 
 
                                               
9 See Kraus/Litzenberger [1973], Harris/Raviv [1991] 
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In fact, regardless of the type of ownership structure, there will always be the fundamental risk 
of large shareholders redistributing wealth for self-interest that is not necessarily congruent with 
other stakeholders. However, given the fact that many Asian corporations are family-based, the 
investors in this case are particularly susceptible to abuse. The existence of family-dominated 
corporations presents substantial impediments to increased minority rights. The ability to 
participate is a function of shareholder rights, protection of those rights and exercising the rights. 
The OECD Principles suggest increasing this ability.  
 
Essentially, when granting shareholder rights, the control already held by existing parties 
becomes a problem, especially when we consider the number of shares held by the respective 
parties. In the context of family ownership concentration, that means, by its nature, these 
shareholders will hold a majority of shares. Therefore, increasing minority rights will have little 
effect, as family members will still hold control. From Table 1.1 we see that on average the 
degree of family ownership concentration in the Asian crisis economies exceeds 55%. 
 
However, the Asian Crisis has brought some fundamental changes in Asian corporation’s 
governance practice. Many of them happened as consequences of economic recovery 
agreements between the governments of most affected countries with the IMF (International 
Monetary Fund). Some points of those agreements are about the restructuring of ownership 
portion of family-dominated companies, which are in financial difficulty and become one of the 
sources of crisis, by selling it to outside investors in order to be more transparent and effective 
governance with the final objective is to improve the firm performance. 
 
The thesis’s main problem will be to investigate whether the structure of equity ownership can 
help explain cross-sectional variation in capital structure and performance. Since corporate 
managers and external block holders are two groups of shareholders who have an influence on 
decisions concerning the allocation of the firm’s resources, the study focuses on the effects of 
managerial share ownership and external block ownership on managerial incentives and 
consequently on the leverage ratio and Tobin’s Q. Moreover, despite the widespread interest in 
the way firms make their financing decisions, most of the capital structure research has been 
conducted in the United States. There is limited evidence outside the United States, especially in 
emerging markets, such as in East Asia region. In addition, empirical research on this area, to my 
knowledge, has not been tested to any greater extent with special focus of post-crisis analysis. 
 
This thesis is then distinctive in a number of ways. The theoretical basis of the link between 
ownership structure, capital structure and firm performance is primarily derived from Brailsford et 
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al. [2002] and Gross [2007], that allows for both managerial ownership and external block holder 
problems in firm financing. This framework hypothesizes that managerial ownership and external 
block holder, both determined exogenously, will influence capital structure and firm performance. 
In the light of the specific sample characteristics, this thesis, however, empirically extends 
Brailsford et al. [2002] and Gross [2007] in a number of ways. Firstly, this thesis allows for the 
simultaneity between capital structure and firm performance, often ignored in the literature, but 
recently highlighted by Berger/di Patti [2003]. Ignoring this important simultaneity could however 
bias the effects of ownership on capital structure and firm performance. Indeed, there is 
evidence that effects of ownership cannot be separated from its effect on leverage. Finally, as 
Stulz [1988] and Brailsford et al. [2002] suggest that there could be important non-linearity in 
the effects of ownership on capital structure and firm performance, which is not accounted for by 
some previous investigations. In view of initial non-parametric analyses of the samples, this 
thesis however allows for nonlinearities in the relationships between ownership concentration, 
insider ownership (managerial ownership), capital structure, and firm performance. This is a 
crucial aspect of the thesis’s analysis, especially when one considers the potential importance of 
majority shareholdings, and the potential threshold effects of different levels of concentration 
(51% for example) on capital structure and firm performance. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the effect of Asian Financial Crisis on corporate 
ownership structure, capital structure, and firm performance of the corporations in the most 
affected countries. It also analyzes how they react to the crisis in term of corporate governance. 
 
I will limit the study to the external block ownership model, managerial share ownership model, 
and the effect of incorporated those model on the corporate financing decision and firm 
performance within Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Korea, Philippines, Hong Kong, and Taiwan 
mainly because of the fact that those are the most affected countries in East Asian region. The 
study will not include any studies done on ownership structure and firm performance outside East 
Asia region. This thesis is limited to comprise study done on ownership structure and firm 
performance within East Asia region between the years 2000 - 2001. The reason for choosing 
this time-horizon will be explained in chapter five. 
 
1.3 ECONOMIC RELEVANCE, ANALYTICAL APPROACH AND AGENDA 
 
The impact of ownership structure on company economic performance is one of the most studied 
areas in finance that has varied results and arguments. For example, McConnell/Servaes [1990] 
find a positive effect of ownership concentration on market-to-book value of equity and 
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profitability, by controlling for industry, capital structure and nation effects. Furthermore, they 
propose and support the hypothesis that the identity of large owners - family, bank, institutional 
investor, government, and other companies - has important implications for corporate strategy 
and performance. The effect of ownership concentration is also found to depend on owner 
identity.  
 
On the other hand, studies by Coase [1988] or Demsetz/Lehn [1985] argue that the relation 
between ownership concentration and corporate performance is spurious. In addition, 
Leech/Leahy [1999] found out that control-type effects have no clear effect on a firm’s 
performance. Smith, Cin, and Vodopivec [1997] examine the relation between employee or 
foreign ownership and firm performance. They find that a percentage point increase in foreign 
ownership is associated with about a 3.9 percent increase in value-added and for employee 
ownership with about a 1.4 percent increase. Claessens/Djankov [1999] find that the more 
concentrated the ownership, the higher the firm’s profitability and labor productivity. 
Estrin/Rosevear [1999] explore whether specific ownership forms have led to different 
performances among firms in Ukraine. They refute the hypothesis that private ownership per se 
is associated with improved performance. As a performance proxy, they use profit, sales, and 
employment. 
 
From the perspective above, the effect of ownership structure plays important role in improving 
firm performance. It is based on the fact that the corporation is surely the most important form 
of firm organization. Since corporate ownership is transferable over time and shareholders have 
limited liability for company debts, the corporation is superior in business creation and 
functioning. However, the corporation has its own problem related to the separation of ownership 
and control. It is namely the principal-agent problem.  
 
Corporate governance deals with the ways in which this problem is solved, i.e. how managers 
(agents) can ensure suppliers of finance to corporations (principals) from appropriation. Actually, 
the subject of corporate governance has great practical importance. Series of well-known 
company failures – Maxwell Group, Bank of Credit and Commerce International, Barings Bank 
etc. – are clear manifestation of such importance. A great number of studies refer to corporate 
governance in developed economies but relatively small literature – to emerging and transition 
economies. Asian crisis 1997 demonstrated to all that rotten corporations can lead to severe 
economic disasters not only at national but also at worldwide level. Regarding to the relation 
between ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm performance, it also triggers an 
interesting question about how much the optimum portion of each party in controlling and 
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owning the company is. In this thesis, the question is directed to the most affected countries 
during post-crisis period. It is the economic relevance of this thesis. 
 
The analytical approach of this thesis is relatively traditional. First, the theoretical literature of 
ownership structure, capital structure, and its effect on firm performance are reviewed in order to 
identify the main hypotheses that may govern the relation between ownership structure and the 
company performance. After that, the associated empirical literature is reviewed to clarify what is 
known about the phenomenon and to discuss some differences of the previous researches that 
characterize the study of ownership structure and its effect on company value. Finally, the thesis 
makes its own empirical analyses. In particular, this thesis tests a multivariate regression model 
of the relations between ownership structure and firm performance on a cross-sectional sample 
of 532 companies in seven East Asian countries during the 2000 - 2001 observation periods. In 
this connection, it should be stressed that the proposed statistical model obviously can be no 
more that a simplistic attempt to model a piece of market behavior because reality is simply too 
complex to model completely. 
 
The agenda of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 1 (this chapter), the big picture is outlined. 
It is shown that the study of the relation between ownership structure, capital structure, and the 
firm performance is merely one of many possible tools in determining and analyzing the effect of 
Asian Crisis with regard to corporate governance. Then, in Chapter 2, the basic aspects of 
ownership structure, capital structure and firm performance are reviewed to identify the basis for 
variable selection. Chapter 3, the main theories of ownership structure and capital structure are 
reviewed to identify the possible hypotheses of the problem. In Chapter 4, the main literatures of 
capital structure and firm performance are investigated to classify the potential hypotheses of the 
problem. Then, in Chapter 5, the main theories of ownership structure and firm performance are 
examined to identify the possible hypotheses of the problem. Chapter 6 provides the research 
methodology that develops the research design, sample and data collecting, and the effect of 
ownership structure and capital structure on the company performance. Chapter 7 is devoted to 
testing the model and analyzing the empirical research and Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES, CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND
FIRM PERFOMANCE: BASIC ASPECTS, THEORETICAL
BACKGROUND, AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The research on ownership structure and financial performance has attracted much academic
interest for a long period of time. Adam Smith raised the question as early as 1776 where he
argued that separation of ownership and control in large joint-stock corporations created poor
incentives for professional managers to operate the firms effectively and create the maximum
wealth to the shareholder. However, because this classic incentive alignment argument has got
so much attention, most outsiders to the research on ownership and performance think that it is
the only argument around. After all, if the incentive argument were the only important argument,
it is puzzling that corporations with dispersed ownership are so widespread in modern economies.
Indeed, from 1776 until the present time the joint-stock corporation with dispersed ownership
has become much more common and important for overall economic activity. This development
contradicts the implied prediction of the incentive alignment argument, namely, that such
companies should be less efficient and therefore less able to survive in the long run. In other
words, there are good reasons to believe that there is more to the story about ownership and
performance than the alignment of managerial incentives.
The objective of this chapter is first and foremost to take a closer look on the concept and the
different aspects of ownership structure, capital structure and firm performance. This is
implemented by an elaboration on the different measures and their development in literature.
This chapter will make clear that ownership is not summarizable in one single or a few variables,
but that it constitutes rather a large spectrum of measures due to its different aspects and
dimensions. Therefore, ownership variables can always mirror only a part of the real ownership
structure, which makes the variable selection an important issue in the ownership, leverage, and
performance literature. Then the literature is organized around varying forms of performance
measures. They can be distinguished by the applied data type, market based, accounting based
and hybrid based. Each type raises different problems. The remainder of the chapter will also
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demonstrate some factors that relate to capital structure and the agency problem. These
literatures are discussed one by one and concluding remarks follow.
2.2 THE CONCEPT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
The economic literature offers several explanations and predictions regarding the relationship
between ownership structure and financial performance. The ownership structure concept
essentially covers two dimensions, namely, that of ownership concentration and that of
ownership type [Short 1994: 218].
The ownership concentration renders quantitative information on ownership, representing a
share size or the sum of shares or a concentration index, e.g., Herfindahl coefficient. In other
words, the ownership structure of the corporate sector is situated in a continuum. At one end of
the spectrum, there are companies in which ownership is dispersed among small shareholders,
while control is concentrated in the hands of managers [Berle/Means 1932]. The dispersed
shareholding is observed in countries with “common law” legal system – USA, UK [La Porta et al.
1999]. There, the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system relies on sophisticated legal
protection of investors from appropriation by managers. Generally, voting on important internal
(election of the board of directors) and external (mergers and liquidations) corporate matters is
the main means of control [Easterbrook/Fischel 1983]. Hence, the enforcement of voting rights is
the key issue of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system.
At the other end of the spectrum, there are companies with concentrated ownership of large
investors [Shleifer/Vishny 1986]. In such companies, managers act at the dictate of the
controlling shareholder or debtor. The concentrated ownership is common for countries where it
is quite costly for small investors to exercise their control and cash flow rights. Large investors
enjoy economies of scale and reduced traditional free rider problem. The Continental Europe and
Japan experience corporate governance conducted by large investors [La Porta et al. 1999]. The
empirical evidence suggests positive relation between the concentration and corporate
performance. Thus, Gorton and Schmid [1996] find for German corporations that block holders
improve company performance. In Japanese corporations, large shareholders replace badly
performed managers more often than dispersed ones [Kaplan/Minton 1994].
The ownership structure of the corporate sector deals with ownership concentration as well as
with different owner types. This second dimension, the owner’s identity, is the qualitative
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information about the type of shareholder. This information is important since different owner
types have different incentives, utility functions and means of control. Generally, according to the
largest owner, ownership of a firm can be divided into two main categories – inside and outside
(Figure 2.1). The insiders are managers and employees. The outsiders can be separated into
individuals, organizations, and state. However, each country has specific features and exhibits
some deviations from theoretical classification due to the legislation and the history of
establishing of private firms
Figure 2.1
Types of Ownership Structure
Managerial Ownership. Berle/Means [1933] ascertained the effect of managerial ownership on
corporation performance as early studies of managerial ownership. They argued that diffusion in
ownership renders owners of shares powerless to constraint professional management. What is
more, the higher diffusion of ownership is, the less (but in nonlinear relation) incentives for minor
shareholders to participate in corporate governance. As a result, managers can seek ways to
draw profits from other shareholders.
Employee Ownership. Employee control is not investigated intensively. Nonetheless, it can be
suggested that because of relatively high monitoring costs and “free rider” problem, the
corporate governance conducted under employee ownership is undermined by managerial
opportunistic behavior. Hence, enterprises do not perform at top margin [Hansmann 1996].
However, employee ownership is preferable for companies that for some reasons cannot be
privatized, since it is better than being state governed [Earle/Estrin 1996].
Private Individual Ownership. Individual investors are supposed to create strong controlling
mechanism since their holding in the corporations is non-diversifiable [Shleifer/Vishny 1986].
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Here, individual ownership refers to one with private individuals as dominant shareholders. With higher
concentration of individual properties, stakeholders tend to enforce monitoring and, thus, to
ameliorate firm performance. However, Demsetz/Lehn [1985] doubt such inference. They assert
that the structure of corporate ownership varies systematically in ways that are consistent with
value maximization. Among the variables that explain such variations are firm size, instability of
profit rate, and regulation factors. Therefore, the deviations from the optimal ownership cause
additional costs.
Organization Ownership. Outside control of organizations is affirmed to treat corporations in
the most efficient way due to signaling and special abilities of owners. These organizations, either
firms (banks, investment funds, industrial groups, concerns, multinationals etc.) or institutions
(industrial and financial associations, agencies etc.), can better analyze information, provide new
technologies and funds, have special monitoring skills. Organization ownership is typically the
most concentrated relatively to others. Therefore, this type of owners need not as much legal
protection as individuals need [Shleifer/Vishny 1997].
State ownership. Traditionally, public enterprises are called to cure market failures. As social
costs of monopoly power, externalities, or distribution issues become significant, state control
seems to be economically more desirable [Atkinson/Stiglitz 1980]. However, empirical evidence
suggests that public firms are highly inefficient in comparison to private ones [Boardman/Vining
1989] and privatized ones [Megginson et al. 1994], even in pursuing public interests. There are
several reasons of such inconsistency. State-controlled firms are governed de facto by the
bureaucrats or politicians that have extremely concentrated control rights, but no significant cash
flow rights, since generated profits are channeled to government budget. The absence of
pecuniary motivation in firm governance is aggravated by political goals of the bureaucrats that
are typically different from social welfare [Shleifer/Vishny 1994]. For instance, politicians can
form special interest groups that help them in elections. Such enormous inefficiency of state firms
has entailed a wave of governance transformation in economies around the world in the last two
decades, namely privatization. Generally, privatization is the replacement of public control over
firm with private control. The resulting ownership structure of private owners with matched cash
flow and control rights provides significant improvements of enterprise performance.
2.2.1 Ownership Structure and its Measure
Apart from these two key ownership dimensions, there are also other aspects that form many
shades of measures. One common issue is the general definition of shareholding. Many studies
Chapter 2: Ownership Structure, Capital Structure, and Firm Performance:
Basic Aspects, Theoretical Background, and Empirical Evidence
17
do not use the direct share, but the cohesive ownership, which includes indirect shareholdings.1
These shares are not personally hold by the individual, but controlled by him. They could be
shares legally belonging to family members or close friends.2
Another distinguishing aspect is the level at which the ownership is measured. Early studies only
examined the shareholdings on the first level, i.e., only the direct ownership of the shares of the
considered company. However, with the evolution of stock markets shareholdings became
increasingly complex through multiple control chains, pyramiding, and crossholdings.3 Figure 2.2
gives examples of the complex ownership structures. Firms form a control chain if Firm A directly
controls Firm B, which in turn controls Firm C or a sequence of firms leading to Firm C, each of
which has control over the next one. In a multiple control chain, the control over a company is
executed via a multitude of parallel control chains.4 Pyramiding is a sub-form of control chains,
where every share in the chain has to present a minimum of control, e.g., 20 or 25%.5
Crossholding means a company directly or indirectly controls its own stocks, e.g., Firm A holds
shares of Firm B owning in turn shares of Firm A. Due to this complex ownership structures, the
incorporation of the further levels of ownership and thus the ownership structure of the
shareholding companies became important.6 Due to this complex ownership structures, the
incorporation of the further levels of ownership and thus the ownership structure of the
shareholding companies became important.7
The consideration of complex ownership structures raises the further question of the measured
object: control rights or cash flow rights. Control rights measure the degree of control given by a
share or control chain, cash flow rights measure the cash flow entitled through the share. Both
the size of the rights themselves as well as the degree of their separation matter for share-
holders’ incentive and behavior.8 Control rights can be separated from cash flow rights in two
ways. First, the company can issue classes of shares that differ in terms of their relative
proportion of voting rights and dividend entitlement, e.g., preferred stock or multiple-vote stock.
1 See Demsetz/Lehn [1985], Kamerschen [1968], Leech/Leahy [1991], McConnell/Servaes [1990], McEachern/Romeo [1978],
Mørck et al. [1988], and Palmer [1973b].
2 See Holderness et al. [1999, p. 438] and Mathiesen [2002, pp. 87-88].
3 See Claessens et al. [2000, p. 92], Faccio/Lang [2002, p. 366], and La Porta et al. [1999, pp. 23-25].
4 See Bertrand/Mullainathan [2001, p. 478] and La Porta et al. [1999, pp. 23-25].
5 See Bertrand/Mullainathan [2001, p. 478], Beyer [1996, p. 84], and Grant/Kirchmaier [2005, p. 66].
6 See Beyer [1996, pp. 82-83], Claessens et al. [2000, p. 91], Faccio/Lang [2002, p. 366], and La Porta et al. [1999,
p. 10].
7 See Becht [1999, p. 1073], Claessens et al. [2000, p. 91], Faccio/Lang [2002, p. 366], Franks/Mayer [2001, p. 961], and La
Porta et al. [1999, pp. 23-25].
8 See Becht [1999, p. 1073] and Faccio/Lang [2002, pp. 391-393].
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Second, even in the absence of violations of the one-share-one-vote rule multiple control chains
explain the divergence of control and cash flow rights.9
Figure 2.2
Examples of Complex Ownership Structure
Source: Gross, Kerstin [2007]. “Equity Ownership and Performance” First Edition, Physica-Verlag: Berlin, p. 11.
For the calculation of the size of control and cash flow rights La Porta et al. [1999] developed a
now widely accepted standard methodology, which was followed by Claessens et al. [2002,
2000], Faccio/Lang [2002], and Barontini/Caprio [2005]. Cash flow rights equal the product of
the share percentages of the control chain, whereas the voting right is represented by the lowest
percentage in the control chain. Figure 2.3 gives an example for the calculation of cash flow and
control rights.10
Edwards/Weichenrieder [1999] use a different definition. They measure the cash flow rights as
fraction of total dividends paid and control rights as votes exercised at the last annual
9 See Becht [1999, p. 1073], Claessens et al. [2000, p. 91], Edwards/Weichenrieder [1999, p. 2], Faccio/Lang [2002, p.
372], and Franks/Mayer [2001, p. 961]. For the special studies on dual-class equity see Bebchuk et al. [2000],
Bergstrom/Rydqvist [1990b], DeAngelo/DeAngelo [1985], Grant/Kirchmaier [2005], Hanson/Song [1995], and
Jarrell/Poulsen [1988].
10 See Faccio/Lang [2002, p. 372], Franks/Mayer [2001, p. 950], and La Porta et al. [1999, pp. 9-12].
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shareholder meeting.11 This method may proxy the voting power better than the classical
definition. However, it imposes also high data requirements. Furthermore, the question "if and
how to handle stock options", especially in case of managerial ownership, is still controversial and
difficult to implement.12
Figure 2.3
Examples of Separation and Calculation of Control and Cash Flow Right
Source: Gross, Kerstin [2007]. “Equity Ownership and Performance” First Edition, Physica-Verlag: Berlin, p. 12.
With regard to owner identity, especially the definition of an insider varies in literature. Mørck et
al. [1988], Agrawal/Mandelker [1990] and Loderer/Martin [1997] define only management as
insiders. Hermalin/Weisbach [1991] and Holderness et al. [1999] even just consider the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO)’s shareholding, and Jensen/Murphy [1990] focus on the share size of the
highest paid executive. However, most studies define both managers and directors as insiders.13
Kole [1996] and Short/Keasey [1999] solve the problem by considering both board and manager
shares, but separately.
11 See Edwards/Weichenrieder [1999, pp. 12-13].
12 See Mehran [1995] for an assessment of stock options, control and cash flow rights.
13 See Agrawal/Knoeber [1996], Agrawal/Mandelker [1990], Agrawal/Nagarajan [1990], Cho [1998], Holderness et al.
[1999], Jarrell/Poulsen [1987], and McConnell/Servaes [1990].
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A final classification of measures is referring to the type of variable: non-metric or metric, where
the first is a nominal or cardinal variable, consisting of one or a set of dummy variables.
Following this categorization of the measures and their evolution in literature are further
examined.
2.2.2 Non-metric Measures
Non-metric measures are categorical variables, returning only a dim picture of the ownership
structure. However, their simplicity also eases their use; thus, they were the first measures to be
used in the ownership and performance literature. Table 2.1 gives an overview over most
frequently used non-metric measures.
In earlier literature, a single dummy variable, which distinguishes only two groups of companies,
was used: those with a block holder of a certain size and those without. Consequently, if the
largest share owned by a shareholder or a group of cohesive shareholders is greater than a
particular threshold of the stocks, the firm was classified as owner-controlled (OC). Due to the
assumption that a dispersed ownership with no significant influence of the owner leaves the
control to the management, the other group was labelled as management-controlled (MC). This
appears misleading from a today’s point of view, since the variable mirrors only general
ownership concentration and not managerial ownership.
When using this measure, the share fraction needed to have control over a firm has to be
defined. However, the control ability of a block holder does not only depend on the share size,
but also on other circumstances as for instance the dispersion of the remaining shares.
Consequently, the literature could not agree on a consistent share fraction, thus the defined
threshold varies through the different studies from 5% to 50%. Nevertheless, since the stock
dispersion rose with the development of stock markets, the early American studies show a trend
of dropping thresholds since Berle/Means [1932]: from 20% to 10% by Larner [1966],
Kamerschen [1968], and Holl [1977], reducing to 5% by Villajero [1962] and Chevalier [1969].14
However, in later studies a general variance in definition is visible, e.g., 15% by
Zeckhauser/Pound [1990] and 50% by Denis/Denis [1994].
14 See McEachern/Romeo [1978, p. 354].
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Table 2.1
Non-metric Ownership Measures
Source: Gross, Kerstin [2007]. “Equity Ownership and Performance” First Edition, Physica-Verlag: Berlin, p. 14.
A study that accounts for the dispersion effect on control is Thonet/Poensgen [1979] who used a
classification at 25%, but only if no other shareholder holds 25%. Kania/McKean [1976] tried to
include control capability by not using the sole fraction of share capital of the firm, but in relation
to the total market. Three cohesive shareholders are defined as controlling if they own at least
10% of the 500 largest companies, 15% of the 500-second largest companies or 20% of the
following 800 companies.
Other studies define two thresholds thereby trying to circumvent the definition of one exact
threshold and the resulting fuzziness of the classification around this threshold to improve their
statistical results. The idea is that the resulting middle range contains the companies that cannot
clearly be defined as OC or MC. Omitting the undefined middle range in the analysis would leave
only correct classified companies within the sample.15
15 See Radice [1971] and Sorensen [1974], who define MC for share size below 5% and OC for a share bigger than 15%
and 20% respectively.
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Apart from this consideration of the dispersion of shares, an improvement in the variable’s ability
to proxy actual control was achieved by accounting for active control by shareholders. This is
achieved by splitting condition for the OC classification into two parts. The threshold lies at 10%
if there is an evidence of active control by the shareholder and at 20% if not.16
A next step in the development of ownership measures was the incorporation of the unused but
potentially valuable information of the omitted middle range of concentrations. For example
Palmer [1973b] used all three ranges defined by the two thresholds and categorizes them as
strong-owner-controlled (SOC), weak-owner-controlled (WOC), and management-controlled (MC)
with the thresholds of 10% and 30%.This approach was copied by Stano [1976] and Bothwell
[1980]. Jacquemin/De Ghellinck [1980] used the different labels of “internal control” if smaller
than 5%, “minority control”, and “majority control” if larger than 50%. In addition, Hindley
[1970] uses the deviating nomenclature “intermediate” for ownership concentration between
20% and 40%.
The concept of the classification into OC and MC was brought further forward by Cubbin/Leech
[1983] who developed a statistical definition of ownership control. It is not based on the size of
the largest share, but on the chance of winning a majority vote and therefore might enhance the
variable’s adequacy for control over the firm. A company is owner-controlled if the probability of
winning the vote lies above a defined threshold.17 Leech/Leahy [1991] and Nickell et al. [1997]
are further examples of the implementation of measures on the concept of the winning
probability.
As mentioned above, these variables measure the ownership concentration and do not include
owner’s identity information. However, the identity has high influence on the possibility of control
over the firm, which becomes obvious in the case of the unity of management and owner.18 An
owner, who is at the same time CEO of the company, obviously has higher ability of control over
the company as a non-management owner. Therefore, studies started to incorporate the identity
of the owner into their considerations. Ware [1975] altered the threshold for OC; it is 15% if the
owner is part of the management and 25% else.19 In contrast, McEachern [1975] modified the
classic categorization by adding the group “externally controlled (EC)”. Firms with the largest
share below 4% are MC. If the share is bigger than the threshold and the owner is a
16 See Boudreaux [1973], Elliott [1972], and Monsen et al. [1968]. The limit for MC is located at 5%.
17 See Cubbin/Leech [1983, pp. 357-358].
18 See Jensen [1986] and Jensen/Meckling [1976].
19 Similar, Steer/Cable [1978] changed the threshold to 3% with management representation and 15% without.
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management representative, it is classified as OC otherwise as EC. By a similar approach
Levin/Levin [1982] distinguish institutional ownership, defining a firm with a share above 10%
only as OC if the shareholder is no financial institution, otherwise it is labelled as “financially
controlled (FC)”. Nyman/Silberstan [1978] even introduce eight types of identity, with the most
important being management, financial institutions and government.20
A further method to delineate the identity of the controlling shareholder is adding dummy
variables. Most variables describe management, outside block-holders, family, and institutional
investors.21 These dummy variables present a special form of non-metric variables, the native
categorical measures. The variables presented before converted the underlying metric
information into non-metric dummies, which implies a loss of potentially valuable information. In
contrast, native categorical measures differ in the way that the data is natively non-metric. The
study by Johnson et al. [1985] gives a further example by considering the stock price effects
caused by the sudden death of an insider.22 They use a dummy to indicate whether the deceased
was the founder.
Similarly, Agrawal/Knoeber [1996] and Denis et al. [1997] apply a dummy to reflect whether the
founder is the top manager or not. However, these variables are mainly used as additional
control variables.
2.2.3 Metric Measures
As shown in Table 2.2 metric ownership measures can be distinguished in two general groups:
Concentration Indices, such as the Herfindahl coefficient, and Concentration Ratios. The first are
measures for the symmetry of share size over all shareholders and may not say anything about
the control ability of the largest shareholder. Therefore, they are rarely used in literature with the
exceptions of Demsetz/Lehn [1985] and Leech/Leahy [1991].23 This leaves the concentration
ratios as alternative to the non-metric OC and MC measures, which focus on the concentration of
controlling shareholders.
Ownership concentration ratios are defined as percentage of stock ownership, voting rights or
cash flow rights by the largest or a group of largest shareholders. The ratio is not converted into
20 For the full description of the groups see Nyman/Silberstan [1978, p. 85].
21 See Cubbin/Leech [1986], Denis/Denis [1994], and Steer/Cable [1978].
22 Slovin/Sushka [1993] performed an akin and more detailed study of this scenario.
23 However, both studies use the Herfindahl index only as additional measure.
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non-metric classifications, but used for analysis as it is. The number of shareholders consolidated
in the ratio varies with the most important ones being the largest, the three largest, the five
largest or the twenty largest shareholders. The chosen value often reflects the average national
stock dispersion, since in high-dispersed firms an alliance of shareholders might be needed to
exploit possible benefits from block holdings. Therefore, the large sum of twenty shareholders is
only used in studies on USA or UK, where the ownership is very diluted. The application of such
high sums to continental European countries does not appear reasonable considering that the
median of the sum of the twenty largest shareholders is at 37.7% for the USA and at 60.5% for
the UK.24 At the same time, the continental European median of largest share is eight times
higher than the US one and four times higher than the UK one.25 However, the studies using
such high sums of shareholding often employ several variables to avoid a proxy bias. For
example Demsetz/Lehn [1985] use ratios of the largest, five largest and twenty largest
shareholdings. Leech/Leahy [1991] even use additionally the ten largest shareholders. In
contrast, Pedersen/Thomsen [1999], that their investigation analyzes the European continental
countries, use only the largest share.
Table 2.2
Metric Ownership Measures
Source: Gross, Kerstin [2007]. “Equity Ownership and Performance” First Edition, Physica-Verlag: Berlin, p. 17.
These concentration measures can also be extended by the additional information of the owner’s
identity. By doing so, the concentration of the different shareholder types is reflected. These
24 See Demsetz/Lehn [1985] for the USA and Leech/Leahy [1991] for the UK.
25 The median of the largest share lies below 5% for US firms and at 9.9% for UK firms compared to a European median
of 39.1%.
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measures do not substitute measures of general ownership concentration; instead, they
represent a different, additional aspect of the ownership structure.
Most studies using special identity measures, such as insider and institutional ownership, employ
the total sum of shares held by one identity group.26 Contrarily, Demsetz/Lehn [1985] and
Agrawal/Mandelker [1990] use the sum of the five largest shares or the Herfindahl index of
ownership.
A further dimension distinguishing the metric measures is the unit used. For example, measures
of insider ownership are mainly notated in percentage of shares.27 In contrast, Kaplan [1989] and
Holderness et al. [1999] also use the dollar value of shares as basic unit.
Furthermore, a qualifying minimum share may be imposed, e.g., McConnel/Servaes [1990] and
Loderer/Martin [1997] consider outside shareholders under the condition of a minimum share of
5%.28
Wruck [1989] and Himmelberg et al. [1999] treat some unconventional metric measures. Wruck
[1989] runs an event study on the changes in ownership concentration in percentage.
Himmelberg et al. [1999] employ in addition to the standard total sum of managerial
shareholding also the average share per top-level manager. Their main argument for doing so is
that “[...] theoretical models generally emphasize managerial ownership levels relative to the
managers’ wealth and not simply the fraction of firm equity held by managers”.29 Unfortunately,
they only integrate this measure in the regression analyzing the determinants of managerial
ownership and eliminate it in their further analysis.
2.3 FIRM (FINANCIAL) PERFORMANCE
Since economic performance is the basic goal of every firm, its measurement is one of the most
interesting and challenging areas of inquiry.30 Due to the complexity of the issue, it is unlikely to
ever measure performance perfectly. Given the multitude of concepts in literature, the objective
26 See Agrawal/Mandelker [1990], Jarrell/Poulsen [1987], Loderer/Martin [1997], McConnell/Servaes [1990, 1995],
Short/Keasey [1999], and Slovin/Sushka [1993].
27 See Agrawal/Knoeber [1996], Agrawal/Mandelker [1990], Cho [1998], Jarrell/Poulsen [1987], Loderer/Martin [1997],
McConnell/Servaes [1990], and Mørck et al. [1988].
28 For further studies, see Agrawal/Knoeber [1996], Mehran [1995], and Short/Keasey [1999].
29 Himmelberg et al. [1999, p. 370].
30 For a discussion on performance measures by research discipline see Hofer [1983].
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of discussion presented in the following section is not to give a comprehensive picture of the
literature but to focus on the performance measures common for the ownership literature.
The performance measures discussed in this section are divided into two general groups, market-
based and accounting-based measures, with the first relying on market data and the latter on
accounting information. A third group is hybrid measures using both types of data. The three
groups and the measures most relevant for the ownership literature are shown in Table 2.3.
The following section is structured in three parts. After market-based measures are briefly
discussed in the next section, Section 2.3.2 and Section 2.3.3 elaborate on accounting-based and
hybrid measures respectively.
2.3.1 Market-based Performance Measures
Market-based measures find their main usage in event studies. Their characteristic of fast
adaptation to information and their daily availability qualifies them for this methodology.
The typical measure is the cumulated abnormal return (CAR) with the idea to measure potential
abnormal market returns related to a particular event. First, the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM) is applied to estimate a function of the daily stock return of each stock in relation to the
return of the market portfolio. This estimation typically uses a period of 100 to 200 days. As next
step, the estimated stock returns are compared to the ones actually observed for a short period
around the particular event:
ARjt = Rjt – ( aˆ j + bˆ j Rmt)
With ARjt as the abnormal return of company j at day t, Rjt as the observed stock return of
company j at day t, aˆ j and bˆ j as estimated parameters from the CAPM and Rmt as the stock
return of the market portfolio.31 Subsequently, the abnormal returns of the considered period are
summed up to the CAR:
CARj = 

2
1
j
j
d
dt
jtAR
Where dj1 and dj2 are the starting and ending dates of the considered period around the event
regarding company j. Finally, the CARs of the different firms are consolidated to an average
31 For information on the CAPM see Lintner [1965], and Sharpe [1963, 1964].
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cumulative abnormal return, which is tested for statistical significance.32 Since the event study
approach is not relevant for the following empirical analysis and the CAR is not usable for a one-
year period, further issues concerning this measure are neglected.
Table 2.3
Selection of Measures of Financial Performance
Source: Gross, Kerstin [2007]. “Equity Ownership and Performance” First Edition, Physica-Verlag: Berlin, p. 24.
32 See Mathiesen [2002, pp. 118-119]. For detailed calculation methods and an assessment of different types of CAR see
Mathiesen [2002, pp. 120-131].
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In contrast to the commonly used CAR, the second market-based measure, market return, is
rarely applied in the performance and ownership literature. It equals the growth in stock value
over a specific period assuming that dividends are reinvested and thereby captures the income of
shareholders in form of dividends and capital gains from stock price changes.33
One reason for its rare usage is given by Demsetz/Lehn [1985], who note that the stock market
rates of return presumably adjust for the ownership structure and its effects on performance.
Stock prices incorporates changes in expectations about future cash flows and the cost of capital.
Consequently, a preferable ownership structure leads to a higher stock price. However, capital
gains due to stock price changes do not reflect a preferable ownership structure, as soon as the
ownership information is reflected in the stock price. Market returns should be equal for all firms
with equal risks in periods when expectations are constant. Hence, they give only valuable
information about the relationship of ownership and performance in the case of an unexpected
event.
Nevertheless, this does not have to be the case for very long time periods as ten years or more.
For example, if it were possible to measure the market return of the entire lifetime of a company,
the market return would also cover the stock price changes. It dues to the ownership structure
and then could be regressed on the average ownership over the lifetime. However, such an
approach would provoke problems caused by missing data, the controlling of other effects and
the ambiguity of calculating averages. Furthermore, it is impossible to include the implied
theoretical causation and timing issues into the model.34
Despite the disadvantages of market return as a financial performance measure in performance
and ownership studies, a few studies apply it. Yet, militating in their favor is their use of long-
term averages and the additional use of an accounting-based or hybrid measure.35
2.3.2 Accounting-based Performance Measures
33 See Chaganti/Damanpour [1991, p. 484], Holl [1977, p. 263], and Stano [1976, p. 672].
34 See Mathiesen [2002, pp. 103-104].
35 Elliott [1972] uses a three-years-average, Stano [1976] a six-years-average; Holl [1977], Levin/Levin [1982], McEachern
[1975], and Thonet/Poensgen [1979] extend the time period to ten years and Sorensen [1974] even uses 18 years.
Chaganti/Damanpour [1991], Levin/Levin [1982], Sorensen [1974] and Thonet/Poensgen [1979] use return on equity,
return on assets and/or the market-to-book ratio as additional performance measures.
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One significant advantage of accounting-based performance measures is that they are not
requiring an exchange listing; thus, also private and small firms may be examined. Furthermore,
they are easy to interpret.
The accounting-based performance measures most common in the ownership literature are
return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA).36 They are defined as:
Earnings after interest expenses and taxes
ROE =
Shareholders’ equity
Earnings before interest expenses and taxes
ROA =
Total assets
The ROE measures only the return on assets of the equity owners, whereas the ROA aggregates
the return of equity-holders and debt-holders. This fact leads to three arguments militating in
favor for a preference of ROE over ROA in equity ownership and performance studies. First,
generally financial performance is based on the shareholder value concept, which is stronger
reflected in the pure equity focus of the ROE than by the diluted equity returns of the ROA.
Second, regarding the effect of performance on equity ownership the pecuniary benefits of
shareholders play an important role. These depend stronger on the ROE than on the ROA also
including the debt-holders’ return. Consequently, the ROE should lead to a more significant
relationship of ownership and performance improving the results. Finally, also other benefits
gained by shareholders through their control rights can only be derived from residual profits.
However, the rents for corporate debt are paid according to predetermined contracts and
therefore not part of the residual profits. Thus again the ROE should better proxy the financial
performance and its effect on ownership. The inclusion of the return of debt-holders would again
dilute the performance measure and its relation to ownership. However, the discussion of ROE or
ROA appears irrelevant when taking a look at the seven studies that used both measures.37 They
obtain similar coefficients for both. However, as predicted by the arguments above, the ROA
sometimes appears insignificant in contrast to the highly significant ROE as in the study of
Chaganti/Damanpour [1991].
36 For studies using the ROE see Boudreaux [1973], Demsetz/Lehn [1985], Demsetz/Villalonga [2001], Gugler et al. [2004],
Jarrell/Poulsen [1988], Kamerschen [1968], Leech/Leahy [1991], Mak/Li [2001], Monsen et al. [1968], Mudambi/Nicosia
[1998], Palmer [1973a,b], Pedersen/Thomsen [1999], and Short/Keasey [1999]; for those using ROA see Bøhren/Ødegaard
[2003], Gedajlovic/Shapiro [2002], Himmelberg et al. [1999], Kole [1996], McConnell/Servaes [1990], and Mehran [1995].
For studies applying both measures see Chaganti/Damanpour [1991], Denis/Denis [1994], Kesner [1987], Lehmann/Weigand
[2000], Murali/Welch [1989], Oswald/Jahera Jr. [1991], Schellenger et al. [1989], and Steer/Cable [1978].
37 See Chaganti/Damanpour [1991], Denis/Denis [1994], Kesner [1987], Murali/Welch [1989], Oswald/Jahera Jr. [1991],
Schellenger et al. [1989], and Steer/Cable [1978].
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Further accounting-based performance measures, as the return on investment or the earnings
per share, are rarely used and will be neglected in the further conduct.38
When calculating accounting-based variables the return measure or the kind of income to be
used, has to be carefully defined. Book return can be disaggregated into three components:
1. income from ordinary operating activities,
2. income from extraordinary activities, and
3. non-operating income.
The latter stems from non-operating activities, such as rents and patents but also from return on
non-operating financial assets. It could be argued that these returns are arbitrary and mainly
elude from the management’s influence and are therefore not related to ownership structure.
The inclusion of non-operating results would bias the actual performance measure. An objection
is that managers decide on the assets creating non-operating income. For example, the selection
of financial assets is part of the responsibilities of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO). Nevertheless,
the maximization of non-operating income is normally not the function of the CFO.
The second income component originates from extraordinary activities. These are infrequent and
unusual events, e.g., restructuring activities or changes in accounting principles. The inclusion of
the income of extraordinary activities may also cause potential problems. It distorts the given
picture of regular performance and hence diminishes the comparability of companies. Yet, this is
only the case for small samples. Due to the Central Limit Theorem, large samples are not
affected by these one-time effects.39 Therefore, the exclusion of extraordinary income from large
samples studies would only result in a loss of information.
A further problem of accounting-based measures is the accounting bias. The comparability of
accounting variables may suffer from different accounting standards applied by the companies.
In addition, the reporting entities are incentivized to distort the data.
38 For studies applying the return on investment see Gugler et al. [2003a, 2004] and Schellenger et al. [1989], for studies
applying the earnings per share ratio see Kesner [1987] and Kim et al. [1988].
39 The Central Limit Theorem states: Given a population with any distribution and taking random samples of size n
from that population, the sample means () will be approximately normally distributed with a mean equal to the mean
of the population and a variance equal to the variance of the population divided by n. The higher n, the closer the
distribution will be to be normal, i.e., for a population with the mean μ and the variance σ2, the mean of a drawn
sample is limb  N  = N (μ, n
2
 ).
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2.3.3 Hybrid Performance Measure
While the two previous parts discussed measures that purely rely on either market or accounting
data, the following measures, the market-to-book ratio (M/B) and the Tobin’s Q (Q), use both,
market and accounting data.40
The M/B is defined as market value of the firm’s liabilities divided by the accounting value of
these liabilities. It measures how much market value is generated by the stock of invested
capital. There are two ways to calculate the M/B:
1. market value of stock divided by the shareholders’ equity (market-to-equity), or
2. market value of stock and debt divided by total assets (market-to-assets).
These definitions resemble the accounting-based measures ROE and ROA; they apply the same
denominator and instead of the accounting earnings, they use the market values of liabilities in
the nominator. Hence, the discussion, whether one of the two methods of calculation is
preferable, takes an analogous course to the discussion of ROE and ROA in Section 2.3.2. As a
result, the market-to-equity ratio seems to be advantageous over the market-to-assets ratio.
The usage of market value of liabilities yields in two advantages of the M/B over the accounting-
based measures. First, the inclusion of extraordinary items is no issue in the case of the M/B.
Second, market data cannot be manipulated by management, as accounting data can.
Nevertheless, as the M/B includes book values, it is not completely free of the accounting bias.
Furthermore, the reliance on market data creates also a disadvantage of the M/B. Sudden
outburst and speculative market movements that are not motivated by changes in the
expectations can make it less representative as performance measure.
The advantages and disadvantages do not only apply to the M/B but also to the second hybrid
measure, the Tobin’s Q. Tobin [1969] introduced the concept of the Tobin’s Q as the ratio of
market value to replacement values of a firm’s assets.41 Since then it has been frequently used as
performance measure in the ownership literature.42 The original definition of Tobin makes the
40 In principle, the Tobin’s Q should be categorized as a market-based measure. However, the ideal composition of pure
market data is mostly replaced by an approximation including accounting data.
41 See Tobin [1978].
42 The following studies use the Tobin’s Q: Barnhart/Rosenstein [1998], Bøhren/Ødegaard [2003], Chang [2003], Chen et
al. [1993], Cho [1998], Cui/Mak [2002], DaDalt et al. [2003], Demsetz/Villalonga [2001], Gugler et al. [2004],
Hermalin/Weisbach [1991], Himmelberg et al. [1999], Loderer/Martin [1997], Mak/Li [2001], McConnell/Servaes [1990, 1995],
Monsen et al. [1968], Mørck et al. [1988], Palia/Lichtenberg [1999], and Weber/Dudney [2003].
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Tobin’s Q theoretically a market-based measure. However, since it is often estimated on the basis
of accounting and market data, it is here categorized as a hybrid.
The Tobin’s Q is closely related to the M/B. However, in contrast to the M/B using the book value
of the total assets as denominator, the Tobin’s Q applies the replacement values of assets.
Consequently, instead of measuring the financial performance of the existing assets, the Tobin’s
Q measures the financial performance of a new investment assuming the possibility to reproduce
the entire existing production capacity. It is profitable to invest in the reproduction of the
production capacity as long as the Tobin’s Q is above one. As a consequence, while the M/B and
other performance measures are present and past oriented and state if it were profitable to have
invested in a company, the Tobin’s Q has a future orientation and is therefore rather an
investment profitability measure. This difference in explanatory power creates a potential
problem: The Tobin’s Q is no direct measure of financial performance but a proxy. This may
cause a proxy error in the variables, which results in lower significance levels if it is used as
endogenous variable, and in inconsistent variables if it is used as explanatory variable.43
The quality of a proxy and therefore the strength of the proxy error depend on its correlation
with direct measures. Fortunately, in the case of Tobin’s Q there are several arguments for a high
correlation with financial performance and consequently for an adequacy as performance
measure. Companies with a high Tobin’s Q find it easier to expand their capacity and hence to
make higher returns. This does not mean that a firm with a low Tobin’s Q cannot achieve the
same, but it is more difficult and may take longer. Consequently, a high correlation exists
especially for shorter time horizons. Furthermore, high book and market returns should condition
high market values and thus a high Tobin’s Q. Additionally, the issue of measurement errors is
not a problem limited to the Tobin’s Q, but seems to apply to all financial performance measures.
Finally, Chung/Pruitt [1994] state its similarity to the concepts of economic and market value
added and forecast even a gain in importance of the Tobin’s Q by virtue its advantages as
standardized measure.44 Regarding the ownership literature, the probably most important, but
practical reason for its usage is that it produces next to the M/B the most significant estimates in
regressions.
Unfortunately, the calculation of the Tobin’s Q can be very complicated and complex, especially
for continental European countries. Their accounting standards allow companies to report historic
purchase values, in contrast to Anglo-American accounting standards that require a reporting of
43 For detailed information see Maddala [1992, Chapter 11].
44 See Chung/Pruitt [1994, p. 74].
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current values. This complicates the estimation of the replacement values. To cope with these
problem different approaches evolved which can be classified into two general competing groups.
The first approach is a computationally costly and complex algorithm, which demands
sophisticated programming. It uses an extensive set of financial statement information as
estimation basis for both market and replacement values. The data is then adjusted for factors
that call for a systematic divergence between market and accounting values. This effort yields
extremely accurate estimates.45 Several variants of the approach are currently in use. They all
base on the first calculation method of Lindenberg/Ross [1981], with the most commonly used
enhancements developed by Hall [1999], Lewellen/Badrinath [1997], Lee/Tompkins [1999], and
Perfect/Wiles [1994]. Exemplarily, the calculation formula of the Lindenberg/Ross [1981]
approach omitting the adjustment procedure will be explained:46
MVt MVDt + MVCSt + MVPSt
QLR = RCt ≈ BVTAt + (RCFAt – BVFAt) + (RCINVt – BVINVt)
where QLR = Tobin’s Q estimate by Lindenberg/Ross [1981]
MVt = year-end market value of outstanding financial claims,
RCt = year-end replacement costs of production capacity,
MVDt = year-end market value of outstanding debt,
MVCSt = year-end market value of outstanding common stock,
MVPSt = year-end market value of outstanding preferred stock,
BVTAt = year-end book value of total assets,
RCFAt = year-end replacement costs of fixed assets,
BVFAt = year-end book value of fixed assets,
RCINVt = year-end replacement costs of inventories, and
BVINVt = year-end book value of inventories.
By this formula, the complexity and high data needs of the Perfect/Wiles’s Tobin’s Q become
obvious.47 As a result, the costly approaches suffer from a sample-selection bias and may cause a
loss of up to 20% in sample size.48
45 See DaDalt et al. [2003, p. 537].
46 See Lindenberg/Ross [1981, pp. 10-17].
47 The other techniques as the ones of Lindenberg/Ross [1981] and Hall [1999] have even higher data requirements,
making it hard to implement them.
48 See DaDalt et al. [2003, p. 551].
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On this account and due to the high effort, researchers developed a more simple-group of
approximations for the Tobin’s Q to circumvent the complex accurate calculation. Hence,
competing estimation approaches evolved using a comparatively small set of financial statement
information with minimal adjustments. An important representative is the approximation by
Chung/Pruitt [1994]. It estimates the Tobin’s Q as follows:49
MVEt + PSt + BVINVt + LTDEBTt + CLt - CAt
QCP = TAt
where QCP = Tobin’s Q estimate by Chung/Pruitt [1994],
MVE = year-end value of common stock,
PS = liquidation value of preferred stock,
BVINV = year-end book value of inventories,
LTDEBT = year-end book value of long-term debt,
CL = year-end book value of current liabilities,
CA = year-end book value of current assets, and
TA = book value of total assets.
The liquidation value of preferred stock is used due to difficulties in obtaining price quotes for
preferred stock. It can be calculated by aggregating the preferred stock market value and
dividing it by Standard & Poor’s preferred stock yield index.50
These approximations, of course, do not yield as accurate results as the original calculations do.
However, Chung/Pruitt [1994] also verify the good approximation quality of their approach by
comparing their measure to the Tobin’s Q of Lindenberg/Ross [1981] where they find a 2 of at
least 96%.51 Furthermore, DaDalt et al. [2003] also analyzed the quality of the Tobin’s Q of
Chung/Pruitt [1994] by benchmarking it against the calculation method of Perfect/Wiles [1994].52
They concluded that the simple technique is preferable, except for cases where extremely precise
estimates are needed and a sample-selection bias is no issue.53 In addition, DaDalt et al. [2003]
further found both approaches are significantly related to a wide range of financial performance
measures.
49 See Chung/Pruitt [1994, p. 71].
50 See Lindenberg/Ross [1981, pp. 10-11].
51 See Chung/Pruitt [1994, pp. 71-74].
52 For the calculation of the Tobin’s Q of Perfect/Wiles [1994] see Perfect/Wiles [1994, p. 322].
53 See DaDalt et al. [2003, pp. 550-551].
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Theoretically, the value of the Tobin’s Q is one if the firm is traded at the exact replacement
costs of its assets. A Tobin’s Q above one implies that market value is greater than replacement
value of the company’s recorded assets. These high values can result from some unmeasured or
unrecorded assets of the company or positive earnings expectations reflected in the market
value. Contrary, if the Tobin’s Q is less than one, the market value is less than replacement value
of the assets. This equals an undervaluation, which makes the company a possible takeover
target, since it is traded at a value less than the value of its parts. Both over- and undervaluation
should be regulated by the market in the long run, thus the company is priced at its reproduction
costs. Hence, on an aggregate basis the Tobin’s Q should tend to be mean reverting, converging
at one.54
However, since the Tobin’s Q reflects the over- undervaluation, and markets can be over- or
undervaluated as total, the Tobin’s Q in practice also depends on the general market valuation
and therefore the economic situation. Due to this sensitivity to the general economic
environment, the Tobin’s Q is often far from one and varying strongly over time, as shown in
Figure 2.4. In the period from 1900 to 2004, the average Tobin’s Q for the United States tended
to revert to 0.63 instead of one as predicted by Tobin.55
Figure 2.4
Historic Values of Tobin’s Q in the USA
Source: Gross, Kerstin [2007]. “Equity Ownership and Performance” First Edition, Physica-Verlag: Berlin, p. 32.
54 See Tobin [1978, p. 422].
55 It varied in values between low 0.27 in 1920 and 1.83 in 1999. See Smithers/ Wright [2000].
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2.4 THE PREVIOUS RESEARCHES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES IN ASIA
Researches about ownership structure, capital structure, and firm performance show varied
results. It becomes interesting when we analyze some research findings that show the ownership
characteristics of Asian corporations and the incentive effect of concentrated ownership. This
section begins with an overview of the ownership structures of firms in Asia, followed by a
discussion of the causes of the ownership structures. The empirical evidences then discuss how
the ownership structures delineate the incentives of managers and owners of the firms, how they
affect corporate policies, and the roles of ownership structures in affecting the economic
performance and valuation of firms. At the final of this section, it is given empirical evidences
that relate to capital structure in Asia.
2.4.1 Ownership Characteristics of Asian Corporations
Unlike companies in the U.S. and U.K. whose shares are diffusely held, one or several members
of a family tightly hold shares of a typical Asian corporation. The company is often affiliated with
a business group also controlled by the same family, with the group consisting of several to
numerous public and private companies. The family achieves effective control of the companies
in the group by means of stock pyramids and cross-shareholdings, which can be quite
complicated in structure. Moreover, voting rights possessed by the family are frequently higher
than the family’s cash flow rights on the firm. Voting rights consequently exceed formal cash-flow
rights, especially in Indonesia, Japan, and Singapore. Claessens et al. [1999] find that more than
two-thirds of firms are controlled by a single shareholder. Separation of management from
ownership control is rare, and the top management of about 60% of firms that are not widely
held, is related to the family of the controlling shareholder. These findings have important
implications for the ability and incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate from minority
shareholders, as shown in a companion paper.56
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang [2000] report these ownership characteristics in detail for a large
sample, 2,980 of listed companies in nine Asian economies. Significant cross-country differences
exist, however. Corporations in Japan, for example, are generally widely held, while corporations
in Indonesia and Thailand are mainly family controlled. State control is significant in Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The separation of ownership and control is most
56 See Claessens et al. [1999, p.82]
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pronounced among family-controlled firms and among small firms. In Korea, Singapore, and
Taiwan, large family-controlled firms also display a significant wedge between ownership and
control. Claessens et al. [2000] find that older firms are more likely to be family controlled, as are
smaller firms. The concentration of control generally diminishes with the level of a country's
economic development.
The evidence also suggests that in some countries a significant share of corporate assets rests in
the hands of a small number of families. At the extreme, 16.6% and 17.1% of the total value of
listed corporate assets in Indonesia and the Philippines, respectively, can be traced to the
ultimate control of a single family. The largest ten families in Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Thailand control half of the corporate assets in our sample, while the largest ten families in Hong
Kong and Korea control about a third of the corporate sector. The exception is Japan, where
family control is insignificant. The concentrated family ownership is further confirmed in several
single-economy studies, including Joh [2003] on South Korea, Yeh, Lee, Woidtke [2001] on
Taiwan, and Wiwattanakantang [2003] on Thailand.
Although high ownership concentration is common among Asian corporations, the extensiveness
of the cross-shareholding or pyramid structures varies across Asian economies. Although quite
popular in Korea and Taiwan according to the cited studies, in Thailand almost 80 percent of the
controlling shareholders do not employ cross-shareholding or pyramid structures. In addition to
family, the state also controls a significant number of listed companies in several economies,
such as in Singapore and predominately so in China. Unlike Japan, control by financial institutions
is less common in developing Asia. Individual or institutional investors typically only hold minority
portion of corporate shares.
2.4.2 The Literature on Ownership Structure in East Asia
As surveyed in Rodrik [1997], numerous scholars have examined the performance of East Asian
corporations over the last four decades, but their ownership structure and the separation
between ownership and control remain largely unknown. Several studies on corporate
governance, which have done in Japan,57 point to the significance of keiretsu groups. These
studies focus, however, on company performance, and do not attempt to trace the ownership of
each company to its ultimate owners and identify those owners by type and control stake. The
57 See Aoki [1990]; Prowse [1992]; Hoshi et al. [1991]; Kaplan [1994].
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exception is Lim [1981] who studies in detail the ownership structures of the largest 100
corporations in Malaysia.
There do exist, however, a number of case studies that describe the ownership and control
structures of some of the largest business groups in East Asian countries: Taylor [1998] for the Li
Ka-shing group in Hong Kong, Sato [1993] for the Salim group in Indonesia, Okumura [1993] for
the Mitsubishi group in Japan, Taniura [1993] for the Lucky Goldstar group in Korea, Koike
[1993] for the Ayala group in the Philippines, Numazaki [1993] for the Tainanbang group in
Taiwan, Taniura [1989] for the Formosa group in Taiwan, Suehiro [1993] for the Charoen
Pokphand group in Thailand, and Vatikiotis [1997] for the Dhanin Chearavanont group in
Thailand.
These case studies provide us with insights into the evolution of corporate ownership and control
in East Asia. The findings suggest that the dominance of most business groups lies in the
privileges that they solicit from the government: exclusive exporting or importing rights,
protection from foreign competition for extensive periods of time, granting of monopoly power in
the local market, procurement of large government contracts, etc. The case study literature does
not allow, however, for cross-country comparisons; neither does it document the precise
mechanisms through which the owners are able to exercise and extend their control.
The recent contributions of La Porta et al. [1998] and La Porta et al. [1999] go a long way
towards filling this gap in our knowledge. The former study documents the ownership structure
of the ten largest non-financial corporations for a cross-section of 49 countries, including nine
East Asian countries. The results show that although ownership concentration of East Asian
corporations is high, it is not significantly different from that in other countries at similar levels of
economic and institutional development. The latter study investigates in great detail the control
structure of the largest 20 publicly traded corporations in 27 rich countries, including four (Hong
Kong, Japan, Korea, and Singapore) East Asian countries. It traces control to the ultimate owners
of each company and distinguishes among five types of owners. Ownership in the majority of
Japanese and Korean corporations is found to be widely dispersed; corporations in Hong Kong
are predominantly controlled by families, while about half of the sampled companies in Singapore
are controlled by the state.
La Porta et al. [1999] also examine the means through which control is enhanced. The study
shows that owners extend their resources through the use of pyramiding and management
appointments, as well as through cross-ownership and the (infrequent) use of shares that have
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more votes. They document that control of East Asian corporations can be achieved with
significantly less than an absolute majority share of the stock, as the probability of being a single
controlling owner through holding only 20% of the stock is very high (above 80% across the four
East Asian countries).
2.4.3 Causes of Ownership Concentration
Why is corporate ownership so highly concentrated in Asia? Why does family ownership dominate
other form of ownership? How has ownership structures evolved over time? What can we say
about the future of family ownership? Most of these questions have not been adequately
addressed empirically in general or for Asia specifically. The body of property rights literature to
date emphasizes the roles of customs, social norms, and law and legal systems in shaping the
structure of property rights and governance systems. More specifically, the literature points some
considerations to the balance between public and private enforcement of property rights as
affecting the degree of concentrated ownership [Eggertsson 1990].
The argument is as follows. Both individual owners and the state can enforce property rights. In
economies where the state does not effectively enforce property rights, enforcement by
individual owners will be most important. The structure of share ownership itself will then affect
the degree to which corporate contracts can and will be enforced because it affects owners’
abilities and incentives to enforce their rights. One prediction from this framework is that
ownership that is more concentrated will be observed in economies where property rights are not
well enforced by the state. Without relying on the state, controlling owners obtain the power
(through high voting rights) and the incentives (through high cash flow rights) to negotiate and
enforce corporate contracts with various stakeholders, including minority shareholders,
managers, laborers, material suppliers, customers, debt holders, and governments. All parties
involved in the corporation prefer this outcome as they share, although to different degrees, in
the benefits of this concentrated ownership through better firm performance.
Using this framework, Shleifer/Vishny [1997] suggest that the benefits from concentrated
ownership are relatively larger in countries that are generally less developed, where property
rights are not well defined and/or not well protected by judicial systems. La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, and Shleifer [1999] confirm this proposition empirically as they show that the ownership
stakes of the top three shareholders of the largest listed corporations in a broad sample of
countries around the world are associated with weak legal and institutional environments.
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The weak state enforcement of property rights is the most probable cause of the concentrated
ownership of Asian corporations as well, as they often confront weak legal systems, poor law
enforcement, and corruption. Likewise, the weak property right systems in Asia may also explain
why family-run business groups have been the dominant organizational forms. Family ownership
and groups are institutional arrangements. They facilitate transactions, are that, the transaction
costs among family members and closely affiliated corporations face a lower degree of
information asymmetry and less hold-up problems that may otherwise prevail in transactions
among unaffiliated parties. Another related reason for the prevalence of groups in Asia may be
poorly developed external markets, both financial, managerial and other factor markets, which
tends to favor internal markets for the allocation of resources.
2.4.4 Empirical Evidence on Capital Structure in Developing Countries (Asian
Countries)
Hamid/Singh [1992], who analyze the corporate finance characteristics of the top 50
manufacturing firms in India, Thailand, Jordan, Malaysia, Taiwan, Mexico, Pakistan, Zimbabwe
and South Korea over the period 1980-1987, find that firms in developing countries used less
internal finance than their developed economy counterparts did. They attribute this to different
growth rates, and to lower retention ratios, rather than, for example, to the distorting influences
of inflation which has had a major influence in at least some developing economies. Atkin/Glen
[1992] and Singh [1995] reach similar conclusions. As with firms that are found within the
developed economies, the use of internal sources of finance does vary across developing
countries. Atkin/Glen [1992] survey macroeconomic data on the corporate sector in several
developing economies (Zimbabwe, Pakistan, Malaysia, India and South Korea), and find that
Zimbabwean and Pakistani firms rely most heavily on internal finance: 58.5% and 58.3%
respectively of all sources, whilst South Korean firms were least dependent with 12.8%.58 They
argued that, as South Korea has a more advanced financial system, it provides a greater number
of external financing options for investment projects; and, indeed, South Korean firms do use a
greater amount of external finance, both equity and long-term debt, than do Pakistani firms.
Cobham/Subramaniam [1998] find that Indian firms use rather more equity and less retained
earnings than do their UK counterparts.
Hamid /Singh [1992] and Singh [1995] find that firms found within developing economies rely
more heavily on equity than on debt to finance growth relative to their counterparts in the
58 See also Guariglia [1999].
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developed economies. A reverse pecking order is observed. Singh [1995] argues that the
dependence of firms in developing economies on capital markets is due to:
1. active government sponsorship, such as privatization, and specific policies that encourage the
demand and supply of funds;
2. financial liberalization which has resulted in higher real interest rates and therefore reduced
demand for bank finance; and
3. rising price-earnings ratios that have reduced the cost of equity capital.
Cobham/Subramaniam [1998] note that these conclusions are puzzling, given the developing
countries’ lax accounting and auditing protocols, which increase information imperfections,
their less well-defined property rights, and small and inefficient capital markets.
Taken together, these factors suggest that firms will use bank-based finance rather than the
capital markets. Cobham/Subramaniam [1998] argue that the studies of Hamid/Singh [1992] and
Singh [1995] suffer from small-sample bias. To correct for this, Cobham/Subramaniam [1988]
conduct a micro-study using two data sets for India: the ICICI (composed of 1013 firms for
1980-1992) and the RBI (containing 1650 firms for 1975-1990), and one for the UK (Business
Monitor consisting of 2000 firms for the period 1982-1990). It was found that the behavior of
large Indian and UK firms were the same in terms of borrowing through the issue of bonds;
however, from the ICICI sample, a negative dependence was noted between size and equity-
finance ratios. Cobham/Subramaniam [1988] suggest that this behavior is due to smaller firms
having lower agency costs since the firms will most likely issue new equity to existing
shareholders/directors who are already familiar with the firm rather than to the public directly.59
Nagano [2003] that investigates the determinant of corporate capital structure in East Asia
countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand) in the aftermath of the 1997
Asian financial crisis reports that there is a high level of dependency by firms on short-term
external financing. Based on empirical analyses, the study found a significant negative
relationship between firm profitability and corporate debt-to-equity (DE) ratio in all the sample
countries. Firm size also has a direct relationship with DE ratio in many countries. On the other
hand, the relationship between corporate debt-to-equity (DE) ratio and firm’s tangibility -
generally significant in the industrialized countries - is entirely insignificant even in the post-crisis
period.
59 Indeed, this suggests that there is a large degree of intra-country differences in capital structures. This (i) concurs
with the observation made by Mayer/Banks (1990) who find intra-country differences in the capital structures of German and
UK firms; and (ii) the major disadvantage of using flow-of-funds data when making any comparisons since a
potentially large amount of information is not captured by the data. Also, and unlike the majority of ratio studies,
Cobham/Subramaniam [1998] use aggregate flow-of-funds data against company accounts. This could also explain the
difference between Cobham/Subramaniam’s [1998] and Hamid and Singh’s findings.
Chapter 2: Ownership Structure, Capital Structure, and Firm Performance:
Basic Aspects, Theoretical Background, and Empirical Evidence
42
Cross-country investigation of the financing environment in each of the sample countries showed
that firms in the region appear to have a pecking order in so far as their corporate finance
decision-making is concerned. They have the highest preference for internal funds, with its
characteristic smaller information cost, and secondarily for short-term bank loans. In general,
banks exercise close monitoring of their debtor clients, which enable them to understand and
anticipate credit risks. The generally close relationship between debtor firms and creditors appear
to lower information asymmetry and may be one of the factors in the high dependency of firms
on external bank loans. This situation could be summarized in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4
Financial Technique in the East Asian Countries
Source: Nagano, Mamoru [2003]. “Determinant of Corporate Capital Structure in East Asia” Waseda Institute of Finance,
Working Paper, p. 10.
2.5 AGENCY THEORY AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICE
Most of the hypotheses formulated in the following are based on the economic principal-agent
theory, where a positive effect stems from the amelioration of the shareholder-management
conflict, e.g., by disciplining the management. Analogously, an aggravation of the conflict results
in a negative effect.
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The principal-agent theory is part of the new institutional economics, which developed as
extension of the neoclassicism. It abandons the assumption of a complete market by allowing
informational asymmetries and transaction costs to cause incomplete contracts.60 This leads to a
methodological individualism, which does no longer consider institutions as profit maximizing
collectives, but as a “nexus for a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts of individuals”.61
Consequently, the economic focus on markets is shifted to man-made institutions, incorporating
the individual into economic theory.
The agency theory in particular analyzes the contractual conflicts arising from informational
asymmetry.62 An agency relation is based on an explicit or implicit contract between the agent
and the principal delegating decision power to the agent.63 Due to the contract, the agent’s
actions influence the utility of both contractual partners.64 However, the agent behaves
opportunistically maximizing his profit regardless of the principal’s interests. In the case of
incomplete informational structures for the benefit of the agent, the principal cannot prevent
those harming actions.65 Consequently, an agency conflict requires two conditions, a conflict of
interest through diverging utility functions of the principal and the agent as well as the existence
of informational asymmetries.66 These informational asymmetries are classified into different
forms shown in Figure 2.4.
Hidden characteristics are important features of the agent unknown to the principal before
contract conclusion. The uncertainty over the agent’s quality may lead to an adverse selection in
the agent’s engagement.67 Since this work deals with already existing contracts, this form is not
further considered.
The hidden intention of the agent to harm the principal can result in a problem before and after
the contract conclusion. Besides problems of adverse selection, it can cause a hold-up problem,
where the principal recognizes the opportunistic actions of the agent, but cannot sanction him or
prevent his actions. Consequently, the agent will not change his behavior.68
60 See Barnea et al. [1981, p. 8] and Richter/Furubotn [1999, p. 137].
61 Jensen/Meckling [1976, p. 310]. See Richter/Furubotn [1999, p. 5].
62 See Barnea et al. [1981, pp. 25-26] and Richter/Furubotn [1999, p. 3].
63 See Jensen/Smith [1985, p. 96] and Richter/Furubotn [1999, p. 163].
64 See Jensen/Meckling [1976, p. 308] and Richter/Furubotn [1999, p. 25].
65 See Jensen/Meckling [1976, p. 305] and Richter/Furubotn [1999, p. 163].
66 See Richter/Furubotn [1999, p. 163]
67 See Richter/Furubotn [1999, pp. 144-145 and p. 509]
68 See Breid [1995, pp. 823-824]
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Figure 2.5
Forms of Informational Asymmetries in Agency Theory
Source: Gross, Kerstin [2007]. “Equity Ownership and Performance” First Edition, Physica-Verlag: Berlin, p. 38.
If after the contract conclusion the result of the agent’s actions is also influenced by other
exogenous factors, the problem of moral hazard can arise. One information asymmetry
conditioning this problem is the hidden action, where the principal can observe the results, but
cannot draw conclusions on the effort of the agent.69 The second informational asymmetry is
hidden information. The principal knows both the result and the agent’s effort. However, he lacks
information on the input-output relation and thus cannot assess the work of the agent.70 Kleine
[1995] compares the situation with a production. In the case of hidden action, the principal does
not know the input by the agent. At the occurrence of hidden information, he sees the input and
output, but does not know the parameters of the production or transformation function.71
69 See Darrough/Stoughton [1986, p. 501] and Spremann [1987, p. 343].
70 See Hartmann-Wendels [1989, p. 715] and Richter/Furubotn [1999, pp. 215-217].
71 See Kleine [1995, p. 31].
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These conflicts, however, hurt the welfare of both the principal and the agent, since the principal
anticipates the reduced utility given rational expectations and partially passes it on to the agent.
Consequently, it is often in the interest of both parties to reduce the conflict.72
The principal can reduce the conflict by controlling the agent or by reducing the information
asymmetry. These efforts are called monitoring, where explicit monitoring consists of governance
activities and implicit monitoring summarizes forms of information gathering.73 The conflict can
also be reduced by trust building actions by the management that are called bonding.74 However,
as both efforts also create costs, only a second-best solution is achieved.75 The difference
between the first-best and second-best solution is called agency costs. They are distinguished on
the basis of their origin into monitoring or control costs, bonding costs, and residual loss.76
The economic principal-agent theory knows two major conflicts: the shareholder-management
conflict and the debt holder - shareholder conflict. However, since this work focuses on the
relation of equity ownership and performance where already Cook [1984] state the loss of control
over the management as the key critical issue, only the first conflict is further considered. The
shareholder-management conflict is based on the separation of ownership and control by
Berle/Means [1932]. It assumes informational asymmetries in favor of the management due to
their daily professional occupation with the company and the market.77 Furthermore, a conflict of
interest exists through differing utility functions. While the shareholder’s utility consists of the two
monetary elements dividends and changes in stock price, the manager features a more complex
utility function. It is composed by the monetary effect of the fixed and variable remuneration and
considerations of personal risk, career prospects, prestige, and other personal interests.78 The
quality and quantity of work performed by the management has a direct negative effect on its
utility, but a positive one on shareholders’ gain. However, it might have a positive indirect effect
on management incentive through performance-based compensation, prestige, and career
prospects.79 The conflict of interest together with the informational asymmetry causes the
problem of moral hazard.
72 See Jensen/Meckling [1976, p. 309] and Jensen/Smith [1985, p. 97].
73 See Bushee [1998, p. 309] and Jensen/Smith [1985, p. 97]
74 In the shareholder - management conflict these might include the application of certain accounting standards
[Jensen/Smith 1985, p. 126] or the creation of a positive reputation [Spremann 1988, p. 619]
75 See Coase [1937, pp. 390-391], Jensen/Meckling [1976, p. 308], and Jensen/Smith [1985, p. 97]
76 See Jensen/Meckling [1976, p. 308]
77 See Barnea et al. [1981, p. 15], Jensen/Meckling [1976, p. 308], and Swoboda [1982, p. 710]
78 See Rappaport [1995, pp. 6-7].
79 See Achleitner/Wichels [2000, p. 7] and Barnea et al. [1981, p. 8]
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Table 2.5
Types of Agency Problems in the Shareholder – Management Conflict
Source: Gross, Kerstin [2007]. “Equity Ownership and Performance” First Edition, Physica-Verlag: Berlin, p. 40.
The conflict manifests itself through a set of a different problems listed in Table 2.5. In the case
of the effort problem, managers optimize their utility by reducing their effort and its direct
negative effect. This is assumed to also decrease the performance of the firm and thus the
shareholder value. Furthermore, managers might misuse corporate assets, therefore asset use
problem, or consume excessive perquisites, which harm the company value. A special form of an
asset use problem is over-investment, where the manager performs unprofitable investments to
increase the firm size, as this empire building often has a positive effect on manager’s prestige.
The horizon or time preference problem is based on differing time horizons of management and
shareholders. While the shareholder is long-term oriented under the assumption of going
concern, the short-term focus of the management stems from the limited duration of its working
contracts with the shareholders. Especially shortly before the expiration of the contract, the
management might neglect profitable and important long-term investments in favor of short-term
results. Finally, the risk preference problem accounts for the fact that the manager’s personal risk
is strongly linked to the firm’s risk. His inclination to be risk-averse leads to suboptimal
investment decisions that are not in the interest of the risk neutral shareholder.80
An equally varied menu of solutions has been proposed to resolve or at least limit these principal-
agent problems. For example, Jensen [1986] argued that management prefers to increase firm
80 See Achleitner/Wichels [2000, p. 7], Barnea et al. [1981, p. 31], Byrd et al. [1998, p. 15-18], and La Porta et al.
[2000, p. 4].
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size, whereas shareholders are seeking to maximize the value of their shares. Management will
attempt to evade shareholder control by financing less profitable projects using internal funds,
which are subject to a minimum of external monitoring. Shareholders can prevent management
from undertaking unprofitable expansion by reducing this “free” cash flow. This can be done
either by increasing the firm’s dividend payment or by increasing its leverage. As Hunsaker
[1999] points out, an increase in leverage also increases the risk of bankruptcy, and therefore
limits management’s consumption of perquisites.
Other vehicles for removing shareholder-manager conflicts include the provision of incentive-
compatible managerial contracts, and the role of the managerial labor market in exerting
discipline on managerial behavior. Shleifer/Vishny [1989] develop a model in which a manager
has an incentive to invest the firm’s resources in those assets that are more highly valued under
that manager than under the next best alternative manager. By this means, the manager
counters the disciplinary forces: of the managerial labor market, of product market competition,
of the threat of take-over, and of a monitoring board of directors. If successful, managers can
demand higher compensation together with greater autonomy. Shleifer/Vishny [1989] show that,
when investment projects are irreversible, the firm over-invests in those specific projects whose
value is greater under one particular manager than under the next best manager. Such specific
projects incur two distinct types of loss: (i) a social cost in relation to investments not being value
maximizing, and (ii) a transfer of economic rent from shareholders to managers. This analysis
helps explain why managers like growth: growth promotes those areas specific to the manager’s
skills and provides management benefits through entrenchment. However, Jensen/Meckling
[1976], Green [1984], and Smith/Warner [1979] argue that management can still be disciplined
by the use of convertible debt. Convertibles reduce the agency costs of monitoring because they
give lenders an opportunity to share in a firm's profits. It may be expected that the greater the
growth opportunities available to a firm, the greater the probability that management will over-
invest. This implies a positive relationship between firm growth opportunities and the level of
convertible debt, and a negative relationship between growth and ordinary (long-term) debt.
A more radical solution to shareholder-manager conflicts is proposed by Kensinger/Martin (1986).
They argue that, if the firm is reorganized into a limited partnership (or royalty trusts), the
managing partner has limited discretion in dividend/re-investment decisions. The reinvestment of
profits is in the hands of individual partners (shareholders) which reduce the manager-
shareholder agency costs by removing the management’s decision-making power.
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An alternative approach to analyzing shareholder-manager conflicts uses transactions-cost
economics, developed particularly by Williamson [1988]. In this approach, debt and equity are
regarded as vehicles for corporate governance rather than as financial instruments;81 Williamson
[1988] argued that the financial structure of a firm is affected by the "specificity" of the different
types of assets that it owns. "Specificity" concerns the extent to which assets can be redeployed
in different investment projects, with only limited modifications. Evidently, the more specific the
asset, the lower will be its liquidation value. In this context, debt acts as a straitjacket for
investment opportunities: lenders will not lend to very specific projects since, in the event of
failure (liquidation), the amount realized will be very low. Thus, leverage should decrease as the
degree of asset specificity rises. Equity-holders are less affected by specificity, since they
necessarily surrender the firm's assets to lenders at liquidation. In total, as asset specificity rises,
the costs of debt and equity rise, with the costs of debt rising faster than equity. Consequently,
highly redeployable assets should be financed by debt whilst equity should be used for highly
non-redeployable assets. Williamson [1988] concluded that this argument was at odds with more
conventional corporate finance literature, as it suggests that debt is a neutral financial instrument
with equity being the instrument of last resort. However, this conclusion was foreshadowed by
the pecking order theory of Myers [1984], and Myers/Majluf [1984].
Corporate strategy may also impact on capital structure. Strategy consists of those actions and
plans that influence the portfolio of activities in which the firm is involved. It determines in how
assets are allocated and the level of debt the firm carries. Most important, the goals of
management strategy may conflict with those of shareholders. The relationship between
corporate strategy and capital structure is less commonly examined in the mainstream corporate
finance literature. Nevertheless, five themes can be identified within the literature that has
appeared:
1. The application of applied discounted cash flow techniques to the development of value-
based planning models;82
2. The relationships among the strategic decisions of a firm, stock market performance and the
level of systematic risk;83
3. The dependence between stochastic inflation rates and the firm’s asset structure, which
reflects the firm’s strategic decisions;84
81 See, for example, Core, Holthausen/Larcker [1999], Brada/Singh [1999], and Vilasuso/Minkler [2001].
82 See Hax/Majluf [1984].
83 See Chang/Thomas [1989].
84 See Kracaw et al. [1994].
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4. The relationship between corporate strategy and the debt-equity ratio;85 It is argued that the
goals, risks, and strength of external monitoring influence the firm’s capital structure.
Specifically, firms that adopt single and related strategies are the most conservative and are
therefore most risk averse while those having unrelated strategies are likely to be least risk
averse. This runs counter to standard diversification arguments, and suggests that strategic
"focus" implies a lesser willingness to take risks.
5. The relationship between the structure of the firm and the leverage of the firm. Riah-
Belkaoui/Bannister [1994], amongst others, assert that a change in a firm’s organizational
structure will result in a change in its capital structure. They argue that the adaptation of a
multi-divisional ("M-form") corporate strategy is associated with an increase in free cash flow.
If so, and as noted above, the capital market may force such firms to finance new capital by
debt rather than by equity in order to reduce management’s misuse of cash [Jensen 1986].
2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although the issues surrounding the potential effects of ownership and control structures on
financial structure and firm performance have been debated for several decades, a consensus
has not yet been reached regarding the importance of ownership and control structures. Most
importantly, the nature of relationship between ownership and control requires further
consideration. In addition, it should include closer examination of the particular characteristics
and incentives of the shareholders and managers being considered. It needs to be recognized
that the level of equity ownership that equates with 'equity control' is likely to differ from firm to
firm and will be dependent on firm-specific factors, including its finance structure. Ownership
structure and financing policies are hypothesized to affect performance, which in turn will affect
ownership structure and financing policies in later periods. In particular, the use of cross
sectional analysis will be unable to fully examine the effects of changes in ownership structure
and financing policies. Hence, it is suggested that further research should consider the use of
panel data sets to track relationships over time.86
In general, ownership measures can be characterized by the two dimensions, there are
ownership concentration, giving the quantitative information of share size, and ownership
identity, representing qualitative identity information, such as management, board or institutional
investors.
85 See Barton/Gordon [1987, 1988], Lowe et al. [1994] and Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam [1999].
86 See Short [1994]
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Several aspects distinguish the variables. Shareholding can be defined as direct or cohesive
shares and measured at different levels of the control chains. In addition, it can refer to control
or cash flow rights. In addition, the identity definition differs, especially in the case of insider
ownership, where the inclusion of board shares is questionable. A final aspect is the statistical
type of the variables, the differentiation into dummy and metric variables. The ownership
measures in early contributions are non-metric variables, which are easy to use, but lose
potentially valuable information. Later studies mainly use different forms of metric measures.
Meanwhile, discussing the performance measures common for the ownership literature,
accounting-based measures as ROE and ROA have the advantage that they can be applied to
non-listed companies, but they have also shortcomings, such as the question of the earnings
definition and a potential accounting-bias. Comparing both measures, the ROE is preferable to
ROA in ownership studies. The hybrid measures result in the most significant estimates in
ownership studies. The M/B avoids the disadvantages of accounting-based measures, but
abnormal market returns at the point of observation might distort it. Similar to the ROE versus
ROA discussion, the market-to-equity ratio seems advantageous. Apart from the benefits and
shortcomings of the M/B, the Tobin’s Q may feature a further disadvantage; it is an indirect
measure of financial performance. Nevertheless, the proxy error should be low. An advantage of
the Tobin’s Q over the M/B consists in its frequent use in literature and the higher significance
achieved by its results.
At the final aspect, it will be clear that; overall, it is difficult to generalize about corporate capital
structures: either within the industrial countries, or within the developing countries, or in
comparisons between the two. Depending on the country, the time period, and the data
definitions, different studies come to different conclusions. This suggests that the root of the
differences in corporate capital structures may lie in the different underlying circumstances faced
by individual firms. If firms in the same country all faced exactly the same circumstances and
constraints, we would expect to see greater uniformity of results within individual countries. It
would appear particularly important therefore to survey the various tests of theories of corporate
capital structure, as these theories seek the source of cross-sectional differences among firms in
more fundamental differences of circumstance among individual firms: their industry,
shareholders, bondholders, managements, and workforce.
Ownership Structures, Capital Structure, and Firm Performance:
An Analysis of Post East Asian Financial Crisis
CHAPTER 3
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE:
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE HYPOTHESES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
An appropriate capital structure is a critical decision for any business organization. The decision is
important not only because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational
constituencies, but also because of the impact such a decision has on an organization’s ability to
deal with its competitive environment. Over the last three decades, the literature considering the
issue of corporate financial structure has been dominated by the debate arising from the
Modigliani/Miller [1958] irrelevance hypothesis, which suggest that, in equilibrium, the financial
structure of a firm is independent of, and irrelevant to, its performance and market value.
Essentially, a firm should be indifferent as to the use of debt or equity to finance project as, “the
average cost of capital to any firm is completely independent of its financial structure and is
equal to the capitalization rate of a pure equity stream of its class”.1
A series of qualifications to this hypothesis have been developed, based on the assumption that
firms select financial structures depending on the various costs and benefits associated with debt
and equity financing, that is, firms are able to select an optimal financial structure. Such
qualifications are concerned with the agency cost arising from the use of debt or equity to
finance projects [Jensen/Meckling 1976], the role of debt-bonding in overcoming management
discretion [Grossman/Hart 1982, Jensen 1982] and the use of debt to signal information
concerning the future prospects of the firm to outsiders [Ross 1977]. Therefore, it is suggested
that, in contrast to the Modigliani and Miller hypothesis, firm performance and value is dependent
on the financial structure of the firm.
The purpose of this chapter is not to discuss the various theories concerning the optimal financial
structure of a firm,2 but rather to concentrate on those theories and empirical studies which
consider the effect of ownership and control structure on financial structure and their subsequent
effect on performance that will be discussed separately in Chapter 4. Specially, this chapter will
1 See Modigliani/Miller [1958, pp. 268-269].
2 For a review of the recent theoretical work, see Titman/Wessels [1988] and Harris/Raviv [1991].
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analyze the question “do different ownership and control structures lead to different retention
and financial structure policies which subsequent affect performance?” In particular, this chapter
intends to investigate the causal and dynamic aspects of the relation between ownership
structure and capital structure of firms in developing countries. The remainder of the chapter is
organized around four prominent hypotheses about ownership structure and capital structure. For
each hypothesis, the literature on performance and ownership structure has come up with
several different empirical evidences or arguments that may explain the relation that is
postulated by the particular hypothesis. These arguments are discussed one by one and
concluding remarks follow.
3.2 THEORITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE IMPACT OF OWNERSHIP
STRUCTURE ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE
The possibility that ownership and control structures can affect financial structures raises several
complex issues. Jensen [1986] suggests that Managerial-Controlled (MC) firms are less likely to
finance projects externally and it therefore follows that such firms should retain more earnings
than Owner-Controlled (OC) firms.3 Ceteris paribus, debt restricts the discretion of management
and increase the threat of bankruptcy.4 If MC firms are more likely to use internal sources of
finance, and as is suggested, such sources are used less efficiently than external sources, it
should follow that MC firms perform worse than other forms of control. In support of this
hypothesis, managerial theorists suggest that MC firms are more likely to retain earnings than OC
firms, as retained earnings represent a source of discretion [Williamson 1964] and provide a
source of funds for expansion [Baumol 1967]. Alternatively, Kamerschen [1970] and McEarchern
[1975] argue that owner-managed firms will retain more earnings due to the preferential tax
treatment of capital gains over dividends and fear of loss control. McEachern [1975] argues
further that owner-managers have more discretion in dictating retention policies.
The debate surrounding the choice of capital structure includes an extensive literature which
considers the agency cost associated with the debt or equity financing.5 The seminal paper by
Jensen/Meckling [1976] addresses the agency cost associated with external financing. The
Jensen/Meckling [1976] model considers a firm which is wholly owned by a single owner-
3 Jensen [1986] argues that managers prefer to finance projects internally in order to avoid monitoring by the capital
markets. Managers have incentives to retain excess cash in the firm as it increases the resources under their control. He
develops a free cash flow theory of debt, based on the agency costs associated with the allowing managers to exercise
discretion over the use of excess cash retained in the firm. Free cash flow is defined as, “Cash flow in excess of that
required to fund all projects that have positive net present value when discounted at the relevant cost of capital”.
4 See Baltagi/Griffin [1989]
5 See Jensen/Meckling [1976], Haugen/Senbet [1979], Barnea et al. [1985], and Darrough/Stoughton [1986].
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manager. In order to finance projects requiring fund in excess of the firm’s internal resources,
the owner-manager faces two options: to issue equity or to issue debt. The sale of equity to
outside investors reduces the owner-manager’s fractional interest in the firm, which increases
his/her incentives to partake in excessive perk consumption, as the effective cost of such
consumption is lowered. However, given assumptions regarding efficient pricing mechanisms
which incorporate expectations, outside investors anticipate such actions by the owner-manager.
They therefore discount the price they are willing to pay for equity shares to take into account
the costs of monitoring the owner-manager and the effects of the divergence of his/her interests
from theirs. Hence, the owner-manager bears the full extent of these agency costs of equity.
To avoid such costs, the owner-manager should finance expansion projects with external debt.
However, the issuance of debt increases also gives rise to agency costs, which occur as a result
of the conflict of interest between the owner-manager and the external lenders. The issuance of
debt increases the owner-manager’s incentives to invest in high risk projects which offer high
returns if successful, but which increase the probability of failure, which conflicts with the
interests of the external lenders. In the event of failure, the owner-manager’s loss exposure is
limited to his equity holding, whilst all gains accrue to him/her if the project is a success.
Therefore, whilst the debt holders would bear a proportion of the losses in the event of failure,
they are taking on extra risk without the compensatory gains from success. Thus, the equity of a
leveraged firm can be seen as a call option on the firm’s assets.6 As a consequence, as the
amount of debt increases in proportion to the amount of equity, debt holders demand
progressively higher premiums, to compensate for the increased probability of failure. Therefore,
the advantage of issuing debt, in the form of a reduction in the agency costs of equity are offset
at the margin by the agency costs of debt financing. The Jensen/Meckling model shows that,
even in a world characterized by the absence of taxes and bankruptcy costs, there will be an
optimum level of debt which minimizes the sum of the total agency costs.
The Jensen/Meckling model therefore suggests that the fraction of equity held in firm by the
owner-manager affects the magnitude of the agency costs of equity financing due to the affect
on his/her incentives to partake in excessive perk consumption. However, the issuance of debt
also gives rise to agency costs. Hence the advantage of issuing debt, in the form of reduced costs
of equity, is offset at the margin by the agency costs of debt. Kim/Sorenson [1986] suggest that
leverage may be positively related to managerial ownership due to differences in the agency
costs of debt and equity facing firms with high management ownership and those with low
6 Black/Scholes [1973].
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management ownership. They advance three possible reasons for this proposition. Firstly, it is
suggested that firm with high inside ownership may face higher agency costs of equity and may
therefore issue debt in order to avoid these agency costs of equity. Secondly, firms with high
inside ownership may issue more debt because the agency costs of debt decline as ownership
concentration increases. Finally, Kim/Sorenson [1986] suggest that firms with high inside
ownership may issue debt above the optimal level in order to maintain control of the firm,
irrespective of the agency costs associated with debt and equity.
The debate surrounding the incentives faced by managers, shareholders and owner-managers
with regard to debt levels has produced several conflicting theories. Grossman/Hart [1982] argue
that managers increase the level of debt in their firms in order to pre-commit or bond themselves
to achieving the level of cash flow necessary to meet the debt repayments. This argument
therefore suggests that debt is used to resolve conflicts between (non-owning) managers and
shareholders. Such bonding reduces management discretion to consume excessively perquisites,
and hence should increase the value of the firm’s equity.7 As a consequence, the agency costs of
additional equity should decrease, as outsiders will perceive that managers have committed
themselves to reduced shirking, an argument consistent with Ross's [1977] model in which
managers use debt levels as a signal of firm quality. However Jensen's [1986] free cash flow
arguments suggest that managers prefer lower debt levels in order to allow themselves greater
discretion over the use of free cash flow and to avoid the threat of bankruptcy. Taken together,
these arguments suggest that whilst managers may prefer to have lower levels of debt, they use
increased debt levels to signal to debt holders and shareholders their commitment not to take
actions that will reduce the value of the firm and increase the probability of bankruptcy.
External shareholders who are well diversified would be expected to prefer debt levels higher
than those sought by managers, as up to the optimal level, debt increases the value of equity.
However, with regard to owner-managers preferences, the situation is more complicated. The
Grossman/Hart [1982] model considers a situation in which management do not own any equity
shares in the firm. As management ownership in a firm increases, owner-managers should find it
less necessary to signal to outside shareholders via increased debt levels as, according to
Jensen/Meckling [1976], owner-managers' and external shareholders' incentives should be
aligned by high managerial ownership. However, as increased debt increases the value of the
firm's equity, owner-managers will benefit from increased debt levels by virtue of the increased
value of the equity shares in the firm. Conversely, it may be argued that high levels of
7 See Jensen/Meckling [1976] and Grossman/Hart [1982]
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management ownership make it difficult for outsiders to discipline such owner-managers and
hence management discretion may increase as management ownership increases. Friend/Lang
[1988] contend that there is a greater incentive for owner-managers rather than for other
shareholders to maintain a low debt ratio in order to avoid the possibility of bankruptcy as they
face higher risks and are relatively undiversified. As the risk of bankruptcy increases as debt
increases, owner-managers in particular are likely to become increasingly risk averse as their
holdings in the firm increase. Friend/Lang [1988] argue that the higher the ownership, the
greater the ability and desire for such owner-managers to adjust debt ratios (downwards) to suit
their own interests. Hence owner-managers would be expected to prefer debt levels below those
preferred by well diversified external shareholders.
However, there are several arguments which suggest that the presence of large external
shareholders may affect the ability of managers to adjust debt levels to suit their own objectives.
With reference to non owner-managers, Zeckhauser/Pound [1990] argue that large external
shareholders, by acting as monitors, may help to solve some of the agency costs of debt
financing which arise between managers and debt holders. It is suggested that firms with large
shareholders should have lower costs of debt which in turn implies that debt ratios should be
higher for firms with large external shareholders. However, they argue that large shareholders
will only perform such a role if they have the right incentives; without incentives they may
compete against debt holders. Taking an alternative perspective, Zeckhauser/Pound [1990]
further argue that the presence of large external shareholders may act as a signal to the market
that managers are less able to indulge in profit reducing behavior and may mitigate the need for
managers to use debt as a signal. Hence, the presence of large external shareholders should be
associated with lower debt ratios. With regard to owner-managers, Friend/Lang [1988] contend
that the presence of large external shareholders may prevent owner-managers from adjusting
debt ratios to suit their own interests and hence firms with large external shareholders would be
expected to have higher debt ratios than firms without such shareholders.
In summary, there are many conflicting theories and opposing arguments relating to the effect of
ownership and control structure on financial structure. As will be discussed in the following sub-
section, the empirical evidence on these issues is limited and there are many issues that will be
the hypotheses in this investigation.
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3.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE
The empirical studies of the effect of ownership on the financial structure of the firm fall into one
of two groups. The first group of studies investigates the effect of control type on the retention
policies of the firm. The second group of studies consists of those which examine the effect
either of management shareholdings on debt ratios or the effect of large external shareholders
on management incentives with regard to the debt ratio.
In the previous sub-section, it was noted that MC firms are hypothesized to be more likely to
retain earnings than OC firms. However, the empirical evidence regarding this issue is
inconclusive. Kamerschen [1970], Sorenson [1974], Holl [1975] and Ware [1975] found MC firms
to have higher dividend payout ratios than OC firms, although the results reported by Sorenson
[1974] and Holl [1975] were not significant. McEachern [1975] found owner-managed firms to
retain significantly more earnings than externally controlled or MC firms, with no significant
differences being found to exist between the latter two categories. However, as argued previous
researches, such studies are fraught with difficulties due to the definitions of control type
employed, and hence it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from them.
The second, more recent group of studies examines the effect either of management
shareholdings on debt ratios or the effect of large external shareholders on management
incentives with regard to the debt ratio. The main studies in this area are summarized in Table
3.1. Whilst the empirical research in this area is limited, the majority of the studies do find
support for the hypothesis that leverage is positively related to management ownership.8 In
contrast, Friend/Lang [1988] contend that their results suggest that a negative relationship exists
between leverage and management ownership. However, as will be discussed below, these
results are open to some doubt. With regard to the impact of large external shareholders on debt
ratios, the results of Friend/Lang [1988] suggest that the presence of large external shareholders
is associated with higher debt ratios. In contrast, Zeckhauser/Pound [1990] found no significant
differences to exist in the debt ratios of firms with large external shareholders as compared to
firms without such shareholders, although, on average, large shareholders were associated with
lower debt ratios.
8 See Kim/Sorenson [1986], Agrawal/Mandelker [1987] and Amihud et al. [1990]
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Table 3.1
Effect of Ownership and Control on Capital Structure – A Summary of the Empirical Findings
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Table 3.1 (Continued)
Effect of Ownership and Control on Capital Structure – A Summary of the Empirical Findings
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The conflicting results of Kim/Sorenson [1986] and Friend/Lang [1988] warrant further discussion
as both papers attempt to analyze the relationship between management ownership and debt
ratios by considering the normal activities of the firm, whereas Agrawal/Mandelker [1987] and
Amihud et al. [1990] consider the relationship after certain investment decisions, acquisitions and
divestures, have taken place. Kim/Sorenson [1986] investigated the proposition that the
ownership structure of the firm may influence its financial structure as a result of the difference
in agency costs of debt and equity between firms with high managerial ownership and firms with
low managerial ownership. Using a dummy variable to denote high/low managerial ownership
and a cut-off point of 25% of equity to define high managerial ownership and 5% of equity to
define low managerial ownership, they found the debt ratio to be positively correlated with the
extent of managerial equity ownership. Firms with high managerial ownership were found to
have on average 5.7% higher debt to equity ratios than firms with low managerial ownership.
In contrast to the findings of Kim/Sorenson [1986], Friend/Lang [1988] reported debt ratios to be
negatively related to management shareholdings. Firms were classified as being either 'closely
held' or 'publicly held' depending on the fraction of stock owned by management, with a cut-off
point of 13.825% of management ownership used to separate the sample into two equal size
groups. It was hypothesized that managers of closely held firms would face higher firm-specific
risks but would have less constraints on their behavior than managers of publicly held firms.
Consequently, closely held firms would be able to maintain a lower debt ratio than publicly held
firms. However, the presence of large non-managerial shareholders may constrain the behavior
of management, even in closely held firms. Therefore, the samples of closely held firms and
publicly held firms were further subdivided, depending on the existence of a non-managerial
shareholder with holdings of 10% or more. Friend/Lang [1988] reported that the debt ratios were
higher for firms which had principal non-managerial shareholders for both closely held and
publicly held firms. For closely held firms, the level of debt decreased as the level of managerial
shareholding in the firm increased, a finding that was independent of the presence of large non-
managerial shareholders. However, this was only true for publicly held firms with a principal non-
managerial shareholder; for other publicly held firms, the debt ratio increased as the fraction of
stock held by insiders increased. Such findings are consistent with the results reported by
Agrawal/Nagarajan [1990], who found managers of all-equity firms to have significantly larger
percentage of shareholdings than managers of leveraged firms.
However, the findings of Friend/Lang [1988] need qualification. Examination of summary
statistics provided by this investigation [Friend/Lang, 1988 Table 1, p. 276] reveals that the mean
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debt ratio of all closely held firms (0.248) is higher than that of all publicly held firms (0.226),
which is consistent with the findings of Kim/Sorenson [1986]. However, the cut-off points used to
classify firms as closely held/high inside ownership differ between the two studies considerably.
Friend/Lang [1988] run separate regressions on each of the four classifications of firms, in
contrast to the dummy variable employed by Kim/Sorenson [1986]. The explanatory variable
employed in the Friend/Lang [1988] regressions measures the fraction of equity held by the
largest dominant managerial insider, although they do note that similar results were obtained
when the holdings of all insiders in each firm were combined. Therefore, the results of both
Kim/Sorenson [1986] and Friend/Lang [1988] do suggest that firms in which inside ownership is
high have higher debt ratios than those firms in which inside ownership is low, and Friend/Lang's
analysis suggests that the presence of large external shareholders limits management discretion
in seeking lower debt ratios (although the results of Zeckhauser/Pound [1990] dispute this).
However, given the difficulties in comparing the results of the two studies, further work analyzing
the impact of management ownership on debt/equity ratios is warranted.
In summary, the empirical evidence which considers the effect of ownership on financial structure
is inconclusive. Once again, one of the main problems is the use of arbitrary cut-off points to
assign firms to various control categories and hence these studies are subject to the limitations
discussed in previous investigations.
3.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The aim of this research is to test the effect of ownership structure into capital structure and firm
performance. The previous researches give evidences that construct some hypotheses below:
 External Block Ownership and Capital Structure
The literature concerning the role of block shareholders strongly suggests that external block
holders have incentives to monitor and influence management appropriately to protect their
significant investments.9 Due to their large economic stake, these investors have a strong desire
to watch over management closely, making sure that management does not engage in activities
that are detrimental to the wealth of shareholders. According to this ‘active monitoring
hypothesis’, external block holders reduce the scope of managerial opportunism, which result in
9 See Friend/Lang [1988]
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lower direct agency conflicts between management and shareholders.10 Shome/Singh [1995]
obtain evidence that is consistent with the active monitoring hypothesis. They examine the
market reaction to the announcement of acquisitions of large share parcels using event study
methodology. Shome/Singh [1995] report significant positive abnormal returns associated with
announcements of block acquisitions by external shareholders. Moreover, they show that the
abnormal returns are positively associated with a reduction in agency costs (through proxy
variables). Furthermore, Bethel et al. [1998] find that long term operating performance of firms
improves subsequent to the acquisition of a block by activist shareholders.
This above evidence is consistent with the reduction in agency conflicts when there are increases
in external block holdings. Consequently, if external block holders serve as active monitors and
closely monitor the actions of corporate managers, management may not be able to adjust the
debt ratio to their own interests as freely if such investors do not exist.
Since the economic stake of block holder’s increase as their share ownership rises, the incentives
of block holders to protect their investments and consequently monitor management can be
expected to increase with the level of their share ownership. Moreover, as the share ownership of
external block holders increase, their voting power and influence increase, giving them greater
ability to control the actions of managers. As corporate debt acts as an internal control on
management it is proposed here that corporate debt ratios are likely to be an increasing function
of the level of share ownership of external block holders.
This leads to the first hypothesis:
H1: Firms with a higher level of external block holdings are likely to have a higher
debt ratio, ceteris paribus.
Shleifer/Vishny’s [1986] active monitoring hypothesis, however, has been challenged by Pound
[1988] who argues that large shareholders may be passive voters who collude with corporate
insiders against the best interests of dispersed shareholders. Evidence consistent with this
‘passive voters hypothesis’ is presented by McConnell/Servaes [1990] in relation to large
shareholders and firm value. If this hypothesis more accurately describes the organizational role
of external block holders, corporate leverage may be negatively related to the share ownership of
such block holders. This thesis therefore can also be seen as conducting an empirical test of two
10 See Shleifer/Vishny [1986].
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opposing hypotheses concerning the role that external block holders play in influencing corporate
capital structure.
 Managerial Share Ownership and Financing Decision
Jensen/Meckling [1976], Fama/Jensen [1983] and Shleifer/Vishny [1986], among others, have
suggested that the structure of equity ownership has an important effect on managerial
incentives and firm value. The literature initially assumes that most investors will prefer to invest
in a well-diversified portfolio to minimize portfolio risk. Since the liabilities of a firm’s shareholders
are limited to their share ownership, risks can be diversified with other investments. However,
corporate managers are unable to achieve the same minimum level of aggregate risk as a large
proportion of their wealth is derived from the significant investment in human capital specific to
the firm. Unlike financial capital, the risks associated with human capital are largely un-
diversifiable.11 These non-diversifiable risks result in a welfare reduction.12 This loss of
diversification is particularly costly to corporate managers due to their personal wealth
constraints.
Since risk-averse managers bear an unavoidable burden of risk linked to the fortunes of the firm
employing them, managerial self-interest advocates argue that once presented with
opportunities, managers have incentives to lower the non-diversifiable employment risks by
ensuring the continued viability of the firm.13 This is known as the "managerial self-interests
hypothesis".
One technique for reducing non-diversifiable employment risk is by decreasing the firms’ debt
holdings.14 This is because debt increases the bankruptcy risks of a firm. Since the occurrence of
bankruptcy or financial distress will result in loss of employment, potential impairment of future
employment and potentially lower earnings capacity of managers, it is argued that self-interested
managers have incentives to reduce corporate debt to a level that is less than optimal. However,
it is unlikely that management can reduce the debt level to zero due to the existence of corporate
governance mechanisms to discipline and control their behavior. Such mechanisms include the
managerial labor market, capital market and market for corporate control.
11 See Amihud/Lev [1981]
12 See Crutchley/Hansen [1989]
13 See Amihud /Lev [1981]
14 See Friend/Lang [1988]
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For instance, Fama/Jensen [1983] argue that stock prices are visible signs that summaries the
implications of decisions about future net cash flows. This external governance device exerts
pressure to orient a firm’s decision process toward the interests of shareholders. The market for
corporate control has been suggested as one of the most effective corporate governance
mechanisms.15 If managers are not maximizing the value of the firm, then any party could, in
theory, purchase the firm, change the financing policy to a value maximizing one, and reap the
resulting increase in value. Weisbach [1993] suggests that the main reason for a hostile takeover
is to replace managers who are not maximizing shareholder wealth. However, impediments in the
market for corporate control are recognized. Prowse [1994], among others, suggest that
takeovers may only be important in correcting the most serious cases of managerial laziness,
incompetence, or self-interest behavior. Further, while the managerial labor market may be
sufficient to eliminate the incentive problems in perfect market conditions, market imperfections
may cause it to be less than perfect. Morck et al. [1988] argue that when managers hold a large
proportion of the firm’s shares, they generally have enough voting power, or influence, to
guarantee their current employment and remuneration with the firm.
Corporate debt policy has also been viewed as an internal control mechanism, which can reduce
agency conflicts between management and shareholders, particularly the agency costs of free
cash flow as suggested by Jensen [1986]. Jensen argues that managers with substantial amounts
of free cash flow are more likely to engage in non-optimal activities. Grossman/Hart [1980]
suggest that debt is a disciplinary device that can be used to reduce the agency costs of free
cash flow. Specifically, the obligations associated with debt reduce management’s discretionary
control over the firm’s free cash flow and their incentives to engage in non-optimal activities.
However as Myers [1977] demonstrates, debt can also have undesirable effects such as inducing
managers to forego positive net present value projects.
Jensen/Meckling [1976] argue that managerial share ownership can reduce managerial incentives
to consume perquisites, expropriate shareholders’ wealth and to engage in other non-maximizing
behavior and thereby helps in aligning the interests between management and shareholders. This
is the ‘convergence-of-interests’ hypothesis.
The convergence of interest hypothesis has been challenged by Fama/Jensen [1983] and
Demsetz [1983] who suggest that managerial share ownership may have adverse effects on
agency conflicts between management and shareholders due to the costs of significant
15 See Manne [1965]
Chapter 3: Ownership Structure and Capital Structure:
Literature Review and The Hypotheses
64
managerial share ownership. They argue that instead of reducing managerial incentive problems,
managerial share ownership may entrench the incumbent management team, leading to an
increase in managerial opportunism.
The combination of the convergence of interests and entrenchment hypotheses suggest a
curvilinear relationship between managerial share ownership and corporate value. Studies such
as Morck et al. [1988], McConnell/Servaes [1990] and McConnell/Servaes [1995] find a non-
linear relationship between managerial share ownership and firm value. These studies suggest
that at low levels of managerial share ownership, managerial share ownership increases firm
value due to the convergence-of-interests effect. However, when the level of management
ownership is high, entrenchment sets in, leading to higher agency conflicts and a consequent
decline in the value of the firm. Morck et al. [1988] using US data find a positive relation between
management ownership and firm value (as measured by Tobin’s Q) in the 0% to 5% ownership
range and beyond the 25% ownership range. McConnell/Servaes [1990], also using US data, find
a positive relation between managerial share ownership and firm value but in the management
ownership range of 0% to 40- 50%.
Short/Keasey [1999] provide support for the curvilinear effects but find that management in the
United Kingdom become entrenched at higher levels of ownership than their United States
counterparts. Kole [1995] argues that the variation in results in the United States may be driven
by a size effect whereas Short/Keasey [1999] argue that governance mechanisms in the different
countries may be a contributing factor in explaining the differences. Despite the possible
connection between managerial share ownership and external block ownership in mitigating
agency conflicts, prior studies have generally only examined the effect of either managerial share
ownership or external block ownership on agency conflicts (and firm value) separately.
The above evidence demonstrates a link between managerial share ownership and firm value.
Despite the irrelevance theory of Modigliani/Miller’s [1958], the existence of market imperfections
suggest a link between capital structure and firm value. Indeed, numerous studies confirm such a
link. For instance, McConnell/Servaes [1995] provide evidence that for firms with few growth
opportunities; firm value (as measured by Tobin’s Q) is positively correlated with leverage and for
firms with high growth opportunities Q is negatively correlated with leverage. Hence, it is
reasonable to argue that a link also exists between managerial share ownership and capital
structure.
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The convergence of interests and entrenchment hypotheses can be applied to other agency
conflicts between managers and shareholders. Berger et al. [1997] in a study of CEO
compensation and firm debt levels find that entrenched managers seek to avoid debt. This
implies that the financing decisions of the firm may be influenced by the share ownership of
corporate managers. Empirical support for the general notion that the capital structure decision is
agency related is also provided by Johnson [1997] who reports that monitoring effects are
influential in the debt decision and in the decision between public and private debt sources.
Using the rationale behind the convergence-of-interests and entrenchment hypotheses, this
thesis argues that the relationship between managerial share ownership and debt ratio may also
be curvilinear. Specifically, at low levels of managerial share ownership, managerial share
ownership is likely to align management and shareholder interests, leading to increased debt
levels. However, when managers already hold a significant portion of the firm’s equity, an
increase in managerial share ownership may lead to managerial entrenchment. In general, when
the level of managerial share ownership is “too high,” there will be few constraints on managerial
behavior, leading to an increase in managerial opportunism and decreased debt levels. Thus, it is
predicted that the relationship between managerial share ownership and agency conflicts is
curvilinear with the effects of managerial opportunism first decreasing, and then increasing as
managerial share ownership rises.
This leads to the second hypothesis:
H2: At low levels of managerial share ownership, managerial share ownership is
positively related to a firm’s debt ratio, ceteris paribus, and at high levels of
managerial share ownership, managerial share ownership is negatively
related to a firm’s debt ratio, ceteris paribus, such that the expected
relationship between management ownership and the leverage ratio is
curvilinear.
Friend/Lang [1988] test the effect of non-managerial block holders on leverage and find that the
presence of such shareholders increases the debt level. They define non-managerial block
holders as investors who hold more than 10% or more of the firm’s outstanding shares.
However, in their analysis, the level of managerial share ownership does not play a role. Their
analysis makes no direct predictions as to whether the relationship between external block
ownership and the debt ratio varies with the level of managerial share ownership. No study has
attempted to investigate the relationship between external block ownership, managerial share
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ownership and debt levels simultaneously. A possible exception is McConnell/Servaes [1995] who
include institutional ownership, managerial share ownership and leverage in the one model but
their focus is on firm value and not leverage per se.
It is argued here that at low levels of managerial share ownership, external block ownership
plays a significant role in monitoring the behavior of management, resulting in lower managerial
opportunism. With low levels of managerial share ownership managers have limited voting power
and influence, while external block holders have the ability to monitor and restrict managerial
opportunistic behavior, therefore mitigating agency conflicts. Consequently, both external block
ownership and managerial share ownership have a positive effect on the managerial incentive
problems. In particular, both factors are hypothesized to be able to reduce managerial
opportunistic behavior, such that external block ownership has a complementary effect at low
levels of managerial share ownership.
This leads to the third hypothesis:
H3: At low levels of managerial share ownership, the level of external block
ownership is positively related to the firm’s debt ratio, ceteris paribus.
At high levels of managerial share ownership, the monitoring effect of external block ownership is
offset by the entrenchment effect arising from high managerial share ownership. Thus, the
effectiveness of external block ownership on managerial opportunism may be significantly
reduced. With managers having effective control, external block holders may not have the ability
to prevent self-interested managers from indulging in non-maximizing behavior. As a result,
external block ownership and managerial share ownership work in opposite directions at high
levels of managerial share ownership.
If the entrenchment effect of managerial share ownership exceeds the monitoring effect of
external block ownership, the significance of the relationship between external block ownership
and leverage will be reduced. The extent of the reduction depends on the magnitude of the
entrenchment effect. At the extreme, if the entrenchment effect dominates the monitoring effect,
the relationship between external block ownership and leverage will be ineffective. Due to the
confounding influences, it is not possible, a priori, to predict the specific relationship between
external block ownership and leverage at high levels of managerial share ownership. However,
what is known is that the relationship between external block ownership and leverage at high
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levels of managerial share ownership will not be as significant as compared to low levels of
managerial share ownership.
This leads to the fourth hypothesis:
H4: At high levels of managerial share ownership, the association between
external block ownership and the firm’s debt ratio is less significant than at
low levels of managerial share ownership, ceteris paribus.
As the consequence of time frame choice, the likelihood of different research findings in this
thesis from previous research is unavoidable. The referenced researches are studies that are
mostly conducted with the data and context pre-crisis period. Intuitively, it is believed to be very
different after the crisis period. For example, in Nigel et al.’s [2005] investigation that analyzes
the effect of ownership concentration on leverage in Korea and Indonesia in pre-Asian crisis, it is
found that the effect of concentration on leverage is positive and significant in both countries.
There is also some evidence of entrenchment effects in that ownership concentration >50% has
a positive effect on leverage in Korea (but not in Indonesia). However, in this thesis the research
time period is concentrated on the year 2000 - 2001. Hoping with this time frame there are many
aspects that are able to reveal the effect of the crisis and it will eliminate problems that are
probable to disturb the essence of this thesis.
3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter discusses four hypotheses about ownership structure and firm performance. These
hypotheses and their associated arguments are summarized below in Table 3.2. This
investigation contributes to this area of research by:
(a) Investigating whether the structure of equity ownership can help explain cross-sectional
variation in capital structure,
(b) Since corporate managers and external block holders are two groups of shareholders
who have an influence on decisions concerning the allocation of the firm’s resources, the
research focuses on the effects of managerial share ownership and external block
ownership on managerial incentives and consequently on the leverage ratio,
(c) Moreover, despite the widespread interest in the way firms make their financing
decisions, most of the capital structure research has been conducted in the United
States. There is limited evidence outside the United States. Therefore, this research will
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be one of extended efforts to investigate this topic in East Asian corporations in term of
post-crisis analysis.
In order to achieve the research objective, this thesis uses an agency framework to develop
several testable hypotheses, as follows:
(a) First, the external block ownership model identifies the effect of external block ownership
on managers’ incentives to reduce their non-diversifiable employment risks and adjust
the corporate debt ratio. In prior researches, external block ownership has traditionally
been defined as the share ownership by large non-managerial investors.
(b) Second, the managerial share ownership model looks at the effect of management
ownership on the level of debt.
(c) Third, the research develops a model that incorporates the effects of both external block
ownership and managerial share ownership on the corporate financing decision.
Table 3.2
The hypotheses of the Effect of Ownership structure on Capital Structure
Ownership Structures, Capital Structure, and Firm Performance:
An Analysis of Post East Asian Financial Crisis
CHAPTER 4
CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFOMANCE:
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE HYPOTHESES
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The topic of optimal capital structure has been the subject of many studies. It has been argued
that profitable firms were less likely to depend on debt in their capital structure than less
profitable ones. It has also been argued that firms with a high growth rate have a high debt to
equity ratio. Bankruptcy costs (proxied by firm size) were also found to be an important effect on
capital structure.1 If these three factors are considered as determinants of capital structure, then
these factors could be used to determine the firm’s performance. In practice, firm managers who
are able to identify the optimal capital structure are rewarded by minimizing a firm’s cost of
finance, thereby maximizing the firm’s revenue. If a firm’s capital structure influences a firm’s
performance, then it is reasonable to expect that the firm’s capital structure would affect the
firm’s health and its likelihood of default.
On the other side, theory suggests that the choice of capital structure may help mitigate these
agency costs. Under the agency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio
reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or
encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Since the seminal paper by
Jensen/Meckling [1976], a vast literature on such agency-theoretic explanations of capital
structure has developed.2 Greater financial leverage may affect managers and reduce agency
costs through the threat of liquidation, which causes personal losses to managers of salaries,
reputation, perquisites, etc.,3 and through pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest
expenses.4 Higher leverage can mitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers
1 See Kraus/Litzenberger [1973]; Harris/Raviv [1991]
2 See Harris/Raviv [1991] and Myers [2001] for review.
3 For example Grossman/Hart [1982], Williams [1987]
4 See Jensen [1986]
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concerning the choice of investment,5 the amount of risk to undertake,6 the conditions under
which the firm is liquidated,7 and dividend policy.8
A common testable prediction of this class of models that is vastly found in prior studies is that
increasing the leverage ratio should result in lower agency costs of outside equity and improved
firm performance, all else held equal. However, when leverage becomes relatively high, further
increases generate significant agency costs of outside debt – including higher expected costs of
bankruptcy or financial distress – arising from conflicts between bondholders and shareholders.
The purpose of this chapter is predominantly to take a closer look on the concepts and theories
of capital structure and firm performance. This chapter has a closed relation to Chapter 5 that
discusses the relationship between ownership structure and performance. The survey here is to
analyze the possibility of non-monotonic and endogeneity relationship of capital structure and
firm performance. Another objective is to emphasize the features of the theories that are relevant
in connection with empirical testing. In particular, the causal and dynamic aspects of the theories
are accentuated. The prior researches generally do not take into account the possibility of
reverse causation from performance to capital structure. If firm performance affects the choice of
capital structure, then failure to consider this reverse causality may result in simultaneous-
equations bias. That is, regressions of firm performance on a measure of leverage may confound
the effects of capital structure on performance with the effects of performance on capital
structure. Therefore, the remainder of the chapter is organized around two prominent
hypotheses about capital structure and firm performance. For each hypothesis, the literature on
performance and ownership structure has come up with several different empirical evidences or
arguments that may explain the relation that is postulated by the particular hypothesis. These
arguments are discussed one by one and concluding remarks follow.
4.2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE
A large body of literature has evolved to deal with cases where the Modigliani-Miller [1958]
results may not apply. Shareholders may not be able to undertake the same financial
transactions as firms and at the same price,9 or face credit constraints.10 The idea of the debt tax
5 See Myers [1977]
6 See Jensen/Meckling [1976], Williams [1987]
7 See Harris/Raviv [1990]
8 See Stulz [1990]
9 See Duffie [1987]
10 See Stiglitz [1988]
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shield has also been influential in altering the applicability of the original MM model.11 Another
major strand of literature, however, has evolved which suggests that leverage has a non-neutral
impact on firms’ behavior and performance, irrespective of whether or not arbitrage is possible,
thus leading to the generation of greater or lesser cash flows than if a firm were to be fully equity
financed.
In the alternative strand of literature, four ideas are relevant. The first is the incentive signaling
approach. If two firms have differing prospects, which are known by management but not
discerned by investors, debt can be used to signal the fact that prospects differ and equity issues
may be interpreted as a negative signal.12 Ross [1977] argues that a firm with better prospects
can issue more debt than one with lower prospects, because the issue of debt by the latter will
result in a higher probability of bankruptcy because of debt-servicing costs, which is a costly
outcome to management. Therefore, a higher level of debt will be associated with a higher level
of performance.
The second idea, one of resource constraints, is advanced by Jensen/Meckling [1976]. In the
situation where an entrepreneur has limited resources, then should capital be raised as equity or
debt becomes an issue. The placement of equity dilutes an owner-manager’s share of profits, and
thereby entrepreneurial incentives, motivating on-the-job consumption. Raising debt avoids the
sacrifice of incentive intensity since the entrepreneur can internalize to a greater degree the
benefits of superior profitability. Therefore, more highly leveraged firms will be more profitable,
since the entrepreneur or owner-manager will not have undertaken on-the-job consumption.
As Williamson [1988] contends, however, the modern corporation with no single owner-manager,
with diverse ownership, and there is separation of ownership and control, is more ubiquitous in
the contemporary industrial landscape. Therefore, the role that debt plays in influencing
corporate performance when it is a part of the capital structure of a large corporation, an
organizational form seen also in the Indian context, is more germane. The relevant idea with
which to address it is one of bonding.13 The behavioral assumption underlying the idea of bond-
ing is one of managerialism,14 and the bonding idea combines ideas of both incentive signaling
and resource constraint.
11 See Modigliani/Miller [1963]; Miller [1977]
12 See Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss [1984]; Leland/Pyle [1977]; Myers/Majluf [1984]
13 See Grossman/Hart [1986]; Jensen [1986]
14 See Marris [1964]
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Assuming that management owns little equity, as a result of which a switch from debt finance to
equity finance does not change managements’ benefit from an increase in profit directly, the
incentive effect of debt is to avoid bankruptcy, because the calling-in of a loan can quite easily
upset the liquidity position of a firm and jeopardize growth possibilities.15 Grossman/Hart [1986]
and Jensen [1986] assume managerial discretionary behavior and debt serves both as a signal as
well as a check on managerial discretion. The issuance of debt, a fact that is easily observed,
permits the market to make inferences about a firm’s strategies, the quality of projects and its
likely performance, and these influences are reflected in the market’s valuation of a firm. Since
the seeking of external funding exposes firms’ strategies to scrutiny, managers are exposed to
increased monitoring which inhibits their engagement in discretionary behavior and the threat of
default also elicits greater managerial effort.16
A firm may issue debt to persuade the market that the management will pursue profits, which
will generate the necessary cash so as to service the debt, rather than indulge in managerial
discretionary behavior. By issuing debt, management, as agent, deliberately changes its incentive
structure so as to bring it in line with those of shareholders, the principals, because of the
resulting impact on market value; or, in other words, management bonds itself to act in the best
interest of its shareholders. Hence, higher levels of debt in the firm’s capital structure will be
directly associated with higher performance levels.17 The principal hypothesis prevalent in the
literature is that a higher level of debt in a firm’s capital structure is associated with a higher level
of performance, leading to the generation of greater cash flows.
An alternative hypothesis, however, also exists in which states that high leverage is associated
with long-term performance declines. Debt holders are assumed to be more risk averse than
equity holders.18 Consequently, they force managers to abandon risky projects and cut back on
R&D expenditures. There is evidence suggesting that a negative relationship exists between R&D
intensity and long-term debts.19 Leverage is, therefore, associated with decline in firms’
innovativeness and the long-run consequence of such decline in innovativeness is a worsening of
performance.
15 See Baxter [1967]
16 See Jensen [1986]
17 See Grossman/Hart [1986]
18 See Smith/Warner [1979]
19 See Baysinger/Hoskisson [1989]
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4.3 THEORIES OF REVERSE CAUSALITY FROM PERFORMANCE TO CAPITAL
STRUCTURE
As noted, prior researches on agency costs generally do not take into account the possibility of
reverse causation from performance to capital structure, which may result in simultaneous-
equations bias. Berger/di Patti [2002] offer two hypotheses of reverse causation based on
violations of the Modigliani-Miller perfect-markets assumption. It is assumed that various market
imperfections (e.g., taxes, bankruptcy costs, asymmetric information) result in a balance between
those favoring more versus less equity capital, and that differences in profit efficiency move the
optimal equity capital ratio marginally up or down.20
Under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, firms that are more efficient choose lower equity ratios than
other firms, all else equal, because higher efficiency reduces the expected costs of bankruptcy
and financial distress. Under this hypothesis, higher profit efficiency generates a higher expected
return for a given capital structure, and the higher efficiency substitutes to some degree for
equity capital in protecting the firm against future crises. This is a joint hypothesis that:
i) profit efficiency is strongly positively associated with expected returns, and
ii) the higher expected returns from high efficiency are substituted for equity capital to
manage risks.
The evidence is consistent with the first part of the hypothesis, i.e., that profit efficiency is
strongly positively associated with expected returns in banking. Profit efficiency has been found
to be significantly positively correlated with returns on equity and returns on assets21 and other
evidence suggests that profit efficiency is relatively stable over time,22 so that a finding of high
current profit efficiency tends to yield high future expected returns.
The second part of the hypothesis – that higher expected returns for more efficient banks are
substituted for equity capital – follows from a standard Altman Z-score analysis of firm
insolvency.23 High-expected returns and high equity capital ratio can each serve as a buffer
against portfolio risks to reduce the probabilities of incurring the costs of financial
distress/bankruptcy, so firms with high-expected returns owing to high profit efficiency can hold
lower equity ratios. The Z-score is the number of standard deviations below the expected return
20 See Harris/Raviv [1991] and Myers [2001] for general discussions of the choice of capital structure, and see Berger,
Herring, and Szegö [1995] for a discussion that focuses on capital choices in banking.
21 See Berger/Mester [1997]
22 See DeYoung [1997]
23 See Altman [1968]
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that the actual return can go before equity is depleted and the firm is insolvent, Zi = (µi +
ECAPi)/σi, where µi and σi are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the rate of return
on assets, and ECAPi is the ratio of equity to assets. Based on the first part of the efficiency-risk
hypothesis, firms with higher efficiency will have higher µi. Based on the second part of the
hypothesis; a higher µi allows the firm to have a lower ECAPi for a given Z-score, so that firms
that are more efficient may choose lower equity capital ratios.
The franchise-value hypothesis focuses on the income effect of the economic rents generated by
profit efficiency on the choice of leverage. Under this hypothesis, firms that are more efficient
choose higher equity capital ratios, all else equal, to protect the rents or franchise value
associated with high efficiency from the possibility of liquidation. Higher profit efficiency may
create economic rents if the efficiency is expected to continue in the future, and shareholders
may choose to hold extra equity capital to protect these rents, which would be lost in the event
of liquidation, even if the liquidation involves no overt bankruptcy or distress costs.
Table 4.1
Hypotheses for Reverse Causality from Performance to Capital Structure
Prior evidence supports the notion that firms hold additional equity capital to protect franchise
value. For example, the relaxation of chartering rules the early 1980s appears to have resulted in
banks lowering their equity capital and taking on more portfolio risk, since they had less franchise
value to protect.24 Firms with unique products are also found to have higher equity capital ratios,
all else equal, as product uniqueness can create market power rents and the firm may hold extra
24 See Keeley [1990]
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equity capital to protect these rents.25 In banking, it is often argued that relationship lending
creates such rents because the bank has proprietary access to information about loan
customers.26 The franchise-value hypothesis is a joint hypothesis that profit efficiency is a source
of rents, and that banks hold additional equity capital to prevent the loss of these rents in the
event of liquidation.
These two hypotheses yield opposite predictions from one another for the effects of profit
efficiency on equity capital or leverage. The two individual effects may be thought of as
substitution and income effects. Under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, the expected earnings from
high profit efficiency substitute for equity capital in protecting the firm from the expected costs of
bankruptcy or financial distress, whereas under the franchise-value hypothesis, firms try to
protect the income from high profit efficiency by holding additional equity capital. Berger/di Patti
[2002] interpret their findings as the net effect of these two hypotheses. Thus, these hypotheses
are only partially identifiable in the sense that they can only distinguish which one is more
important than the other is.
This reverse causality is also found in the studies of Kovenock/Phillips [1997] that argue that the
potential for simultaneity between capital structure decisions and product market performance
largely stems from time-varying factors that affect all of the firms in an industry, such as capacity
utilization, demand condition, etc.
4.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPITAL
STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE
One of the main factors that could influence the firm’s performance is capital structure. Since
bankruptcy costs exist, deteriorating returns occur with further use of debt in order to get the
benefits of tax deduction. Therefore, there is an appropriate capital structure beyond, which
increases in bankruptcy costs, are higher than the marginal tax-sheltering benefits associated
with the additional substitution of debt for equity. Firms are willing to maximize their
performance, and minimize their financing cost, by maintaining the appropriate capital structure
or the optimal capital structure. Harris/Raviv [1991] argued that capital structure is related to the
trade-off between costs of liquidation and the gain from liquidation to both shareholders and
managers. Therefore, firms may have more debt in their capital structure than is suitable as it
25 See Titman [1984], Titman/Wessels [1988]
26 See Petersen/Rajan [1995]
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gains benefits for both shareholders and managers. However, as stated in the previous literature,
underestimating the bankruptcy costs of liquidation or reorganization, or the aligned interest of
both managers and shareholders, may lead firms to have more debt in their capital structure
than they should.27 Krishnan/Moyer [1997] found a negative and significant impact of total debt
to total equity (TD/TE) on return on equity (ROE). Another study by Gleason, Mathur and Mathur
[2000] found that firm’s capital structure has a negative and significant impact on firm’s
performance measures return on assets (ROA), growth in sales, and pre tax income. Therefore,
high levels of debt in the capital structure would decrease the firm's performance.
However, not only does a firm’s level of leverage affect corporate performance and failure but
also its debt maturity structure.28 Schiantarelli/Sembenelli [1999] investigated the effects of firms’
debt maturity structure on profitability for Italy and the United Kingdom. They found a positive
relationship between initial debt maturity and medium term performance. A study by
Barclay/Smith [1995] provides evidence that large firms and firms with low growth rates prefer to
issue long-term debt. Another study by Stohs/Mauer [1996] suggested that larger and less risky
firms usually make greater use of long-term debt. They also found that debt maturity is
negatively related to corporate tax, the firm’s risk and earning surprises. In other words, the
choice of debt structure could have an impact on both corporate performance and failure risk.
Furthermore, there are other factors, besides capital structure, that may influence firm
performance such as firm size, age, growth, risk, tax rate, factors specific to the sector of
economic activity, and factors specific to macroeconomic environment of the country.
Zeitun/Tian [2007] reported that the short-term debt to total assets has a positive and significant
effect on the market performance measure (Tobin’ s Q), which could to some extent support
Myers's [1977] argument that firms with high short-term debt to total assets have a high growth
rate and high performance. Meanwhile, Majumdar/Chhibber [1997] that investigated the
relationship between leverage, or the level of debt in the capital structure, and performance for a
large cross-section of Indian firms, found a negative relationship that is not in accordance with
the assumptions of theory as commonly accepted in Western economies.
Schiantarelli/Srivastava [1997] empirically investigate the determinants and consequences of the
term structure of debt. Using a rich panel of data on privately owned companies in India, they
also examine the influence of debt maturity structures on those firms’ performance, especially on
productivity. The results are not conclusive, but seem to support conventional beliefs about the
27 See, for example, Harris/Raviv [1991]
28 See Barclay/Smith [1995] and Ozkan [2002]
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importance of long-term finance to firm performance. Heavy leveraging, however, has a strong
negative impact on productivity.
A non-monotonic association between external (debt-like) financing and product market
outcomes is shown in Campello’s [2005] investigation that suggest that moderate debt taking by
a firm may, on the margin, yield market share gains. After some point, though, additional
indebtedness leads to significant sales underperformance.
By using a model of potential disagreement between managers and investors that leads to
testable predictions about both capital structure and dividend policy, Faulkender et al. [2005] find
that better corporate performance, and consequently higher agreement between the manager
and investors, results in lower debt-equity ratios. The better a firm performs; the greater is the
confidence that investors have in the manager’s ability to make future decisions that will also
result in good performance. Hence, the probability that investors will disagree with the manager’s
project choice declines and this makes it less expensive for the manager to make financial policy
choices that increase the manager’s project-choice control and reduce the investors’ ability to
block such project choices. In the other words, company performance determines capital
structure.
The same result also is revealed by Moon/Tandon [2007] that investigate whether the association
between leverage with the magnitude of growth opportunities. They find that performance,
which is proxied by earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets, has a negative
significant relationship to debt-to-equity ratio. This association exists significantly in large firms
with high and low growth, and in small firms with high growth.
4.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Based on the theoretical literature in section 2.5 (Chapter 2), agency problems are important in
determining not only ownership structures but also capital structures. The alternative capital
structures will lessen against different agency problems within signaling models on which this
thesis analysis is based. High leverage may reduce the agency costs of outside equity, and
increase firm value by encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Most
existing literature in this area seeks to investigate the relation between profits (internal finance)
and the choice between debt and equity (external finance). This however tends to be within a
single equation approach, thus ignoring the potential simultaneity in the determination of profits
and leverage. This is perhaps surprising when one considers the large literature that is concerned
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with determining the optimal capital structure at the firm level, see for example Rajan/Zingales
[1995], or Roberts [2002] and the literature discussed therein.
Berger/di Patti [2003] offer two hypotheses for the reverse causation from performance to capital
structure. First, firms that are more efficient choose lower equity ratios than others, all else
equal, because higher efficiency reduces the expected costs of bankruptcy and financial distress.
The second hypothesis focuses on the income effect of the economic rents generated by
efficiency (as an indicator of performance) on the choice of leverage. Thus firms that are more
efficient choose higher equity capital ratios, all else equal, to protect the rents or franchise value
associated with high efficiency from the possibility of liquidation. Prior evidence supports the
notion that firms hold additional equity capital to protect franchise value.29
Following the Berger/di Patti’s model, the exclusion of ownership structure variables may bias
tests of the agency costs hypothesis of the effects of capital structure on firm performance. The
author argues that ownership structure as well as capital structure should be included in studies
of agency costs, since the separation of ownership and control that creates the agency costs. A
number of prior studies examine the effects of capital structure on performance without
controlling for ownership structure,30 while others evaluated the effects of ownership structure on
performance without controlling for capital structure.31
If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure and vice versa, then the failure to take
this into account may result in serious simultaneity bias, with important implications for pattern
of firm financing and performance. In the light of the two-way relationship between capital
structure and firm efficiency, one needs to allow for the simultaneity between capital structure
and firm performance. Thus, hypothesis (5) and (6) are modified as follows:
H5: Firms with a higher level of external block holdings, low levels of managerial
share ownership, and higher firm performance are likely to have a higher debt
ratio, ceteris paribus.
H6: Firms with a higher level of external block holdings, low levels of managerial
share ownership, and higher debt are likely to have a higher firm
performance, ceteris paribus.
29 For example Keeley [1990]
30 For example Titman/Wessels [1988]
31 For example Mester [1993], Pi/Timme [1993], Gorton/Rosen [1995], DeYoung, Spong and Sullivan [2001]
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As argued above, firms with higher profit margins may substitute outside equity capital for debt.
On the other hand, it may also be true that firms that are more efficient try to protect the value
of their high income by holding more equity capital. The estimated coefficient of profit in the
leverage equation would capture the net value of these two possible and opposite effects.
As indicated above, one may also expect some non-linearity in the effects of firm performance on
capital structure so that firms at a higher level of efficiency may behave differently from those at
a lower level. Since I am not sure about the nature of this non-linearity, I experiment with a few
alternatives, namely, (a) inclusion of an additional square term of performance measure, (b)
replacing performance measure by its log (natural) and (c) inclusion of an additional inverse term
of the performance measure.
The agency cost hypothesis would predict that an increase in leverage raises efficiency. Some
may however argue that there is a possible non-linearity in the effects of leverage on profit
margin as a measure of firm efficiency as well. In particular, when leverage is sufficiently high,
further increases may result in lower efficiency because the benefits in terms of reduced agency
costs of outside equity are overcome by greater agency costs of debt.
4.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter discusses two hypotheses about capital structure and firm performance. These
hypotheses and their associated arguments are an extension of Berger/di Patti’s [2002]
investigation that offer two hypotheses of reverse causation based on violations of the
Modigliani-Miller perfect-markets assumption. These hypotheses become important because it
does not only allow for simultaneity between capital structure and firm performance, but also the
non-linearity in these relationships. These hypotheses are summarized below in Table 4.2.
The test of these hypotheses contributes to this area of research by:
(a) Investigating whether the simultaneity and non-linearity between capital structure and
firm performance exist in East Asian countries,
(b) Since corporate managers and external block holders are two groups of shareholders
who have an influence on decisions concerning the allocation of the firm’s resources, the
research focuses on the effects of managerial share ownership and external block
ownership on the leverage ratio and consequently on the firm performance, and
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(c) The research results will extent empirical evidence of reverse causality between capital
structure and firm performance.
In order to achieve the research objective, this thesis uses an agency framework to develop
several testable hypotheses, as follows:
(a) First, the external block ownership model, managerial share ownership model and firm
performance measures identifies the effect of these three variables on the corporate debt
ratio. In prior researches, firm performance is normally endogen variable.
(b) Second, the research develops a model that incorporates the effects of external block
ownership, managerial share ownership and the level of debt on the firm performance, to
look the effect of reverse causality and simultaneity between capital structure and firm
performance.
Table 4.2
The hypotheses on capital structure and firm performance
Ownership Structures, Capital Structure, and Firm Performance:
An Analysis of Post East Asian Financial Crisis
CHAPTER 5
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFOMANCE:
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE HYPOTHESES
5.1 INTRODUCTION
What are the characteristics of ‘good’ ownership structure? Does ownership structure matter for
firm performance? Why certain firms have large block holders and others do not? Should the
power of large shareholders be limited to avoid expropriation or encouraged to curb managerial
discretion? These questions have been largely explored in corporate finance literature and we
understand better now the intricacies of the relationship between ownership structure and firm
performance.
However, empirical evidence on the impact of shareholders with significant equity holdings on
corporate performance remains ambiguous. Various authors using different samples of firms and
different empirical strategies obtain different, difficult to compare and sometimes contradictory,
results. It is increasingly recognized that the problem in disentangling this relationship is largely
due to the pervasive endogeneity of ownership, which has to be taken into account in order to
obtain unbiased results. Nevertheless, the existing empirical evidence also suggests that the
relationship between ownership and performance may depend on the type of the firm and on the
period of observation in the life of the firm.
The objective of this chapter is first and foremost to take a closer look on the concepts and
theories of ownership structure and firm performance. These theories have grown considerably in
number and some of them have undergone serious refinements since the early days of Adam
Smith. However, the survey here is rather informal and leaves the more rigorous expositions for
the references. Another objective is to emphasize the features of the theories that are relevant in
connection with empirical testing. In particular, the causal and dynamic aspects of the theories
are accentuated. The remainder of the chapter is organized around five prominent hypotheses
about ownership structure and firm performance. For each hypothesis, the literature on
performance and ownership structure has come up with several different empirical evidences or
arguments that may explain the relation that is postulated by the particular hypothesis. These
arguments are discussed one by one and concluding remarks follow.
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5.2 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Prior researches have shown that the impact of ownership on firm performance is twofold. On
the one hand, concentrated ownership can provide for better control of management, as size of
ownership stake and the incentive to monitor are positively correlated. In turn, it should improve
firm performance and equally benefit minority shareholders. On the other hand, it can come with
costs for minority shareholders as the controlling owners might try to expropriate from them.
This is one of a number of private control benefits enjoyed by large block holders at the expense
of firm value.1 A number of surveys have attempted to measure these at the country level. For
example, Nenova [2000] documents differing levels of private control benefits across a large
cross-section of countries reflected in premiums paid for voting shares. Dyck/Zingales [2004]
document similar control premia paid in European block trades. Bebchuk [1999] argues that it is
rational for block holders to grab these private control benefits before managers do.
The existing literature is split concerning the effect of ownership on performance. Bebchuk/Roe
[1999] and Roe [2003] argue that what, at face value, appear to be inefficient ownership
structures (whether dispersed or concentrated), are in fact efficient in the context of their
institutional environment. Coffee [1999, p. 3] argues that the current ownership arrangements
are more a “product of a path-dependent history than the ‘neutral’ result of an inevitable
evolution toward greater efficiency.” If this second proposition is correct, then the predominant
ownership structure might not necessarily be the best performing one.
Thomsen et al. [2003] who showed that block holders might destroy firm value when studying
firms in the largest continental European countries confirm this suspicion. Nevertheless, all the
above evidence clearly implies that ownership structures matter for firm performance, whether
positively or negatively.
Acemoglu [1999b, 2004] has pointed out that the long-run equilibrium of economic institutions is
often sub-optimal. In his research, reform of institutional arrangements, within which it includes
corporate control and governance arrangements, might imply a possible loss to groups that
currently hold power. It is argued that as these groups cannot be credibly compensated ex-post
for their loss of power, they have an incentive to block change. The implication is that ownership
structures might not adjust perfectly to changes in economic conditions or the needs of the firm.
1 See Jensen/Meckling [1976], Grossman/Hart [1988].
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This view would predict that we would see inefficient ownership structures persist over time. As
Zingales/Rajan [2003, p. 2] state, “financial systems do not .... emerge simply as a result of their
superiority in a particular environment. The power of vested interest distorts the process of
evolution”.
These findings are in clear contradiction to Demsetz/Lehn [1985] and the research of
Demsetz/Villalonga [2001]. They argue that an optimal ownership structure is achieved through
private contracting between shareholders and management based on the value maximization
principle. The financing costs of concentrated ownership increase with firm size because families,
and other controlling investors, cannot diversify their portfolio. Therefore, a firm has a natural
incentive to move to a more diffuse ownership structure, and we should observe an optimal
ownership structure where the benefits of control and financing are at equilibrium. Consequently,
they argue that no relation between the two variables can be detectable, and empirically found
no relationship between ownership structure and performance for a sample of US firms between
1976 and 1980.
5.3 OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND PERFORMANCE
The nature of a corporation’s ownership structure will affect the nature of the agency problems
between managers and outside shareholders, and among shareholders. When ownership is
diffuse, as is typical for U.S. and U.K. corporations, agency problems will stem from the conflicts
of interest between outside shareholders and managers who own an insignificant amount of
equity in the firm.2 On the other hand, when ownership is concentrated to a degree that one
owner has effective control of the firm, as is typically the case in Asia, the nature of the agency
problem shifts away from manager-shareholder conflicts to conflicts between the controlling
owner (who is often also the manager) and minority shareholders.
Ownership concentration, i.e., the existence or degree of block holdings, is the most often
examined form of ownership measure.3 The following section examines its effect on
performance, before the reverse effect is considered in Section 5.3.1. Finally, the hypotheses
considered in the further analysis and their effects are summarized.
2 See Jensen/Meckling [1976]
3 For an overview over studies on ownership concentration and its effect on corporate control see Holderness [2003] and
Short [1994].
Chapter 5: Ownership Structure and Firm Performance:
Literature Review and The Hypotheses
84
5.3.1 Effect of Ownership Concentration on Performance
Table 5.1 gives a brief overview over the different hypothesized effects explained in this section
and the theories, of which they are based on.
The argument for a positive effect of ownership concentration on performance is given by the
shareholder-management agency conflict. The benefits of monitoring are increasing with share
size, while the occurred costs do not augment with the ownership concentration. A larger share
size thus increases the cost-efficiency of monitoring and due to this higher incentive enhances its
usage.4 Furthermore, a larger share size might even raise the shareholders’ capability of control,
since block holders are assumed to be better informed than average investors might. In addition,
this higher insight to the company also reduces the costs for explicit monitoring, which further
increases its cost-efficiency. Thus high ownership concentration leaves the shareholder not only
highly motivated to monitor the management but also more capable in controlling them.5
Table 5.1
Hypotheses for an Effect of Ownership Concentration on Performance
4 See Shleifer/Vishny [1986, p. 463].
5 See Bøhren/Ødegaard [2003, pp. 4-5], Bushee [1998, p. 309], Holderness [2003, p. 56], Shleifer/Vishny [1997, p.
754], and Shleifer/Vishny [1986]. This hypothesis is theoretically proven by the models of Grossman [1976],
Grossman/Hart [1980], Shleifer/Vishny [1986] and others as Bolton/von Thadden [1998], Burkart et al. [1997],
Huddart [1993], Leech [2001], and Maug [1998]. Empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis is found by several
studies as: Agrawal/Knoeber [1996], Agrawal/Mandelker [1990], Bebchuk/Fried [2003], Bertrand/Mullainathan [2000],
Brailsford et al. [2002], Carney/Gedajlovic [2002], Denis/Serrano [1996], Edwards/Weichenrieder [1999, 2004], Franks et
al. [1997], Gedajlovic/Shapiro [2002], Hill/Snell [1989], Hindley [1970], Kaplan [1989], Monsen et al. [1968], Mørck
et al. [1988], Pedersen/Thomsen [1998, 1999], Renneboog [2000], Short et al. [2002a], Wruck [1989], Yafeh/Yosha
[1995], and Zeckhauser/Pound [1990].
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While the ability to control the actions of the management rests on the control rights of the
share, the incentive for monitoring depends on the degree of alignment between the cash flow
function of the shareholder and the performance of the cooperation. Therefore, it depends on the
cash flow rights held by the shareholder. Recapitulating, the monitoring activity by the
shareholder is determined by the incentive through cash flow rights and the control capability
represented through the control rights. Hence, it is a conjoint effect, which can be viewed as a
product of the control and cash flow rights. For example, if the shareholder holds only a small
cash flow entitlement, he will not put much effort in monitoring activities, no matter how high his
control ability is. Consequently, an increasing divergence of control and cash flow rights causes a
mitigation of the monitoring effect.
The second group of hypotheses supports a negative effect of ownership concentration on
performance.6 An argument closely linked to the monitoring argument is the over-monitoring. It
was introduced and model theoretically proven by Burkart et al. [1997] and Pagano/Röell [1998].
They assume that the increased control reduces the space for self-realization of the management
and hence discourages the managers. This de-motivation renders the management less active.
The reduced managerial effort and space for initiative diminishes the firm performance.7 Fee
[2002] proves the importance of the over-monitoring argument by using the artistic stakes in the
film industry, where self-realization and motivation have a high impact. Similar to the monitoring
argument, the over-monitoring effect is conjointly determined by control and cash flow rights.
Accordingly, a high divergence reduces its strength.
A further negative effect based on agency theory is the theory of private benefits of control.8
While the higher information base and influence of a large shareholder is advantageous in
reducing the shareholder-management agency conflict, it also generates an additional conflict.
Since the large shareholder is better informed and has more control rights than minority
shareholders, he might use this to exploit possibilities for beneficial actions, which may endanger
for shareholder value.9 Apart from theoretical arguments by the models of Burkart et al. [1997]
and Zwiebel [1995] the existence of such benefits is empirically supported by several studies as
Barclay et al. [1993], Dyck/Zingales [2004], Zingales [1994], and Wruck [1989]. They prove
higher premiums for block trades, which have to stem from benefits only accessible for block
6 Such a relation was found by several studies as Hindley [1970], Lehmann/Weigand [2000], and Pedersen/Thomsen [1999].
7 See Burkart et al. [1997, p. 674] and Pagano/Roell [1998, pp. 187-190].
8 See Agrawal/Samwick [2003], Barclay/Holderness [1989], Dyck/Zingales [2004], Zingales [1994], and Zwiebel [1995]
9 See Barclay/Holderness [1989, p. 372] and Holderness [2003, pp. 55-56].
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holders. Prominent examples for such private benefits are self-trading or insider contracts.10
Furthermore, block holders and minority shareholders may also have different preferences
regarding time horizon and investment goals. An example is given by Fama/Jensen [1985] who
prove different investment rules for companies with large shareholders and a stronger retention
of dividends.11
Minority shareholders cannot prevent those damages given the large share and influence of the
block holder that creates a hold up problem.12 With the increase of control rights, the block
holder has more power to influence the company decisions, and it is more entrenched against the
sanctions of other shareholders; thus, the possibility of a successful execution of harmful actions
rises. The cash flow rights indicate the degree to which the damage of the company’s
performance is carried by the block holder and determine the opportunity costs of the
exploitation of the private benefits. Consequently, the increase of cash flow rights reduces the
incentive for a harmful action and a high divergence of control and cash flow rights strengthens
the negative effect of ownership concentration on performance.
5.3.2 Effect of Performance on Ownership Concentration
While many studies support the effect of ownership concentration on performance,
Demsetz/Lehn [1985] argue for the endogeneity of ownership and a reverse effect of
performance on ownership concentration. The hypotheses on this effect direction are
summarized in Table 5.2.
The most known hypothesis is the insider-investment argument that assumes a positive effect of
performance on ownership concentration. More already indicated in the previous section, a large
shareholder is better informed than minority shareholders or potential investors. He uses his
knowledge about the firm’s prospects to maximize his wealth. He capitalizes on his insights,
increases his ownership when expecting good financial performance, and decreases his share
when expecting the deterioration of financial performance. As a result, well performing firms
10 See Bebchuk [1999], Bebchuk et al. [2000], Burkart et al. [1997], Goshen [2003], Zingales [1994], and Zwiebel
[1995].
11 See also Anderson/Reeb [2003, p. 1304], Becht [1999], and Lemmon/Lins [2003, pp. 1445-1446 and p. 1466].
12 See Barclay/Holderness [1989] and La Porta et al. [2002, p. 1148]. This problem is similar to the general
entrenchment argument of insider ownership.
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should be higher concentrated than bad ones.13 The models by Grossman/Stiglitz [1976],
Grossman [1976, 1995], and Grossman/Hart [1980] provide a detailed rationale on how an
informed investor is able to generate higher returns on his investments than the average investor
is.
Table 5.2
Hypotheses for an Effect of Performance on Ownership Concentration
A further argument for the positive effect of performance on ownership concentration is the
profit-debt-ownership argument.14 It combines two effects: the modified pecking order
hypothesis and the substitution effect of agency devices. The modified pecking order hypothesis
by Myers/Majluf [1984] assumes a negative relation of performance on debt, since profitable
firms have more internal funds to finance their investments.15 The second element that is
proposed by Jensen/Meckling [1976] claims that financial leverage has a negative effect on
ownership concentration. Since leverage controls the agency conflicts between shareholders and
managers, the need for external capital to mediate the conflict decreases.16 Consequently,
performance decreases the leverage, which increases the ownership concentration. However, the
studies performed in the following include leverage as a control variable. Consequently, the effect
of leverage on ownership concentration will be represented in its coefficient and not be
detectable in the direct effect of performance on ownership. Hence, this hypothesis is not further
considered in this work.
13 See Anderson/Reeb [2003, p. 1303], Chang [2003], Demsetz/Lehn [1985], Lemmon/Lins [2003, p. 1446],
Loderer/Martin [1997, p. 237], and Thompson II [1976, p. 2].
14 See Jensen et al. [1992, p. 250].
15 The pecking order theory was first proposed by Donaldson [1961] to explain observed financial behavior of firms.
Myers/Majluf [1984] and Myers [1984] introduced a modified version with informational asymmetries and bankruptcy
costs to also influence capital structure policy. It states that, as far as firms can choose, they prefer internal over equity
financing and equity over debt financing.
16 See Jensen [1986, pp. 323-329].
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5.4 INSIDER OWNERSHIP AND PERFORMANCE
The effect of managerial ownership on performance has been intensively discussed since
Jensen/Meckling [1976], who introduced the management-shareholder agency conflict.
Accordingly, the most extensive research was done on this relation.17 However, as mentioned in
Chapter 2, the definition used for managerial or insider ownership varies in literature. In the
following explanations the denotations “insider ownership” and “managerial ownership” are used
synonymously and refer to cohesive shareholdings of management (and board) neglecting the
definition differences. Other forms of insiders such as company founders and families are not
considered. Nevertheless, the latter may be considered indirectly in the indirect shareholdings of
the management or board.
The sections are structured analogously to the previous chapters. First, the effects of insider
ownership and then the reverse effects by performance are examined. Finally, both sections are
summarized.
5.4.1 Effect of Insider Ownership on Performance
The early discussion of the effect of insider ownership on performance has its main arguments
that stem from 1976 and 1980. These arguments also have been combined to non-monotonous
effects. The two best-known combinations are stated together with the simple hypothesized
effects in Table 5.3.
The earliest argument was brought on by Jensen/Meckling [1976] and it is based on the
principal-agent theory. It assumes a positive effect of managerial stock ownership, since it adds a
factor depending on shareholder value to the utility function of the management. Thus, the
managerial utility function becomes more similar to that of the shareholders. Consequently, the
opportunity costs of harming actions rise and diminish their advantage for the management.18
Due to the assimilation of the utility functions, the hypothesis is called interest or incentive
alignment argument.19 Since the effect depends on the degree of loss due to harming actions, it
17 For a literature review on insider ownership and performance see Short [1994] and Holderness [2003]
18 See Benston [1985], Brandhoff [1999, p. 223], Byrd et al. [1998, pp. 18-19], Cebenoyan et al. [2000, p. 23],
Cui/Mak [2002, p. 315], and Jensen/Meckling [1976, p. 312-313]. Next to simple stock ownership, similar amelioration
of the agency conflict can be achieved through different compensation designs. See Byrd et al. [1998, pp. 19-21], Huddart
[1993], and Jensen/Murphy [1990].
19 See Achleitner/Wichels [2000, pp. 7 and 10], Bøhren/Ødegaard [2003, p. 5], and Cebenoyan et al. [2000, p. 23]
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depends on the cash flow rights. Accordingly, the divergence of ownership and control reduces
the strength of the effect and has a negative effect on performance.
Table 5.3
Hypotheses for an Effect of Insider Ownership on Performance
While many studies support the incentive alignment argument, many other studies find no or
even a negative relation, as for instance Ware [1975]. These contradicting results are explained
by a further hypothesis, implying a negative effect of insider ownership on performance. This
argument is called entrenchment argument and it was developed by Fama [1980], Fama/Jensen
[1983b], and Demsetz/Ricardo-Campbell [1983]. It is also based on the principal-agent theory.
Instead of reducing the conflict through an interest alignment, insider ownership is argued to
create a hold-up problem.20 Due to its share, the management can protect itself against
disciplining actions, the so-called managerial entrenchment.21 It averts punishment or reduces
the degree of possible punishment and thus allows the management to conduct firm-harming
actions at lower opportunity costs and risk.22 A rise in control rights strengthens the
entrenchment, while the cash flow rights increase the opportunity costs and reduce the incentive
for harming actions. Consequently, a high divergence of both worsens the performance loss.
20 The shareholder recognizes the opportunistic behavior of the management, but cannot prevent it. See Grossman/Hart
[1986], and Williamson [1975].
21 The notation "entrenchment hypothesis” was first introduced by Mørck et al. [1988, p. 294].
22 See Mørck et al. [1988, pp. 293-294], Shleifer/Vishny [1989, pp. 123-124], and Stulz [1988, pp. 27-28].
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One could argue that due to the incentive alignment the manager will not harm shareholder
value. However, his utility function does not only consist of monetary aspects, but also includes
factors such as power, prestige, and career prospects. Following the principle of diminishing
marginal rates of substitution, these aspects gain relatively more importance the wealthier a
manager is. If a manager holds a large share, he is probably wealthy and therefore less
motivated by money than by intrinsic factors.
Mørck et al. [1988] indicate that the entrenchment works through several channels:23
1. impeding owner’s and creditor’s control,
2. impeding control through the market for managerial labor,
3. impeding control through the market for corporate control, and
4. impeding control through product markets.
Next to the shareholder, the creditor has also a monitoring function. For firms with high
managerial ownership the control through other owners and creditors becomes inefficient, since
the other shareholders and creditors are relatively too weak to impose a sanction.24
Additionally Fama [1980] assumes a disciplining effect of the market for managerial labor.
However, he argues that highly concentrated managerial ownership would prevent any
competition for the managerial position.
Furthermore, the market of corporate control has a sanctioning function on opportunistic
behavior. A poorly performing company is more likely to become the object of a hostile takeover,
after which the management might be replaced. However, with rising managerial ownership the
management can more easily oppose the takeover.25 This was already supported by Weston
[1979], who found no hostile takeovers in the case of a managerial ownership above 30%.
Finally, Machlup [1967] argues that in the case of efficient product markets supernormal profits
do not exist. Therefore, if managers do not maximize profits, the company will fail. Yet, the
model by Hart [1983] proves that managerial ownership can cause even an entrenchment
against the control of product markets.
23 See Mørck et al. [1988, p. 294].
24 See Demsetz/Ricardo-Campbell [1983] and Fama/Jensen [1983b]
25 See Jensen/Ruback [1983], Mørck et al. [1988, p. 294], Stulz [1988, p. 50], and Walkling/Long [1984].
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Many studies combine those two contradicting hypotheses resulting in a non-monotonous effect.
The most famous example is Mørck et al. [1988], whose combination is graphically demonstrated
in Figure 5.1. They assume the incentive alignment argument to be linear, while the general
entrenchment argument is a monotonous, nonlinear effect with a large gradient for medium
managerial ownership. In Mørck et al.’s combined argument the incentive alignment dominates
the combined effect for low managerial ownership. For medium levels, the general entrenchment
forces a negative effect. The combined effect again turns positive for high managerial
ownership.26
Figure 5.1
Mørck et al.’s Combined Argument
Source: Gross, Kerstin [2007]. “Equity Ownership and Performance” First Edition, Physica-Verlag: Berlin, p. 51.
5.4.2 Effect of Performance on Insider Ownership
Apart from the many studies on the effect of insider ownership on performance, some
researchers analyze whether the direction of causality is assumed right. The literature knows two
26 The N-shape was often applied as for instance by Brailsford et al. [2002], Chen et al. [1993], Chen/Ho [2000], Cho
[1998], Cleary [2000], Cui/Mak [2002], Gler et al. [2003b], Hermalin/Weisbach [1991], Hubbard/Palia [1995], Kole [1996],
Mudambi/Nicosia [1998], Short/Keasey [1999], Short et al. [2002a, 1994], and Welch [2003]. However, the thresholds of
5% and 25% were often altered.
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main hypotheses stating a positive or no effect of performance on insider ownership. These are
given in Table 5.4.
The first argument for a positive effect is the reward argument.27 Shareholders try to use the
incentive alignment effect to ameliorate the firm’s performance. Next to performance-based
salaries, they also use stock grants or options as remuneration.28 Managers of a well performing
company receive shares or options that will be executed in the case of high performance. Con-
sequently, the insider ownership rises with performance.29 However, there is no consensus on the
time period the performance data should be taken from. While some take the previous year’s
performance, others rely on the same year’s performance.
Table 5.4
Hypotheses for an Effect of Performance on Insider Ownership
The second effect, the insider-reward argument, is introduced by Cho [1998]. He hypothesizes
that managers will choose or accept equity compensation if they expect the firm to perform well.
They anticipate bad performance by trying to decrease the equity-based component of their
remuneration. As a result, insider ownership increases when insiders expect good performance. If
27 See Kole [1996, p. 16
28 See Byrd et al. [1998, pp. 18-21], Huddart [1993], and Jensen/Murphy [1990]. For studies on the effect of the salary
level and management turnover see Baker et al. [1988], Dahya et al. [1998], Denis/Serrano [1996], and Warner et al. [1988].
For performance based bond see Baker et al. [1988], Bushman et al. [1996], Gilson [1989], Kaplan [1994], Lambert/Larcker
[1987], Murphy/Zimmerman [1993], and Sloan [1993]; for accounting based bond see Banker et al. [1996] and Kole/Lehn
[1997] and for market-based bond see Yermack [1995] and Mehran [1995].
29 See Lorie/Niederhoffer [1968], Masson [1971, p. 1291], and McEachern [1975, pp. 92-93].
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their expectations hold true, which is likely due to the inside knowledge, high performance
correlates with high managerial ownership.30
The third explanation does not originate from the research field of managerial remuneration. The
insider-investment argument states that managers might capitalize on their insider knowledge
regarding the firm’s prospect. When they expect the financial performance to improve, they
increase their share and decrease it in the case of performance deterioration.31 Most countries
circumscribe the possibility for insider investment. But even if insider trading immediately before
announcements is forbidden by insider legislation, opportunities for capitalizing on the insight in
periods without announcements still exist.32
Besides the fact that, compared to the reward arguments, literature deals more often with the
insider-investment argument, its importance is further supported by statistical data. Forbes (ed.)
[1991] names a sum of $0.6 million as average stock grants for the CEOs of the 800 largest US
corporations in 1991. In comparison Holderness et al. [1999] report for a sample of 4,200
publicly listed US companies in 1995 combined holdings by officer and directors of $73.0 million.
The simple adjustment for the sample size difference results in a comparative value of $3.15
million of CEO stock grants. This equals 4% of the total managerial ownership in 1995. It seems
very unlikely that 96% of the insider holdings belong to other insiders than CEO or that the
values changed that dramatically in four years.33 This indicates that a large part of managerial
ownership arises from personal investments rather than from equity remuneration.
5.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Reflecting to Holderness’s investigation, in a reverse-causation problem the real causation runs in
the opposite direction of the assumed one. This might yield significant results, but gives a wrong
picture of the relation.34 An effect may not only run the other direction than assumed yielding a
reverse-causation problem, but there maybe even a multidirectional causation. The resulting
30 See Cho [1998, p. 115] and Yermack [1997].
31 Lorie/Niederhoffer [1968] started a whole series of papers examining if insider can outperform other investors by using their
inside knowledge. See Ahuja et al. [2005], Beneish/Vargus [2002], Burton et al. [2003], Bushman et al. [2005],
Chalmers et al. [2002], Gombola et al. [1999], Hanson/Song [1995], Hu/H. [2001], Lee [2002], Pescatrice et al. [1992], and
Zhang [2005]
32 See Mußler [2005], Loderer/Martin [1997, p. 237], and Mathiesen [2002, p. 20]. Studies analyzing the insider-
investment argument are Demsetz [1986], Eckbo/Smith [1998], Hermalin/Weisbach [1991], Jaffe [1974], Loderer/Martin
[1997], Rozeff/Zaman [1988], and Seyhun [1986]
33 Especially if considering the probably higher stock remuneration for CEOs compared to other insiders and for CEOs of
the largest 800 companies compared the market.
34 See Holderness [2003, p. 58].
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endogeneity or simultaneous equations bias is very likely to exist in analyses of ownership and
performance. As theory contains effects for both directions, from ownership on performance and
vice versa, it supports the assumption of simultaneous reciprocal determination of ownership and
performance. Although the endogeneity was already addressed by Demsetz/Lehn in 1985 and is
widely accepted by researchers, it is rarely modeled in empirical studies.
Since it is limited and until now the author knows only six studies that model ownership and
performance simultaneously.35 Therefore, the ignorance of an existing endogeneity bias has
resulted in inconsistent estimates and confused directions of causation. The results of these six
studies partly differ drastically from those of studies without modeled endogeneity.36 Therefore,
the consideration of the simultaneous causation estimated by the simultaneous equations method
is seen as the main advantage of this study.
Like Cho [1998] who has extended the argument of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) by examining the
interdependence of managerial ownership, investment, and corporate value, in this study tries to
develop the simultaneous causation of the ownership-performance relationship. In his study,
drawing on Demsetz/Lehn [1985], simultaneous regression analysis was utilized to control for
endogenity and it was found that ownership structure was endogenously determined by
corporate value (as measured by Tobin's Q). It was also reported that investment and not
managerial ownership significantly influenced corporate value. Cho [1998] concluded that
managers in firms with higher Tobin's Q, or with better investment opportunities tend to hold a
higher fraction of their firm's shares. However, he found no evidence that managerial ownership
had a causal effect on investment or corporate value.
In the light of finding new evidences in simultaneous causation, the same consideration could be
applied in the two-way relationship between ownership structure and firm value. Thus, one needs
to allow for the simultaneity between ownership structure and firm performance.
This leads to the seventh, eight, ninth and tenth hypothesis:
H7: Firms with a higher level of external block holdings and a higher debt ratio are
likely to have higher firm performance, ceteris paribus.
H8: Firms with low levels of managerial share ownership and higher debt are
likely to have a higher firm performance, ceteris paribus.
35 See Agrawal/Knoeber [1996], Bøhren/Ødegaard [2003], Cho [1998], Demsetz/Villalonga [2001], and Loderer/Martin [1997].
36 See Mathiesen [2002, p. 47].
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H9: Firms with higher debt and higher firm performance are likely to have a higher
level of external block holdings, ceteris paribus.
H10: Firms with higher debt and higher firm performance are likely to have low
levels of managerial share ownership, ceteris paribus.
The effect of general ownership concentration on performance is unclear due to the contradicting
hypotheses. That is, while the concentration could lead to better monitoring and consequently to
better performance, it could also trigger managerial de-motivation with a negative effect on
performance. Furthermore, the block holder could use control to consume private benefits at the
expense of other shareholders and firm performance.
However, performance can also determine ownership concentration. Large shareholders use their
better company knowledge to increase their share if they assume good performance or to sell it
in the case of a bad firm’s prospect.
For the effect of insider ownership on performance, two contradicting arguments exist. While the
managerial ownership aligns the managers’ incentive with shareholders’ interest, it can also
entrench the management against controlling and sanctioning actions. The divergence of control
and cash flow rights has a negative effect on performance, since the cash flow rights form
opportunity costs of opportunistic behavior and benefits for shareholder-value-oriented actions.
The effect of performance on insider ownership is assumed, if existent, as positive. The first
argument is that shareholders try to use managerial stock ownership or option plans as incentive
alignment; thus, they reward the management for good performance with stocks. Second, the
management of well performing companies favors stock remuneration and is more likely to
accept or to promote those compensation designs. Finally, the managers use their insider
knowledge to perform legal forms of insider trading. They increase their share if the company is
perceived as well performing and reduce it in the case of bad firm prospects.
In order to see the simultaneity of combined effect of ownership concentration and insider
ownership on performance, it is arranged another hypothesis that leads to the eleventh
hypothesis, which has the same function with the sixth hypothesis in Chapter 4 (Capital Structure
and Firm Performance). Therefore the test of combined effect of ownership concentration and
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insider ownership on performance will be done as well as the test of capital structure effect on
performance.
H11 or H6: Firms with a higher level of external block holdings, low levels of
managerial share ownership and a higher debt ratio are likely to have
higher firm performance, ceteris paribus.
This hypothesis is intended to analyze whether both level of external block holding and
managerial share ownership influence the firm performance or not. A simultaneous equations
model assuming the performance as well as the different ownership forms as exogenous allows
the consideration of ownership interactions and the clear separation of their effects on
performance.
5.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter discusses four hypotheses about ownership structure and firm performance. These
hypotheses and their associated arguments are an extension of few studies in the field of
ownership structure and firm performance that consider firm performance as endogenous
variable. These hypotheses become important because it does not only allow for simultaneity
between ownership structure and firm performance, but also it tests the endogeneity of
performance in this relationship. These hypotheses are summarized below in Table 5.5.
The test of these hypotheses contributes to this area of research by:
(a) Investigating the possibility that an effect may not only run the other direction than
assumed yielding a reverse-causation problem, but there maybe even a multidirectional
causation,
(b) As theory contains effects for both directions, from ownership on performance and vice
versa, it supports the assumption of simultaneous-reciprocal determination of ownership
and performance. Although the endogeneity was already addressed by Demzets/Lehn in
1985 and is widely accepted by researchers, it is rarely modeled in empirical studies. The
author knows only six studies that model ownership and performance simultaneously,37
and
(c) The research results will extent empirical evidence of simultaneity between ownership
structure and firm performance.
37 See Agrawal/Knoeber [1996], Bohren/Odegaard [2003], Cho [1998], Demzets/Villalonga [2001], Gross [2007], and
Loderer/Martin [1997].
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In order to achieve the research objective, this thesis uses an agency framework to develop
several testable hypotheses, as follows:
(a) First, the external block ownership model and managerial share ownership model identify
the effect of these two variables on firm performance, respectively.
(b) Second, the research develops a model that incorporates the effects of firm performance
on external block ownership and managerial share ownership with the level of debt as
control variable, to look the effect of reverse causality and simultaneity between
ownership structure and firm performance.
Table 5.5
The Hypotheses on Ownership Structures and Firm Performance
Ownership Structures, Capital Structure, and Firm Value:
An Analysis of Post East Asian Financial Crisis
CHAPTER 6
MODEL, METHODOLOGY AND DATA
This chapter includes the model and the methodology to use when this study is conducted. To
deduct the model specifications, the following section first elaborates on crucial model issues in
the ownership performance literature. Especially the endogeneity discussion in Section 6.1.2, it
gives also justification of the estimation method used, the simultaneous equations, which is
explained in Section 6.1.3. Furthermore, the methodology underlying the empirical study done in
this thesis will be presented.
6.1 MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
6.1.1 Linearity and Monotonousness
One bias always present in economic literature is the model specification error. In the ownership
and performance literature, there are several issues to be considered to minimize the potential
model specification error and subsequent bias of results. This section elaborates on the treatment
of different model specification issues in literature. Based on these discussions the models
analyzed in this work are deducted.
In the ownership literature, a severe model specification error may lie in the assumed shape of
the relationship. From the early studies in the 1960s until today, many studies have supposed a
linear effect.1 This surprises considering that a multitude of studies result in a nonlinear and even
non-monotonous relation of ownership and performance, with the first indication given by
Monsen et al. [1968].2 Furthermore, the variety of contradicting effects argues also for a
potential nonlinear relation. However, given the contradicting empirical evidence the exact shape
is still unclear.
A frequently modeled shape of the effect of managerial ownership is given by Mørck et al.
[1988]. They use a piecewise regression with two turning points of 5% and 25%, cutting the
1 See Demsetz/Lehn [1985], Jacquemin/De Ghellinck [1980], Kamerschen [1968], Kamerschen/Paul [1971], Larner [1966],
Leech/Leahy [1991], McEachern [1975], Mehran [1995], Murali/Welch [1989], Pedersen/Thomsen [1999], Radice [1971],
Round [1976], Stano [1976], Steer/Cable [1978], and Thonet/Poensgen [1979].
2 See Chen et al. [1993], Cho [1998], Cleary [2000], Cui/Mak [2002], Gugler et al. [2003b], Hermalin/Weisbach
[1991], Holderness et al. [1999], Hubbard/Palia [1995], Kole [1996], McConnell/Servaes [1990, 1995], Monsen et al.
[1968], Mørck et al. [1988], Short/Keasey [1999], Short et al. [2002a, 1994], Stulz [1988], Welch [2003], and Wruck
[1989].
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function in three parts. Many studies copy this approach and find a significantly positive relation
of ownership and performance in the first range from zero to 5%.3 Other adjust the range size
such as Chen et al. [1993] and Cho [1998], who use a range from zero to 7%. Nevertheless,
they still find evidence for a positive effect. The second part of the function is also proven
significant by the majority of studies indicating a negative relation.4 Chen et al. [1993] also alters
the second turning point to 12% and Cho [1998] to 38%. Yet, both find a negative relation for
their definition of the second piece of the function. However, for the last range of the function
ending at 100% none of the studies finds significant evidence for an effect.
Figure 6.1 shows that the result is a two-parted function with a maximum potentially
approximating a bell-shaped relation. If so, the results would concur with Stulz’s [1988]
hypothesis that assumes a parabolic relation. Stulz [1988] ranges the shape from zero to 50%,
since the probability of a takeover vanishes at an insider ownership of theoretically 50% or
higher. This high threshold may be exaggerated, since already a smaller share might guarantee
the control over a firm. This holds especially under the condition of other entrenchment activities
reducing the threshold. For example, Weston [1979] supports Mørck et al. [1988]’s lower
threshold. He finds evidence that no hostile takeover has been observed with an insider
ownership over 30%.
Besides the studies by Chen et al. [1993] and Cho [1998],5 five further studies present
significantly different turning points. Hermalin/Weisbach [1991] document a bell shape from zero
to 5%, with a maximum at 1%. In contrast, Short et al. [1994] observe a positive effect from
zero to 68% and a weakly significant and negative effect from 68% to 100%. The two studies by
McConnell/Servaes [1990, 1995] produce similar results of a bell shape peaking at 50%. Finally,
Short/Keasey [1999] use a third degree polynomial with a maximum at 16% and a minimum at
42%. Except for the latter, the assumed effect shapes are illustrated in Figure 6.1.
One explanation for the different thresholds is given by Mathiesen [2002]. He argues that larger
firms have a bell closer to zero.6 The dispersion of shareholdings is higher for large firms; thus,
only a small share is needed for controlling the firm. The studies support this hypothesis.
Hermalin/Weisbach [1991] consider a small sample of very large firms. In contrast, Short et al.
[1994] use small firms and McConnell/Servaes [1990, 1995] use a large sample including both
3 See Holderness et al. [1999], Hubbard/Palia [1995], Kole [1996], McConnell/Servaes [1990], Mørck et al. [1988], and
Wruck [1989]
4 See Hubbard/Palia [1995], Mørck et al. [1988], Wruck [1989] and Holderness et al. [1999] with their 1935 sample.
5 Chen et al. [1993] and Cho [1998] change the threshold to 7% and 12% or 7% and 38% respectively
6 See Mathiesen [2002, p. 33] and Kole [1995]
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small and large companies. Furthermore, Kole [1995] analyzes the studies of Mørck et al. [1988]
and McConnell/Servaes [1990], which are based on the same model, and concludes that the
differences in the results are caused by such a size effect.
Figure 6.1
Comparison of Different Shapes of the Managerial Ownership – Performance
Relation in Literature; Only Considering the Effect Direction Not the Strength
Source: Gross, Kerstin [2007]. “Equity Ownership and Performance” First Edition, Physica-Verlag: Berlin, p. 71.
Short/Keasey [1999] explain their deviating evidence by the scope of their study on the United
Kingdom. The institutional differences cause a nation effect on the shape of the relation. In
particular, they argue that US managers become more easily entrenched than UK managers do.
The importance of national differences and their effect on the ownership structure and the cor-
porate governance are also shown in comparative studies by La Porta et al. [1999] and
Faccio/Lang [2002].
Another explanation for the differing results is the estimation method used. Studies using a
squared ownership measure or a third degree polynomial assume that the shape fully ranges
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from zero to 100%.7 In contrast, a piecewise modeled function is flexible in its range and turning
points. Due to its flexibility and its simple application the piecewise approach, it can not only
proxy a third-degree polynomial but also more complex functions. Furthermore, high collinearity
between simple and, for example, squared measures could cause a multicollinearity bias in
polynomial functions, reducing significance of coefficients. However, in the case of an exact
polynomial relationship in reality the fit of a piecewise model could be worse, since it assumes
linear pieces and no curves. Yet, this case is not very likely regarding the multitude of possible
functions. Therefore, the piecewise approach is preferable to complex polynomials.
6.1.2 Endogeneity, Simultaneousness and Causation
A further modeling aspect argued in the ownership performance literature is the issue of
endogeneity and the direction of causation. Already the existence of hypotheses of effects in both
directions argues for endogeneity and simultaneity within the ownership and performance
relation and requires the incorporation of these effects. Bøhren/Ødegaard [2003] use the
assumed mechanisms and the modeled causations to classify the existing research by the two-
by-two matrix shown in Figure 6.2.8
Most of the studies belong to the first cell. They assume that ownership is exogenous and
causation runs only in one way. Examples are Mørck et al. [1988] and McConnell/Servaes [1990],
who analyze the effect of ownership on performance. Other studies prove the reverse direction of
causation, from performance to ownership.9
Demsetz/Lehn [1985] founded the second generation, as they were the first to argue that in
equilibrium the ownership structure is endogenously determined. Although ownership is viewed
as endogenous, only one way of causation is modeled. Himmelberg et al. [1999] support the
argumentation, but also does not consider both effect directions.
As a two-way causation model always implies the endogeneity of at least one mechanism, the
third cell is not feasible.
7 Examples for a squared variable are McConnell/Servaes [1990, 1995], and Short et al. [1994]. The third-degree
polynomial is applied by Short/Keasey [1999, p. 86]
8 See Bøhren/Ødegaard [2003, pp. 7-8]
9 See Baesel/Stein [1979], Demsetz [1986], Jaffe [1974], Kole [1996], Murphy [1985], Pope et al. [1990], Rozeff/Zaman
[1988], Seyhun [1986], and Yermack [1996].
Chapter 6: Model, Methodology and Data
102
Figure 6.2
Classification of Studies Based on Endogeneity and Causation
Source: Gross, Kerstin [2007]. “Equity Ownership and Performance” First Edition, Physica-Verlag: Berlin, p. 76.
The last generation of studies models the endogeneity and two-way causation resulting in a
simultaneous equations model. Only five studies of the fourth generation are known to the
author: Agrawal/Knoeber [1996], Bøhren/Ødegaard [2003], Cho [1998], Demsetz/Villalonga
[2001], and Loderer/Martin [1997]. While Agrawal/Knoeber [1996] do not give information about
the causation, the others find interesting new evidence. The approaches of the first and fourth
generation applied on the same data produce tremendously different results. For example, Cho
[1998] finds an effect of ownership on performance in the ordinary least squares (OLS) model. In
contrast, the simultaneous equation model indicates the reverse causation running from
performance to ownership and leaving the traditional effect of ownership on performance in-
significant.
This example illustrates the bias resulting from lacking consideration of existing endogeneity. The
so-called simultaneous equations bias yields in confused directions of causation and/or
inconsistent estimates. Consequently, the results of the studies of the first and second generation
have to be questioned.10
10 See Mathiesen [2002, p. 47]
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Therefore, a test for simultaneity of effect, such as a Hausman test, appears necessary to
exclude the possibility of an endogeneity bias. This test is conducted by only two studies:
Hermalin/Weisbach [1991] reject the hypothesis of simultaneity justifying its neglect.11 In
contrast, Himmelberg et al. [1999] find simultaneity, but do not reflect it in their model leaving
their results questionable.12 Consequently, due to the different facts arguing for simultaneity of
ownership and performance endogeneity should not only be tested but it should further be
incorporated in the resulting model, if statistically proven.
Furthermore, not only performance and ownership may suffer from the simultaneity bias, but
also the different ownership types themselves as indicated by their interaction stated by theory.
Especially the substitution effect of agency devices by Jensen/Meckling [1976] and Jensen [1986]
argues for an interdependence of the ownership aspects, such as block ownership, institutional
ownership, and managerial ownership. Since these ownership types are theoretically agency
devices, they influence each other’s cost-efficiency and hence the extent of their usage. Thus,
the simultaneous model has to be extended to the different agency devices and ownership
aspects.
Hermalin/Weisbach [1991] examine the interactions of managerial ownership and board
composition, while Crutchley/Hansen [1989] and Jensen et al. [1992] simultaneously consider the
effects of managerial ownership, debt, and dividend policy. Moyer et al. [1992] consider even
more monitoring mechanisms: board composition, insider and institutional ownership, analyst fol-
lowing as well as debt and dividend policy. Yet, they do not study them in a simultaneous setting.
Holthausen/Larcker [1993] are the first to introduce performance as further endogenous variable
analyzing the effects of managerial ownership, capital structure policy, and performance.
Agrawal/Knoeber [1996] combine the approaches of Moyer et al. [1992] and Holthausen/Larcker
[1993] by first modeling insider and institutional ownership, block holding, debt policy, board
composition, and CEO tenure simultaneously. In a second step, they analyze the effects on firm
performance. Yet, they do not study the several ownership forms simultaneously with
performance as endogenous variable in order to consider both the endogeneity between
ownership and performance and that of ownership itself.
In this thesis, a simultaneous equations model assuming the performance as well as the different
ownership forms as exogenous allows the consideration of ownership interactions and the clear
separation of their effects on performance. Consequently, the model applied in this work picks up
11 See Hermalin/Weisbach [1991, p. 106]
12 See Himmelberg et al. [1999, p. 373]
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this thought by forming five hypotheses with both performance and the different ownership
aspects as exogenous, interdependent variables.
6.2 SAMPLE SELECTION AND VARIABLE USED
In order to investigate the relationship between the structure of equity ownership and corporate
financing policies, a range of data are needed. The countries studied in this thesis are Indonesia,
South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, the seven countries
that were involved in the East Asian Financial crisis. Although other East Asian countries (and
other emerging markets outside Asia) were affected by the crisis, the five of those seven
countries considered here suffered disproportionately in terms of stock market decline and
currency depreciation (see Table 6.1 and Figure 6.3).
Table 6.1
Five East Asian Countries – Crisis Statistics
Source: Todd Mitton (2001)
Therefore, for the companies included in this research sample, it is set some criteria, as follows:
(1) each firm must have financial data reported in the Worldscope database, which is the
primary data source used in this study,
(2) the primary business segment of each firm must not be in financial services, that is, not
in standard industrial classification (SIC) 6000 – 6999,
(3) each firm must be identified in Worldscope as being included in the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) global index. The IFC includes firms in the global index only if they are
among the largest and liquid firms in a given market.
The sample selection process is outlined in Table 6.2. The final sample consists of 532 firms from
the eight crisis countries. In general, the sample is representative of larger firms that trade on
the major stock exchange of each country. Small listed firms and other unlisted firms, including
large multinationals with no local listing (which can make significant contributions to GDP) are
not represented in the sample. Table 6.3 shows that Korea has the most firms in the sample,
with 232 firms, and Taiwan has the fewest, with 19 firms. The median size of firms, in terms of
total assets, also varies, with Taiwan having the largest (a median size of over $545.10 million)
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and Indonesia is the smallest (a median size of over $94.24 million). The average proportion of
firms’ capital structure, in terms of debt ratio, also varies, with Indonesia having the largest (an
average size of over 70.06%) and Malaysia is the smallest (an average size of over 43.76%)
Figure 6.3
East Asian Stock Market Indices
Source: Todd Mitton (2001)
Time horizon
The reason for choosing the time horizon 2000 - 2001 is mainly that the period of post-2000 is
believed as the period of recovery of the crisis. The research chooses to 2-years observation due
to the fact and intention to portrait the post Asian financial crisis environment. In addition, the 2-
years observation is hoped to be able to give enough information of the relationship between
ownership structure and firm performance at the time of emerging East Asian Capital Market.
Population
The research considers the population of the study to be all non-regulated firms where the
companies involved are listed on the stock market within one of East Asian Capital Market, such
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as Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX – Indonesia), SET (Bangkok - Thailand), KLSE (Kuala Lumpur -
Malaysia), KRX (Seoul - Korea), PSE (Manila - Philippines), SEHK (Hong Kong), and TSEC (Taipei
– Taiwan), and the time period chosen. For each sample firm, the following items are collected:
(a) the share ownership of the top two, top five and all directors. This includes both
executive and non-executive directors;
(b) the share ownership of the top 10 largest shareholders; and
(c) the distribution of shareholders and their holdings.
The sources that have been used to find the required data are Thomson One Banker,
Worldscope, and DataStream.
Table 6.2
Sample Selection Process
1. Initial sample (companies, which are listed in JSX (Jakarta), SET
(Bangkok), KLSE (Kuala Lumpur), SSE (Seoul), PSE (Manila),
SEHK (Hong Kong), and TSEC (Taipei – Taiwan) during 2000 –
2001, have passed the SIC screen)
1633
2. Exclude the companies that have not complete ownership data to
determine the external block holders and managerial share
ownership
(460)
3. Removed from the sample because an incomplete data, such as
intangible assets and long-term debt (641)
4. Final sample 532
I supplement the Worldscope data with ownership information from the Asian Company
Handbook 2000, Hong Kong Company Handbook 2000, the Handbook of Indonesian Companies
2000, the Philippine Stock Exchange Investments Guide 2000, and the Securities Exchange of
Thailand Companies Handbook 2000 to complete the ownership profiles of the sample (Table
6.3). I exclude companies which that proxy ownership that cannot be traced to a specific owner.
In all cases, I collect the ownership structure as of December 2000 or the end of the 2000 fiscal
year (March 2001).
In Table 6.3, it is presented summarily the transaction characteristics. It includes some important
characteristics, such as financial statistics (total assets and debt ratio), ownership structures
(external block ownership and managerial ownership), and sample inclusion.
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Table 6.3
Sample Characteristics
6.2.1 Ownership Variables
All ownership measures used in these analyses refer to cohesive shareholding, since both direct
and indirect ownership influence the control ability and the incentive structure of the owner. To
measure the ownership concentration (external block holders) that should reproduce the
existence and power of a controlling shareholding, the control rights of the 10 largest
shareholders are used in the variable external block ownership (EBO). The extension of the
concentration measure to further shareholders by using for example the share of the three
largest shareholders is discarded for two reasons. First, the existence of concentration effects,
such as private benefits, depends mainly on the largest shareholder. Indeed, it is possible that
large shareholders form alliances to conjointly exploit potential benefits. However, as explained in
Section 5.3.1, the probability of shareholder coalitions and therefore, the necessity of shareholder
aggregation by concentration measures depend on the general level of concentration present in
the market.
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Similarly, the total of insider shares is applied with managerial share ownership (MSO) being the
sum of control rights owned by managers. It is done to examine the effect of the insider
definition, which is the combined ownership of management and board. In addition, since the
ownership variables were not extracted from an existing database but collected within the scope
of this work and crosschecked, the probability of recording error is low. Therefore, no data
processing is applied to avoid an information reduction. Table 6.4 gives an overview the used
variable used and their definition.
Table 6.4
Definition of Ownership Variables
6.2.2 Capital Structure and Financial Performance Variables
Based on the discussion on financial performance measures in Section 2.3 the following empirical
analyses use the Tobin’s Q estimated through the Chung/Pruitt [1994] approach as main
performance variable. The only change made is in the treatment of preferred stocks, where the
liquidation value is replaced by the stock price.13 Furthermore, robustness checks will test the
effect of the usage of hybrid measures compared to the frequently used accounting-based
variable. The ROE is used as alternative accounting-based performance measure, with the
income definition including income from ordinary and extraordinary activities and excluding non-
operating income.
Table 6.5 gives an overview over the variable definitions. Furthermore, Table 6.6 states the
applied rules for data processing. It serves as plausibility check reducing biases caused by
measurement or reporting errors in the variables that might produce inconsistent estimates. The
data processing rules are derived from natural boundaries or from the definition of highly suspect
outliers by the inter-quartile range (IQR). The IQR is the range between the lower and upper
13 This change was also made by Gugler et al. [2004, p. 18]
Chapter 6: Model, Methodology and Data
109
quartiles. Values in the inner fences, located at a distance of 1.5 * IQR below the lower and
above the upper quartiles, are not problematic. The outer fences at a distance of 3 * IQR
distinguish values into suspect outliers, lying inside the fences, and highly suspect outliers
outside the range.
A definition as highly suspect outlier results in a change of the affected value by setting it equal
to the outer fence. This approach is called winsorizing and is based on the assumption that
outliers are not completely false but exaggerated. The alternative of labeling them as missing
values is problematic and a deletion of the observations could significantly reduce the sample
size. Both method results in a loss of potentially valuable information and could force a truncation
error. Thus, the concept of winsorizing is preferred over excluding affected values.14
Table 6.5
Definition of Capital Structure and Financial Performance Variables
6.3 RESEARCH MODEL AND VALIDITY TEST
Five research models are developed to test 11 hypotheses. In order to test the validity of the
models, this thesis conducts three classical regression validity tests; there are multicollinearity,
autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity [Gujarati 2003].
6.3.1 Model I
Since the underlying hypothesis is that capital structure is a function of the distribution of equity
ownership among managers and external block holders, the firm’s debt to equity ratio is
14 This practice modifies outliers by making them no more extreme than the most extreme data that is believed to be
relevant or accurately measured. This method is for example applied by Demsetz/Villalonga [2001].
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regressed on various measures of ownership structure (and other control) variables. The first
hypothesis proposes that firms with higher levels of external block holdings will have higher
leverage. This hypothesis is tested by regressing the dependent variable, ln (D/E) against the
external block ownership (EBO) and control variables:
Ln (D/E)it = α0 + 0 EBOit + 1 SIZEit + 2 INDit + 3 GROWTHit + 4 PROFit + 5 FCFit
+ 6 INTA + 7 NDTS + eit …………………………………………. (1)
where:
it = the i-th firm in period t
Ln (D/E) = natural log transformation of Debt/Equity ratio
EBO = percentage of ordinary shares held by the larger shareholders. Data for the top
two, five, and 20 external shareholders are used as the proxy for external block
ownership.
Sensitivity analysis is conducted on the impact of the top 10 external shareholders. Friend/Lang
[1988] use a dummy variable to represent the existence of external block shareholders with a
holding of 10% or more of a firm’s outstanding stock. This thesis extends Friend/Lang [1988]
by using the proportion of outstanding shares owned by external block holders.
The two variables used to control for risk are:
SIZE = natural log (total assets). Many studies suggest that firm size is one important
factor, which affects a firm’s debt policy and therefore risk.15 This variable is expected to have
a positive coefficient as larger more diversified firms are likely to have a lower risk of bankruptcy
and can sustain a higher level of debt.16
IND = zero-one dummy variable for industry classification, where IND = 1 if
industrial company and IND = 0 if natural resources company. A more detailed
industrial classification is not used because the increase in the number of dummy
variables imposes too severe restriction on the degrees of freedom in the regression. It is argued
that industry class is a potential determinant of capital structure because firms, in the same
industry, face similar demand and supply conditions, and thus have similar risk characteristics.17
15 See Scott/Martin [1975], Ferri/Jones [1979], Agrawal/Nagarajan [1990].
16 See Scott/Martin [1975], Ferri/Jones [1979]
17 See Scott/Martin [1975], Ferri/Jones [1979]
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To some extent, the industry variable may also capture some of the effects of the “free cash
flow” theory advanced by Jensen [1986]. Jensen identifies some industries with significant
potential for free cash flow abuses. However, I include a specific variable, (below) for free cash
flow to isolate these effects.
The three variables used to control for agency costs are:
GROWTH = the annual percentage change in total assets. Titman/Wessels [1988] suggest
that a firm’s growth opportunities are a good proxy for the agency costs of debt. They suggest
that the tendency to invest sub-optimally to expropriate wealth from a firm’s debt holders is likely
to be higher for firms in growing industries. On the other hand, growth may also be an indicator
of profitability and success of the firm. If this is the case, GROWTH will be a proxy for available
internal funds. If a firm is successful and earning profits, there should be sufficient internal funds
available for investment. This may then be associated with Myers/Majluf [1984] “pecking order”
theory, which suggests a negative coefficient on the GROWTH variable. Further,
McConnell/Servaes [1995] suggest that the agency relationship induced by managerial share
ownership differs between high and low growth firms.
FCF = OYBT + DEP + AMO - TAXPAID - DI VPAID
where:
OYBT = operating income before income tax
DEP = depreciation expense
AMO = amortization separately reported, such as goodwill
TAXPAID = total tax paid
DIVPAID = total dividends paid
FCF is a direct measure of Jensen’s [1986] free cash flow hypothesis. The free cash flow
hypothesis states that managers endowed with excessive free cash flows will invest sub-optimally
rather than paying the free cash flow out to shareholders. Jensen [1986] predicts that firms with
excessive free cash flow are likely to have higher leverage. FCF is defined in a similar manner to
Lehn/Poulsen [1989].
PROF = operating income before interest and taxes scaled by total assets. Indicators of
a firm’s profitability include ratios of operating income over sales and operating income over total
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assets18 and ratios of average earnings before interest and taxes over total assets.19 Using a
modified version of the “pecking order” hypothesis, Myers/Majluf [1984] relate profitability to
capital structure by suggesting that firms that are more profitable will demand less debt because
internal funds are available for finance. Since profitable firms have more earnings available for
retention, these firms tend to build their equity relative to their debt. A number of empirical
studies have examined the effect of profitability on firm leverage, including Friend/Lang [1988].
Generally, these studies find a negative association between profitability and leverage.
The variable used to control for asset specificity is:
INTA = Total Intangibles
Total Assets
Balakrishnan/Fox [1993] argue that asset specificity creates problems for debt financing due to
the non-redeploy ability characteristics of specific assets. More specifically, asset specificity
adversely affects a firm’s ability to borrow. Balakrishnan/Fox [1993] suggest that examples of
firm-specific assets are intangible assets such as brand names, research and development
expenditure and other reputational investments. The INTA variable may also capture a firm’s
discretionary investment opportunities. Myers [1977] argues that agency costs associated with
intangibles assets are higher than those associated with tangible assets did. To the extent that
INTA picks up this effect, it will be negatively related to the D/E ratio.
The last explanatory variable is used to control for the effect of taxes:
NDTS = Annual Depreciation Expense
Total Assets
NDTS variable is used to capture the non-debt tax shield's argument put forward by
DeAngelo/Masulis [1980]. They argue that the greater the level of non-debt tax shields, the
lower is the benefit of additional debt. Thus, all else equal, firms with higher non-debt tax shields
are expected to receive lower tax benefits from issuing debt and therefore will utilize less debt.
DeAngelo/Masulis’s [1980] argument therefore implies a negative relation between non-debt tax
shields and the D/E ratio.
18 See Titman/Wessels [1988]
19 See Wald [1995]
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6.3.2 Model II
To test for the hypothesized curvilinear relationship between managerial share ownership and
capital structure, the managerial share ownership variable and the square of managerial share
ownership variable is augmented to the regression model:
Ln (D/E)it = α0 + 0 MSOit + 1 (MSO)2it + 2 SIZEit + 3 INDit + 4 GROWTHit +
5 PROFit + 6 FCFit + 7 INTAit + 8 NDTSit + eit …………… (2)
where:
MSO = percentage of ordinary shares owned by all executive and non-executive
directors. Share ownership of corporate directors is used by Morck et al.
[1988] and Keasey et al. [1994], amongst others to proxy for managerial share
ownership.
Other variables are as previously described in Section 6.3.1.
6.3.3 Model III
In Model III, a joint test is used to investigate the third and fourth hypotheses, which explore the
relationship between external block ownership and leverage at different levels of managerial
share ownership. Specifically, the third hypothesis predicts that external block ownership and
debt are positively related when the level of managerial share ownership is low. The fourth
hypothesis predicts that at high levels of managerial share ownership, the association between
external block ownership and the firm’s debt ratio is less significant than at low levels of
managerial share ownership, since the positive monitoring effect of external block ownership is
offset by the negative entrenchment effect associated with managerial share ownership.
To test these two hypotheses, a dummy variable D, denoting different levels of managerial share
ownership is employed. D takes the value of 0 if the level of managerial share ownership is less
than 20%. When managerial share ownership is 20% or more D takes the value of 1. While there
is generally little theoretical justification for the particular cut-off, the 20% level has been used in
several previous studies. For example, Hermalin/Weisbach [1991] find that the entrenchment
effect of managerial share ownership sets in after 20% of managerial share ownership.
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The natural log of D/E is then regressed against MSO, MSO2, EBO, D*EBO and the control
variables:
Ln (D/E)it = α0 + 0 MSOit + 1 (MSO)2it + 2 EBOit + 3 (D*EBO)it + 4 SIZEit +
5 INDit + 6 GROWTHit + 7 PROFit + 8 FCFit + 9 INTAit + 10 NDTSit
+ eit …………………… (3)
The coefficient on the EBO variable reflects the relation between external block ownership and
the debt level when the level of managerial share ownership is low.
The coefficient on the D*EBOit variable then reflects the difference in the external block
ownership and leverage relationship between high and low levels of managerial share ownership.
In order to infer the relationship between external block ownership and leverage at high levels of
managerial share ownership, the coefficient β3 is added to the coefficient β2. In other words, the
sum of β2 and β3 gives the slope for the relationship between external block ownership and
leverage when the level of managerial share ownership is high.
6.3.4 Model IV
In Model IV, a joint test is used to investigate the fifth and sixth hypotheses, which explore the
possibility of non-monotonic and endogeneity relationship of capital structure and firm
performance. The prior researches generally do not take into account the possibility of reverse
causation from performance to capital structure. If firm performance affects the choice of capital
structure, then failure to consider this reverse causality may result in simultaneous-equations
bias. That is, regressions of firm performance on a measure of leverage may confound the
effects of capital structure on performance with the effects of performance on capital structure.
In both of hypotheses, ownership structure (external block ownership and managerial share
ownership) is used to see the simultaneity of combined effect of ownership concentration and
insider ownership on performance. Therefore, the sixth hypothesis is equal to the eleventh
hypothesis, which has the same function as intended in Chapter 5 (Ownership Structure and Firm
Performance). Consequently, the test of combined effect of ownership concentration and insider
ownership on performance will be done as well as the test of capital structure effect on
performance.
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Ln (D/E)it = α0 + 0 TQit + 1 ROEit + 2 MSOit + 3 (MSO)2it + 4 EBOit + 5 (D*EBO)it
+ 6 SIZEit + 7 INDit + 8 GROWTHit + 9 PROFit + 10 FCFit + 11 INTAit
+ 12 NDTSit + eit …………………… (4)
Tobin’s Qit = α0 + 0 (D/E)it + 1 MSOit + 2 (MSO)2it + 3 EBOit + 4 (D*EBO)it +
5 SIZEit + 6 INDit + 7 GROWTHit + 8 PROFit + 9 FCFit + 10 INTAit +
11 NDTSit + eit …………………… (5)
ROEit = α0 + 0 (D/E)it + 1 MSOit + 2 (MSO)2it + 3 EBOit + 4 (D*EBO)it +
5 SIZEit + 6 INDit + 7 GROWTHit + 8 PROFit + 9 FCFit + 10 INTAit +
11 NDTSit + eit …………………… (6)
If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure and vice versa, then the failure to take
this into account may result in serious simultaneity bias, with important implications for pattern
of firm financing and performance.
6.3.5 Model V
In Model V, a joint test is used to investigate the seventh until the eleventh hypotheses, which
explore the endogeneity or simultaneous equations bias that is very likely to exist in analyses of
ownership and performance. As theory contains effects for both directions, from ownership on
performance and vice versa, it supports the assumption of simultaneous reciprocal determination
of ownership and performance. Although the endogeneity was already addressed by
Demsetz/Lehn in 1985 and is widely accepted by researchers, it is rarely modeled in empirical
studies.
To model the hypotheses, five equations will be tested:
Tobin’s Qit = α0 + 0 (D/E)it + 1 EBOit + 2 (D*EBO)it + 3 SIZEit + 4 INDit +
5 GROWTHit + 6 PROFit + 7 FCFit + 8 INTAit + 9 NDTSit + eit
…………………… (7)
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ROEit = α0 + 0 (D/E)it + 1 EBOit + 2 (D*EBO)it + 3 SIZEit + 4 INDit +
5 GROWTHit + 6 PROFit + 7 FCFit + 8 INTAit + 9 NDTSit + eit
…………………… (8)
Tobin’s Qit = α0 + 0 (D/E)it + 1 MSOit + 2 (MSO)2it + 3 SIZEit + 4 INDit +
5 GROWTHit + 6 PROFit + 7 FCFit + 8 INTAit + 9 NDTSit + eit
…………………… (9)
ROEit = α0 + 0 (D/E)it + 1 MSOit + 2 (MSO)2it + 3 SIZEit + 4 INDit +
5 GROWTHit + 6 PROFit + 7 FCFit + 8 INTAit + 9 NDTSit + eit
…………………… (10)
EBOit = α0 + 0 (D/E)it + 1 TQit + 2 SIZEit + 3 INDit + 4 GROWTHit +
5 PROFit + 7 FCFit + 8 INTAit + 9 NDTSit + eit
…………………… (11)
EBOit = α0 + 0 (D/E)it + 1 ROEit + 2 SIZEit + 3 INDit + 4 GROWTHit +
5 PROFit + 7 FCFit + 8 INTAit + 9 NDTSit + eit
…………………… (12)
MSOit = α0 + 0 (D/E)it + 1 TQit + 2 SIZEit + 3 INDit + 4 GROWTHit +
5 PROFit + 7 FCFit + 8 INTAit + 9 NDTSit + eit
…………………… (13)
MSOit = α0 + 0 (D/E)it + 1 ROEit + 2 SIZEit + 3 INDit + 4 GROWTHit +
5 PROFit + 7 FCFit + 8 INTAit + 9 NDTSit + eit
…………………… (14)
6.3.6 Model Validity Test
A. Multivariate regression method to find the influence of independent variable
The thesis carries out a multivariate regression to assess the relationship between the structure
of equity ownership, corporate financing policies, and firm performance. The dependent variable
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is (1) the debt/equity ratio (D/E), and is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the book
value of debt (DBV) to market value of equity (EMV), (2) firm performance measures, there are
Tobin’s Q and ROE, and (3) ownership structure. Equity is defined as market value of equity.
Book value of debt is used as a proxy for market value of debt due to problems in estimating
market values of unlisted debt securities. Many studies have used book value of debt in
measuring leverage (as examples see Friend/Lang [1988] and Titman/Wessels [1988]).
Bowman [1980] argues that even if the market value of debt is a more accurate measure of
leverage, the use of book value of debt is not expected to distort leverage ratios. The natural log
transformation of D/E is used to mitigate possible problems with the sample distribution of the
ratio.
Six sets of explanatory variables are included in an attempt to capture different effects. The first
set of explanatory variables comprises the ownership variables. Since a firm’s capital structure is
likely to be affected by many factors other than the allocation of equity ownership, the remaining
four sets of variables are included in an attempt to control for these other effects. These
variables are used to “isolate” the effects of the equity ownership on capital structure and include
risk (two variables), agency cost (three variables), asset specificity (one variable) and tax (one
variables).
B. The test of multivariate regression model validity
In order to make sure that the multivariate regression model is valid, the thesis will conduct three
classical regression validity tests, there are multicollinearity, autocorrelation, and
heteroscedasticity [Gujarati 2003].
1. Multicollinearity test
The multicollinearity test is used to find any linear relationship amongst explanatory variables in a
regression model. It can affect two or more of them. The correlation can be negative or positive.
In the presence of multicollinearity, the estimate of one variable's impact on y while controlling
for the others tends to be less precise than if predictors were uncorrelated with one another. To
detect multicollinearity in this thesis, it is used Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of each
independent variable. If the VIF of a variable exceeds 10, which will happen if R 2j exceeds 0.90,
that variable is said be highly collinear.
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2. Autocorrelation test
Autocorrelation test is done to find whether there is a correlation among disturbance term.
Autocorrelation of the residuals (error terms) is a problem, and leads to an upward bias in
estimates of the statistical significance of coefficient estimates, such as the t statistic. In this
thesis, the autocorrelation test for the presence of first-order autocorrelation is the Durbin-
Watson statistic. From the Durbin-Watson table is derived the critical values of dl and du, with
criteria as follows:
1. If d < dl or (4- dl) < d, there is statistically autocorrelation.
2. If dl  d  du or (4- du)  d  (4- dl), the test is neutral.
3. If 2 < d < (4- du) or du < d < 2, there is not statically autocorrelation in regression
model.
In order to cure the autocorrelations symptoms, in this thesis, it will be used Cochran-Orcutt
Method, as follows:
1. Determine the residual value of regression model and define its residual lag.
2. Transform all variable (dependent and independent variables) into new lag first order
variables.
3. Determine the correlation sensitivity coefficient between residual and its lag by
regressing residual with its lag variable.
4. Transform the variables to get new variables by using formula “X – (sensitivity coefficient
* lag X).
5. Do regression of new independent variables to new dependent variables, in order to get
an equation with DW value that is free from autocorrelation.
3. Heteroscedasticity test
When using some statistical techniques, such as ordinary least squares (OLS), a number of
assumptions are typically made. One of these is that the error term has a constant variance. This
will be true if the observations of the error term are assumed to be drawn from identical
distributions. Heteroscedasticity is a violation of this assumption. To detect the existence of
heteroscedasticity, in this thesis, it will be used Spearman’s Rank Correlation Test, as follows:
1. Calculate the residual value of the regression equation, then its value is changed to be
absolute value.
2. Determine the existence of heteroscedasticity by testing the significance of Spearman’s
Rank Correlation between the absolute residual values with independent variables.
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6.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In general, the research will use all relevant data of 532 companies in eight countries (Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) as a final sample and it will
be done in three steps. First step will test the first hypothesis, to find whether firms with higher
levels of external block holdings will have higher leverage. This step tests the underlying
hypothesis that capital structure is a function of the distribution of equity ownership among
managers and external block holders.
Second step will test the curvilinear relationship between managerial ownership and capital
structure. Third step will explore the relationship between external block ownership and leverage
at different levels of managerial share ownership. Fourth step will analyze the relationship
between capital structure (leverage) and firm performance. This step tests associated arguments
that are an extension of Berger/di Patti’s [2002] investigation, which offer two hypotheses of
reverse causation based on violations of the Modigliani-Miller perfect-markets assumption. This
step becomes important because it does not only allow for simultaneity between capital structure
and firm performance, but also the non-linearity in these relationships. Fifth step as the final step
will not only allow for simultaneity between ownership structure and firm performance, but also it
tests the endogeneity of performance in this relationship.
The five steps will be done by using multiple regression method to find the influence of
independent variable, as follows:
 External Blockholders Ownership (variable)
 Managerial Shares Ownership (variable)
 Difference External Blockholder Ownership (variable)
 Debt ratio (variable)
 Tobin’s Q (variable)
 Return On Equity (variable)
In addition, the model includes control variables that are used as explaining variable, they are:
 Firm size (variable)
 Industry:
 Industrial company (dummy)
 Natural resource company (dummy)
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 Growth (variable)
 Free Cash Flow (variable)
 Firm profitability (variable)
 Asset specificity (variable)
 The effect of tax (variable)
Figure 6.4
Hypotheses Scheme
Ownership Structures, Capital Structure, and Firm Performance:
An Analysis of Post East Asian Financial Crisis
CHAPTER 7
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This chapter includes the empirical results gained by doing a regression to the independent
variables and dependent variables in the models. These results will be followed by an analysis of
each independent variable’s influence in five models that are used to test the hypotheses.
7.1 THE TEST OF MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODEL VALIDITY
In order to make sure that the multivariate regression model is valid, the thesis will run three
classical regression validity tests; there are multicollinearity, autocorrelation, and
heteroscedasticity [Gujarati 2003].
1. Multicollinearity test
To detect multicollinearity in this thesis, it is used Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of each
independent variable. If the VIF of a variable exceeds 10, which will happen if R 2j exceeds 0.90,
that variable is said be highly collinear. Normally, the closer VIF is to 1, the greater evidence that
an independent variable is not collinear with other independent variables.
Table 7.1A
Multicollinearity Test – Model I
No. Variable VIF Conclusion
1 External Block Ownership 1,046 Not exist multicollinearity
2 Size 1,042 Not exist multicollinearity
3 Industry 1,028 Not exist multicollinearity
4 Growth Total Assets 1,042 Not exist multicollinearity
5 Profitability 1,050 Not exist multicollinearity
5 Free Cash Flow 1,044 Not exist multicollinearity
7 Intangibles 1,019 Not exist multicollinearity
8 Non-Debt Tax Shield 1,051 Not exist multicollinearity
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Table 7.1B
Multicollinearity Test – Model II
No. Variable VIF Conclusion
1 Managerial Share Ownership 5,794 Not exist multicollinearity
2 Managerial Share Ownership (Square) 5,683 Not exist multicollinearity
3 Size 1,072 Not exist multicollinearity
4 Industry 1,030 Not exist multicollinearity
5 Growth Total Assets 1,025 Not exist multicollinearity
6 Profitability 1,051 Not exist multicollinearity
7 Free Cash Flow 1,045 Not exist multicollinearity
8 Intangibles 1,025 Not exist multicollinearity
9 Non-Debt Tax Shield 1,051 Not exist multicollinearity
Table 7.1C
Multicollinearity Test – Model III
No. Variable VIF Conclusion
1 Managerial Share Ownership 11,378 Exist multicollinearity
2 Managerial Share Ownership (Square) 6,586 Not exist multicollinearity
3 External Block Ownership 1,362 Not exist multicollinearity
4 Difference External Block Ownership 2,930 Not exist multicollinearity
5 Size 1,073 Not exist multicollinearity
6 Industry 1,031 Not exist multicollinearity
7 Growth Total Assets 1,045 Not exist multicollinearity
8 Profitability 1,062 Not exist multicollinearity
9 Free Cash Flow 1,048 Not exist multicollinearity
10 Intangibles 1,026 Not exist multicollinearity
11 Non-Debt Tax Shield 1,052 Not exist multicollinearity
Table 7.1D
Multicollinearity Test – Model IV (A – B – C)
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Table 7.1E
Multicollinearity Test – Model V (A – B – C – D – E – F – G – H )
The multicollinearity test shows that the multivariate regression model is relatively free from
multicollinearity problem. It is because all VIF values are below 10 and closer to 1, only MSO in
Model III and Model IV (A-B-C), which its VIF value is a little bit above 10 (11.378, 11.445, and
11.483 respectively). As mentioned in Chapter 6 (section 6.3.6 B – 1), the multicollinearity test is
used to find any linear relationship amongst explanatory variables in a regression model. It can
affect two or more of them. In this investigation, all independent variables do not have severe
multicolinearity problem whether hypothetic variables or control variables. Therefore, relatively it
can be said that the multivariate model does not have multicolinearity problem.
2. Autocorrelation test
In this thesis, the autocorrelation test for the presence of first-order autocorrelation is the
Durbin-Watson statistic. As shown in Table 7.2 (A-B-C-D-E), there is no any tendency of the
presence of autocorrelation in the multivariate regression model (Appendix 2 until 6).
Chapter 7: Empirical Results and Analysis
124
Table 7.2A
Autocorrelation Test – Model I
DW statistics
DW table
(n = 532 ; k = 8), α level = 5%
Value dL du 4 – du 4 – dL Criteria du < d < (4- du)
2.034 1.686 1.852 2.148 2.314 Free from autocorrelation
Table 7.2B
Autocorrelation Test – Model II
DW statistics
DW table
(n = 532 ; k = 9), α level = 5%
Value dL du 4 – du 4 – dL Criteria du < d < (4- du)
2.039 1.675 1.863 2.137 2.325 Free from autocorrelation
Table 7.2C
Autocorrelation Test – Model III
DW statistics
DW table
(n = 532 ; k = 11), α level = 5%
Value dL du 4 – du 4 – dL Criteria du < d < (4- du)
2.025 1.654 1.885 2.115 2.346 Free from autocorrelation
Table 7.2D
Autocorrelation Test – Model IV
Model IV - A
DW statistics
DW table
(n = 532 ; k = 13), α level = 5%
Value dL du 4 – du 4 – dL Criteria du < d < (4- du)
2.034 1.539 1.813 2.187 2.461 Free from autocorrelation
Model IV - B
DW statistics
DW table
(n = 532 ; k = 12), α level = 5%
Value dL du 4 – du 4 – dL Criteria du < d < (4- du)
2.081 1.550 1.801 2.199 2.450 Free from autocorrelation
Model IV - C
DW statistics
DW table
(n = 532 ; k = 12), α level = 5%
Value dL du 4 – du 4 – dL Criteria du < d < (4- du)
2.069 1.550 1.801 2.199 2.450 Free from autocorrelation
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Table 7.2E
Autocorrelation Test – Model V
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It can be concluded that only in Model V (E-F-G-H) there is a probability of the presence of
autocorrelation in the multivariate regression model. It needs a correction to make sure that the
model is valid and able to be used to test hypothesis 9 and hypothesis 10. Hence, this thesis uses
Cochran-Orcutt Method to cure the autocorrelations symptoms. According to Cochran-Orcutt
method, there are some steps to cure the symptoms, in which it creates new multivariate
regression model. Table 7.2F shows the result after doing a correction to the model (Appendix
7). It means the model is valid and able to be used to test hypothesis 9 and hypothesis 10.
Therefore, we can use the new multivariate regression model to continue our next step of
analysis.
Table 7.2F
Corrected Autocorrelation Test – Model V (E-F-G-H)
Model V – E (Corrected DW)
DW statistics
DW table
(n = 1361 ; k = 9), α level = 5%
Value dL du 4 – du 4 – dL Criteria du < d < (4- du)
2.041 1.582 1.768 2.232 2.418 Free from autocorrelation
Model V – F (Corrected DW)
DW statistics
DW table
(n = 1361 ; k = 9), α level = 5%
Value dL du 4 – du 4 – dL Criteria du < d < (4- du)
2.079 1.582 1.768 2.232 2.418 Free from autocorrelation
Model V – G (Corrected DW)
DW statistics
DW table
(n = 1361 ; k = 9), α level = 5%
Value dL du 4 – du 4 – dL Criteria du < d < (4- du)
2.013 1.582 1.768 2.232 2.418 Free from autocorrelation
Model V – H (Corrected DW)
DW statistics
DW table
(n = 1361 ; k = 9), α level = 5%
Value dL du 4 – du 4 – dL Criteria du < d < (4- du)
2.001 1.582 1.768 2.232 2.418 Free from autocorrelation
3. Heteroscedasticity test
When using some statistical techniques, such as ordinary least squares (OLS), a number of
assumptions are typically made. One of these is that the error term has a constant variance. This
will be true if the observations of the error term are assumed to be drawn from identical
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distributions. Heteroscedasticity is a violation of this assumption. To detect the existence of
heteroscedasticity, in this thesis, it will be used Spearman’s Rank Correlation Test.
As shown in Table 7.3 (A-B-C-D-E), relatively there are no statistically significant correlations
amongst independent variables and it only influences in control variables, such as Size and
Industry (Size in Model IV A-B, Model V A-B-C-D-E-G-H and Industry in Model I, II, II, IV A-B-C,
V B-C-D-G-H), which are not tested in hypotheses. It means that all multivariate regression
models are relatively free from any disturbance that is able to obscure the analysis.
Table 7.3A
Heteroscedasticity Test – Model I
Spearman’s rho ARES
Independent
Variable
Correlation
Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N Significance
EBO -.067 .123 532
SIZE -.249(**) .000 532 Significant at the 0.01 level
Industry .209(**) .000 532 Significant at the 0.01 level
GrowthTA .061 .158 532
PROF .049 .263 532
FCF -.005 .902 532
INTA .011 .799 532
NDTS .008 .850 532
Table 7.3B
Heteroscedasticity Test – Model II
Spearman’s rho ARES
Independent
Variable
Correlation
Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N Significance
MSO .000 .996 532
MSO2 .001 .982 532
SIZE -.260(**) .000 532 Significant at the 0.01 level
Industry .197(**) .000 532 Significant at the 0.01 level
GrowthTA .034 .435 532
PROF .043 .320 532
FCF .021 .627 532
INTA -.009 .839 532
NDTS .018 .685 532
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Table 7.3C
Heteroscedasticity Test – Model III
Spearman’s rho ARES
Independent
Variable
Correlation
Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N Significance
MSO .039 .375 532
MSO2 .036 .404 532
EBO -.058 .185 532
D(EBO) .079 .067 532
SIZE -.253(**) .000 532 Significant at the 0.01 level
Industry .228(**) .000 532 Significant at the 0.01 level
GrowthTA .063 .149 532
PROF .064 .138 532
FCF -.015 .731 532
INTA -.008 .857 532
NDTS .037 .392 532
Table 7.3D
Heteroscedasticity Test – Model IV (A-B-C)
Spearman’s rho ARES
Model IV – A Model IV – B Model IV – CIndependent
Variable Correlation
Coefficient
Sig.
(2-tailed)
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig.
(2-tailed)
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig.
(2-tailed)
Tobin’s Q .101(*) .020 - - - -
ROE .089(*) .041 - - - -
Ln D/E - - -.175(**) .000 .239(**) .000
MSO .050 .248 -.036 .410 -.213(**) .000
MSO2 .050 .252 -.051 .238 -.215(**) .000
EBO -.065 .132 .024 .585 .189(**) .000
D(EBO) .084 .052 -.052 .228 -.164(**) .000
SIZE -.252(**) .000 -.075 .085 .090(*) .037
Industry .234(**) .000 .123(**) .004 .000 .991
GrowthTA .072 .098 .102(*) .018 -.079 .069
PROF .082 .059 -.009 .841 -.256(**) .000
FCF -.005 .914 .014 .755 -.089(*) .041
INTA -.008 .848 .051 .239 -.026 .554
NDTS .055 .208 -.213(**) .000 .001 .976
Note: ** = Significant at the 0.01 level
* = Significant at the 0.05 level
N = 532
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Table 7.3E
Heteroscedasticity Test – Model V (A-B-C-D-E-F-G-H)
Heteroscedasticity by itself does not cause OLS estimators to be biased or inconsistent (for the
difference between these two concepts see the graphs below) since neither bias nor consistency
are determined by the covariance matrix of the error term [Gujarati 2003]. The rest un-
heteroscedasticity estimators in this thesis are still sufficient to have minimum variance or
efficient.
7.2 THE EFFECT OF EXTERNAL BLOCK OWNERSHIP ON CAPITAL
STRUCTURE
In general, all control variables are positively skewed. In particular, in most cases these data are
bounded by zero. It is because most data sets have a central peak, meaning that the majority of
data points cluster fairly close to the center. Higher values indicate a higher, sharper peak; lower
values indicate a lower, less distinct peak. Therefore, it is likely to exhibit positive skewness
(Table 7.4). If the coefficient of skewness/SES1 is more than about 2 or less than about −2, we
can say that the population very likely has some skewness in the same direction as the sample
[Gujarati 2003].
1 SES: Standard Error of Skewness
Chapter 7: Empirical Results and Analysis
130
Correlation analysis (Table 7.5) shows that some explanatory variables are significantly
correlated, especially some control variables. First, there is significantly negative correlation
between the SIZE and MSO variables (-0.176). This statistic confirms the wealth constraint
argument, which suggests that the personal wealth constraint of corporate insiders is one
important barrier to managerial share ownership. Specifically, as the size of the firm increases, it
becomes more costly for managers to purchase a larger percentage of shares. This argument is
strengthened by the significant correlation between the SIZE and MSO Square variables (-0.185)
that implies the company size has impeded the managers’ opportunity to increase its company
shares.
On the other side, the correlation between SIZE and D(EBO), which are negatively correlated
significantly (-0.148), is consistent with the idea that, as firms become larger, ownership
concentration decreases, as shareholders have to invest greater amounts to obtain a given level
of shareholdings. In other words, the concentration of external block holders becomes to be
more diluted or dispersed as well as the size of firm is going to increase and the level of
managerial ownership is high.
A significantly positive correlation between MSO, MSO Square, and GROWTH (0.117 and 0.119,
respectively) is also found. This implies that the high level of managerial share ownership
increases the firms’ opportunity to use profit or earnings as retained earnings or expanding
funds. On the other side, a significant negative correlation between EBO and GROWTH (-0.156),
implies that existence of external block holders creates a contrary situation to the relation
between MSO and GROWTH.
A significantly negative correlation between INDUSTRY and NDTS (-0.082) suggests that certain
industries do not use annual depreciation expense as a mode to receive lower tax benefits and it
could explain to the fiscal policy in East Asian countries on non-debt tax shield policy. The
industry characteristic seems to determine also its profitability, because there is a significantly
negative correlation between INDUSTRY and PROF (-0.090). It can mean that certain industries
are still in difficulties in the post Asian financial crisis.
Finally, PROF and NDTS also have a significant positive correlation (0.195) which implies that
profitable firms are more likely to allocate its earnings to get free cash flow in form of annual
depreciation expense. Meanwhile, PROF and MSO Square have a significant positive correlation
(0.090) that implies managerial share ownership pushes the firms’ profitability and uses it as a
source of financing.
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Table 7.4
Descriptive Statistics – Skewness and Kurtosis
Skewness KurtosisIndependent
Variable Statistics Standard Error Statistics Standard Error
MSO 1.646 .106 2.890 .211
MSO2 4.412 .106 28.223 .211
EBO .092 .106 -.857 .211
D(EBO) 1.317 .106 -.267 .211
SIZE .620 .106 .719 .211
Industry -.522 .106 -1.734 .211
GrowthTA 13.462 .106 240.857 .211
PROF -1.231 .106 19.734 .211
FCF -11.152 .106 171.031 .211
INTA 5.942 .106 49.074 .211
NDTS 2.097 .106 6.681 .211
The significant correlation between these variables suggests that multicollinearity may be a
potential problem in the analysis. The effect, if any, of this correlation between explanatory
variables on the robustness of our empirical results is investigated and reported in section 7.5.
Table 7.5
Coefficient Correlation
Independent
Variable MSO MSO
2 EBO D(EBO) SIZE Industry Growth PROF FCF INTA NDTS
MSO 1.000 .986(**) -.442(**) .695(**) -.176(**) .076 .117(**) .081 -.030 -.049 -.053
MSO2 .986(**) 1.000 -.466(**) .705(**) -.185(**) .078 .119(**) .090(*) -.026 -.061 -.057
EBO -.442(**) -.466(**) 1.000 -.313(**) .084 -.056 -.156(**) -.172(**) .041 .081 .020
D(EBO) .695(**) .705(**) -.313(**) 1.000 -.148(**) .045 .030 .045 -.038 -.073 .006
SIZE -.176(**) -.185(**) .084 -.148(**) 1.000 -.017 -.011 -.047 .074 .055 -.048
Industry .076 .078 -.056 .045 -.017 1.000 .024 -.090(*) .016 .057 -.171(**)
Growth .117(**) .119(**) -.156(**) .030 -.011 .024 1.000 .283(**) -.187(**) .103(*) .080
PROF .081 .090(*) -.172(**) .045 -.047 -.090(*) .283(**) 1.000 .264(**) -.075 .195(**)
FCF -.030 -.026 .041 -.038 .074 .016 -.187(**) .264(**) 1.000 -.008 .109(*)
INTA -.049 -.061 .081 -.073 .055 .057 .103(*) -.075 -.008 1.000 .126(**)
NDTS -.053 -.057 .020 .006 -.048 -.171(**) .080 .195(**) .109(*) .126(**) 1.000
** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
* Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
In order to test whether the external block ownership affect companies’ capital structure, the
thesis run a multivariate regression model that puts firm’s debt to equity ratio as dependent
variable.
In this step, the thesis will test first hypothesis as follows:
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Ho1 : 1 = 0 Firms with a higher level of external block holdings are likely not to have a higher
debt ratio, ceteris paribus.
Ha1 : 1  0 Firms with a higher level of external block holdings are likely to have a higher
debt ratio, ceteris paribus.
Table 7.6 presents the regression results for the external block ownership test (that is, Model I).
As can be seen from this table, there is supportive evidence of a positive relation between
external block ownership and leverage. The coefficient on the EBO variable is positive and
statistically significant (t-statistic = 3.062).
Table 7.6
The Effect of External Block Ownership on Capital Structure
Model I
Ln (D/E)it = α0 + 0 EBOit + 1 SIZEit + 2 INDit + 3 GROWTHit +
4 PROFit + 5 FCFit +6 INTAit + 7 NDTSit + eit
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic F Significance R2
Constant -2.278 -9.932 .000
EBO .621 3.062* .002
SIZE .226 6.738* .000
Industry -.240 -2.330** .020
GrowthTA -.002 -2.217** .027
PROF -2.256 -5.682* .000
FCF 8.11E-005 .453 .651
INTA .078 .117 .907
NDTS -2.033 -1.268 .205
MODEL 14.557* 4.88 0.182
* = significant at α level = 1% (t>2.575 or t<-2.575)
** = significant at α level = 5% (t>1.959 or t<-1.959)
*** = significant at α level = 10% (t>1.644 or t<-1.644)
This positive relation is consistent with the active monitoring hypothesis that suggests that large
shareholders have greater incentives to monitor management due to their significant investment
in the firm. The increased monitoring by external block holders decreases managerial
opportunism, leading to lower agency conflicts. The results obtained are also consistent with
those of Friend/Lang [1988] and Brailsford et al. [2002] who obtain evidence that firms with
large non-managerial investors have significantly higher average debt ratios than those without
external block holders. The thesis’s results do not support the passive voting hypothesis [Pound
1988] which suggests that large shareholders vote with management without due regard to the
interests of dispersed shareholders.
Chapter 7: Empirical Results and Analysis
133
The overall regression explains approximately 18.2% of the variation in the dependent variable.
Consistent with the size argument, the SIZE variable in the regression has a significant positive
coefficient (t-statistic = 6.738), suggesting that larger firms have higher leverage. This is
consistent with Scott/Martin [1975] and Ferri/Jones [1979] and empirical evidence obtained by
Agrawal/Nagarajan [1990] and Brailsford et al. [2002].
The significant negative coefficient on PROF (t-statistic = -5.682) is consistent with the pecking
order hypothesis of Myers [1977] and Myers/Majluf [1984], and the empirical results of
Titman/Wessels [1988], Friend/Lang [1988], Chiarella et al. [1992], Allen [1993] and Wald
[1995]. The “pecking order” hypothesis suggests that profitable firms will demand less debt
because internal funds are available for financing projects.
The IND variable which proxies for firm risk has a negative and significant coefficient (t-statistic
= -2.330). This is consistent with Scott/Martin [1975] and Bradley et al. [1984]. It also suggests
that resource companies have higher leverage than industrial companies in term of East Asian
companies’ characteristic that mainly operate in exploiting natural resources. It also implies that
in East Asian companies’ type of industry influence the financing decision, one factor that can
explain the cause of wide effect of Asian financial crisis to certain companies.
The coefficient on the GROWTH variable is negative and significant (t-statistic = -2.217). This is
consistent with Bradley et al. [1984] and Titman/Wessels [1988] who obtain a significant
negative relationship between growth opportunities and firm’s leverage. It means that the
company policy to use leverage as source of financing has impeded the opportunity to grow.
The unanticipated negative but insignificant coefficient on FCF may be due to the fact that the
independent variables included in the models overlap and capture more than one effect. In this
case, a few variables may proxy for the effect of free cash flow simultaneously. In particular,
besides capturing the profitability effect, PROF variable may also proxy for the effect of free cash
flow. To the extent that some industries have significant potential for free cash flow abuse, the
IND variable may also capture some of the free cash flow effects. As a result, the FCF variable
may only reflect the residual effects of free cash flow.
The coefficient on the NDTS variable is not significant. This supports the tax advantage of capital
structure under a favored non-debt tax shields system.
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7.3 THE EFFECT OF MANAGERIAL SHARE OWNERSHIP ON FINANCING
DECISION
The next stage of analysis involves testing the curvilinear relationship as proposed in the second
hypothesis. Table 7.7 contains the regression results of the curvilinear model where ln(D/E) is
regressed against managerial share ownership (MSO), the square of managerial share ownership
(MSO2) and control variables. The coefficient on MSO is positive but insignificant. The coefficient
on MSO2 is negative and insignificant. These results support the second hypothesis.
The signs on MSO and MSO2 parallel the alignment of interests and entrenchment effects of
managerial share ownership put forward by Jensen/Meckling [1976] and Fama/Jensen [1983]
respectively. Specifically, when the level of managerial share ownership is low, an increase in
managerial share ownership has the effect of aligning management and shareholders’ interests.
Consequently, as managerial share ownership increases from a low level, managers have less
incentive to reduce the debt level, resulting in a higher level of debt (but at a decreasing rate).
However, when corporate managers hold a significant proportion of firm shares, the
entrenchment effect sets in, resulting in higher managerial opportunism and therefore a lower
debt ratio. In particular, with significant voting power and influence, it becomes more difficult to
control managerial behavior, resulting in fewer constraints on managers’ ability to adjust debt
ratios to their own self-interests.
Ho2 : 1 = 0 At low levels of managerial share ownership, managerial share ownership is not
positively related to a firm’s debt ratio, ceteris paribus, and at high levels of
managerial share ownership, managerial share ownership is not negatively
related to a firm’s debt ratio, ceteris paribus, such that the expected relationship
between management ownership and the leverage ratio is curvilinear.
Ha2 : 1  0 At low levels of managerial share ownership, managerial share ownership is
positively related to a firm’s debt ratio, ceteris paribus, and at high levels of
managerial share ownership, managerial share ownership is negatively related to
a firm’s debt ratio, ceteris paribus, such that the expected relationship between
management ownership and the leverage ratio is curvilinear.
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Table 7.7
The Effect of Managerial Share Ownership on Financing Decision
Model II
Ln (D/E)it = α0 + 0 MSOit + 1 MSO2it + 2 SIZEit + 3 INDit + 4 GROWTHit +
5 PROFit + 6 FCFit +7 INTAit + 8 NDTSit + eit
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic F Significance R2
Constant -2.037 -9.027 .000
MSO .693 .804 .422
MSO2 -1.762 -.988 .323
SIZE .234 6.836* .000
Industry -.258 -2.480** .013
GrowthTA -.002 -2.695* .007
PROF -2.353 -5.870* .000
FCF 8.54E-005 .472 .637
INTA .251 .373 .710
NDTS -2.022 -1.250 .212
MODEL 11.803* 4.88 0.169
* = significant at α level = 1% (t>2.575 or t<-2.575)
** = significant at α level = 5% (t>1.959 or t<-1.959)
*** = significant at α level = 10% (t>1.644 or t<-1.644)
Overall, this curvilinear regression model explains approximately 16.9% of the variation in the
dependent variable. Several of the control variables, including SIZE, IND, GROWTH, and PROF
have statistically significant coefficients at either 1% or 5% levels. Moreover, the signs are
consistent with predictions. Indeed, all coefficient signs, except FCF, are as hypothesized. The
coefficient on FCF is statistically insignificant. Again, the coefficient on the tax variable is not
significant.
The turning point of the quadratic relationship can be found by evaluating the first derivative and
setting it to zero. This thesis turning point is 0.196%. This result has practical import as it means
that managerial share ownership in excess of 0.196% impose restrictions on the amount of
leverage a firm can support, on average.
7.4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXTERNAL BLOCK OWNERSHIP AND
LEVERAGE AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF MANAGERIAL SHARE
OWNERSHIP
Previously, this study separately tested the effect of external block ownership and managerial
share ownership on capital structure and found that both have a significant impact on corporate
financing policies. While external block holders have a positive effect on the debt ratio, the
relation between managerial share ownership and leverage is curvilinear. This implies that the
debt ratio is a function of both managerial share ownership and external block ownership. Thus,
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this thesis now explore a model which brings together both EBO and MSO (and the control)
variables.
The regression results for the joint test are presented in Table 7.8. The results support the third
and fourth hypotheses that propose that the relationship between external block ownership and
leverage at high levels of managerial share ownership differs from that at low levels of
managerial share ownership.
Ho3 : 1 = 0 At low levels of managerial share ownership, the level of external block
ownership is not positively related to the firm’s debt ratio, ceteris paribus.
Ha3 : 1  0 At low levels of managerial share ownership, the level of external block
ownership is positively related to the firm’s debt ratio, ceteris paribus.
Ho4 : 1 = 0 At high levels of managerial share ownership, the association between external
block ownership and the firm’s debt ratio is more significant than at low levels of
managerial share ownership, ceteris paribus.
Ha4 : 1  0 At high levels of managerial share ownership, the association between external
block ownership and the firm’s debt ratio is less significant than at low levels of
managerial share ownership, ceteris paribus.
The results of the joint model retain support for the curvilinear relationship between managerial
share ownership and leverage. The coefficient on MSO (t-statistic = 2.188) is significantly positive
and MSO2 (t-statistic = -1.844) is also negative significantly. The coefficient on the EBO variable
tests the relationship between external block ownership and debt levels when the level of
managerial share ownership is low, it is positive and significant (t-statistic = 3.643). The
coefficient on the D*EBO dummy variable is not significant (t-statistic = -1.437) which indicates
that the relationship between external block ownership and leverage is relatively not different at
high and low levels of managerial share ownership. Specifically, the slope coefficient for the
relationship between external block ownership and leverage at high levels of managerial share
ownership is approximately zero (which is obtained from the summation of β2 and β3, i.e. 0.631).
It is argued that the negative entrenchment effect arising from high levels of managerial share
ownership is offset by the positive monitoring effect of external block holders.
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Table 7.8
The Relationship of External Block Ownership and Leverage at Different Levels of
Managerial Share Ownership on Financing Decision
Model III
Ln (D/E)it = α0 + 0 MSOit + 1 MSO2it + 2 EBOit + 3 (D*EBOit) + 4 SIZEit + 5 INDit
+ 6 GROWTHit + 7 PROFit + 8 FCFit +9 INTAit + 10 NDTSit + eit
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic F Significance R2
Constant -2.560 -9.668 .000
MSO 2.614 2.188** .029
MSO2 -3.499 -1.844*** .066
EBO .841 3.643* .000
D*EBO -.210 -1.048 .295
SIZE .237 6.983* .000
Industry -.249 -2.420** .016
GrowthTA -.002 -2.246** .025
PROF -2.281 -5.722* .000
FCF 6.32E-005 .353 .724
INTA .180 .270 .787
NDTS -1.942 -1.213 .226
MODEL 11.106* 4.88 0.190
* = significant at α level = 1% (t>2.575 or t<-2.575)
** = significant at α level = 5% (t>1.959 or t<-1.959)
*** = significant at α level = 10% (t>1.644 or t<-1.644)
Overall, the regression results less support the thesis proposition that the relationship between
external block ownership and leverage at low levels of managerial share ownership is different
from that at high levels, due to the interaction between managerial share ownership and external
block ownership. Even though the sign of D(EBO) is as predicted, its influence is not quite
significant to make a difference. This result is different from Brailsford et al. [2002]’s
investigation in Australian companies that supports the different relationship of external block
ownership and leverage at different levels of managerial share ownership. Short/Keasey [1999]
argue that governance mechanisms in the different countries may be a contributing factor in
explaining the differences.
The signs on the majority of the control variables, including SIZE, IND, GROWTH, and PROF, are
consistent with the predictions and the coefficients are statistically significant. However, the
negative coefficient on FCF is different from that anticipated. Further, the sign and coefficient on
the tax variable are again insignificant.
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7.5 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
One issue raised in the discussion on section 7.3 is the presence of significant correlation
between some of the explanatory variables. It has been suggested that this correlation may
create a problem of multicollinearity, and consequently model misspecification. The problem with
multicollinearity is essentially the lack of sufficient information in the sample to permit accurate
estimation of the individual parameters. It has been suggested that multicollinearity need not
necessarily create a problem [Maddala 1992]. One way of testing for the impact of
multicollinearity is by dropping the explanatory variables that are highly correlated. Hence, the
highly correlated variables are removed one at a time to test the sensitivity of the results.
Table 7.9A
Sensitivity Analysis – Omitted GROWTH from the Joint Model (Model A)
Ln (D/E)it = α0 + 0 MSOit + 1 MSO2it + 2 EBOit + 3 (D*EBOit) + 4 SIZEit + 5 INDit
+ 6 PROFit + 7 FCFit +8 INTAit + 9 NDTSit + eit
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic F Significance R2
Constant -2.617 -9.889 .000
MSO 2.540 2.119** .035
MSO2 -3.333 -1.751*** .081
EBO .909 3.958* .000
D*EBO -.196 -.972 .332
SIZE .239 7.021* .000
Industry -.264 -2.560** .011
PROF -2.356 -5.910* .000
FCF 9.08E-005 .506 .613
INTA .137 .205 .838
NDTS -1.829 -1.139 .255
MODEL 11.622* 3.93 0.182
* = significant at α level = 1% (t>2.575 or t<-2.575)
** = significant at α level = 5% (t>1.959 or t<-1.959)
*** = significant at α level = 10% (t>1.644 or t<-1.644)
First, the study excludes from the full model the GROWTH variable that is highly correlated with
the MSO, MSO2, EBO, PROF, FCF, and INTA variables (Model A). Next, it excludes the GROWTH
variable and the PROF variable due to its high correlation with MSO2, EBO, IND, FCF and NDTS
variables (Model B). Finally, the investigation excludes the GROWTH and FCF variables along with
the NDTS variable due to its high correlation with IND, INTA, and PROF variables (Model C).
Table 7.9 (A-C) presents these results.
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Table 7.9B
Sensitivity Analysis – Omitted GROWTH and PROF from the Joint Model (Model B)
Ln (D/E)it = α0 + 0 MSOit + 1 MSO2it + 2 EBOit + 3 (D*EBOit) + 4 SIZEit +
5 INDit + 6 FCFit +7 INTAit + 8 NDTSit + eit
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic F Significance R2
Constant -2.754 -10.122 .000
MSO 2.318 1.875*** .061
MSO2 -3.607 -1.836*** .067
EBO 1.010 4.272* .000
D*EBO -.106 -.509 .611
SIZE .241 6.876* .000
Industry -.231 -2.175** .030
FCF .000 .558 .577
INTA .088 .127 .899
NDTS -3.301 -2.015** .044
MODEL 8.481* 2.72 0.128
* = significant at α level = 1% (t>2.575 or t<-2.575)
** = significant at α level = 5% (t>1.959 or t<-1.959)
*** = significant at α level = 10% (t>1.644 or t<-1.644)
Table 7.9C
Sensitivity Analysis – Omitted SIZE, PROF and GrowthTA from the Joint Model (Model C)
Ln (D/E)it = α0 + 0 MSOit + 1 MSO2it + 2 EBOit + 3 (D*EBOit) + 4 INDit +
5 FCFit + 6 INTAit +7 NDTSit + eit
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic F Significance R2
Constant -2.878 -10.825 .000
MSO 2.389 1.927** .055
MSO2 -3.717 -1.888** .060
EBO 1.017 4.291* .000
D*EBO -.117 -.564 .573
SIZE .239 6.801* .000
Industry -.206 -1.947*** .052
FCF .000 .650 .516
INTA -.034 -.049 .961
MODEL 3.637* 2.94 0.058
* = significant at α level = 1% (t>2.575 or t<-2.575)
** = significant at α level = 5% (t>1.959 or t<-1.959)
*** = significant at α level = 10% (t>1.644 or t<-1.644)
From Table 7.9 (A-C), it can be seen the regression results of Models A, B and C are similar to
those of the joint model as presented in Table 7.8. In particular, the coefficient on MSO2 in all
three models is negative and statistically significant. The EBO coefficient estimate for all models
is significantly positive. The coefficient on D(EBO) in three models is negative and insignificant,
meanwhile dummy variable (IND) and SIZE still are significant when GROWTH, PROF, and NDTS
variables are omitted. However, the sign remains consistent across all models. All other
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coefficients’ significances are similar to those of the joint model, except NDTS. When the
GROWTH and PROF variables are omitted, the coefficient on NDTS variable becomes significant.
It can be concluded that the influence of tax system on leverage relates to the growth and
profitability of a company. The influence becomes less significant when we do not have any
further information about the growth level and profitability of a company.
7.6 THE EFFECT OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE ON FIRM PERFORMANCE AND ITS
NON-MONOTONIC RELATIONSHIP
In testing the relation between leverage and firm performance and the probability of its non-
monotonic relationship under the framework of agency theory, the external block ownership
model and managerial share ownership model are incorporated into the model as Berger/di Patti
[2002] have suggested in their studies. Under virtually any theory of agency costs, ownership
structure is important, since the separation of ownership and control creates agency costs.2
Greater insider shares may reduce agency costs, although the effect may be reversed at very
high levels of insider holdings.3 As well, outside block ownership or institutional holdings tend to
mitigate agency costs by creating a relatively efficient monitor of the managers.4 Exclusion of the
ownership variables may bias the test results because the ownership variables may be correlated
with the dependent variable in the agency cost equation (performance) and with the key
exogenous variable (leverage) through the reverse causality hypotheses. Therefore, Table 7.10
(A-B) contains the regression results that test this reverse causality.
Ho5 : 1 = 0 Firms with a higher level of external block holdings, low levels of managerial
share ownership, and higher firm performance are not likely to have a higher
debt ratio, ceteris paribus.
Ha5 : 1  0 Firms with a higher level of external block holdings, low levels of managerial
share ownership, and higher firm performance are likely to have a higher debt
ratio, ceteris paribus.
2 See Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet [1985].
3 See Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny [1988]
4 See Shleifer and Vishny [1986]
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Ho6 : 1 = 0 Firms with a higher level of external block holdings, low levels of managerial
share ownership, and higher debt are not likely to have a higher firm
performance, ceteris paribus.
Ha6 : 1  0 Firms with a higher level of external block holdings, low levels of managerial
share ownership, and higher debt are likely to have a higher firm performance,
ceteris paribus.
In Table 7.10A, it is measured the effect of firm performance on capital structure, to test the
Berger/di Patti’s model of reverse causality. The regression model using return on equity (ROE) is
excluded from the analysis because the ROE measure does not have any significant variable in
the estimation.5 These results make Tobin’s Q the most powerful measures of performance in the
East Asian countries case. Therefore, the discussion will concentrate on this measure of
performance beside the other control variables.
A positively and significantly relation between Tobin’s Q and leverage can be interpreted that the
East Asian companies after the crisis apply the efficiency-risk hypothesis. It means higher profit
efficiency has generated a higher expected return for those companies in a given capital
structure, and the higher efficiency has substituted to some degree for equity capital in
protecting the firm against future crises. In the other words, firms with high-expected returns
owing to high profit efficiency can hold lower equity ratios. It is also interpreted that firms that
are more efficient are considered from lenders as more solvent and consequently they can be
expected to be more leveraged than less efficient ones. This result is consistent with
Sarkar/Sarkar [2005] that tested the effect of Tobin’s Q on leverage in Indian companies post
East Asian crisis. They found that the Tobin’s Q is related positively and significantly to leverage
in low and high growth firms.
The regression results for this reverse causality that are presented in Table 7.10A, support the
fifth hypothesis that proposes firm with higher performance are to have a higher debt ratio. This
result is different from the previous studies that applied the reverse causality, such as Akintoye
[2008] and Margaritis/Psillaki [2006], which support the franchise-value hypothesis, where firms
that are more efficient choose higher equity ratios (or lower leverage ratio), all else equal, to
protect the rents or franchise value associated with high efficiency from the possibility of
liquidation.
5 It is worth noting that the sample included defaulted firms with a negative value of ROE for some firms in some cases,
which may affect the validity of ROE as a measure of performance in this study.
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Table 7.10A
The Effect of Firm Performance Measures on Capital Structure
Model IV - A
Ln (D/E)it = α0 + 0 Tobin-Qit + 1 ROEit + 2 MSOit + 3 MSO2it + 4 EBOit + 5 (D*EBOit) + 6 SIZEit
+ 7 INDit + 8 GROWTHit + 9 PROFit + 10 FCFit +11 INTAit + 12 NDTSit + eit
Ln D/E
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic Sig. 2 tail
Constant -2.450 -9.027 .000
Tobin’s Q .093 1.829*** .068
ROE .000 .010 .992
MSO 2.758 2.305** .022
MSO2 -3.857 -2.023** .044
EBO .781 3.355* .001
D(EBO) -.220 -1.095 .274
SIZE .240 7.075* .000
Industry -.253 -2.459** .014
GrowthTA -.002 -2.239** .026
PROF -2.278 -5.713* .000
FCF 6.68E-005 .374 .709
INTA .110 .165 .869
NDTS -2.645 -1.608 .108
F – Value 9.680*
R Square 0.195
* = significant at α level = 1% (t>2.575 or t<-2.575)
** = significant at α level = 5% (t>1.959 or t<-1.959)
*** = significant at α level = 10% (t>1.644 or t<-1.644)
Meanwhile, some control variables demonstrate interesting results. As shown in a previous study
of Rajan/Zingales [1995] that showed firm profitability has a negative relationship with debt to
equity ratio in four of seven industrialized countries, in this study it is obtained an inverse
relationship between PROF (profitability) and leverage. It can be interpreted that probably it
exists the information cost between external and internal finance. In case there is a significant
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, firms must depend on bank loans of
external fund, and as a result, debt to equity ratio becomes generally high. Furthermore, it may
provide support for the proposition that due to agency conflicts, companies over-leveraged
themselves, thus affecting their performance negatively. These results are consistent with the
findings of previous studies such as Gleason, Mathur and Mathur [2000], Tzelepis/Skuras [2004],
Krishnan/Moyer [1997], among others.
The negative and significant coefficient for IND (industry) variable could be as a result of the
negative ROE value for some firms included in the analysis as a result of distress. It also means
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that natural resource companies in East Asia less use leverage as source of expanding.
Meanwhile, GROWTH variable has a negative and significant coefficient that means firms with
high debt levels sometimes forego of an investment project in spite of expectations of high
returns because of the reluctance of creditors to finance the project. In other words, other
pertinent and more important factors may have come into play into the decision to use equity
versus debt in pursuing growth projects, such as interest rates, the tedious legal and regulatory
hurdles required to list and issue new shares, domestic appetite for new share issuances in the
local stock market, etc. In addition, banks in general set leverage ratio limits to borrowers in line
with the need to curtail excessive liabilities to within prudent levels and to avoid financial distress
to the firm. This practice therefore restricts higher debt exposure.
Other control variables, such as FCF, INTA, and NDTS, do not have any significant coefficient
that can support prior investigations and these control variables’ results are consistent with three
previous models (Model I, II, and III).
Table 7.10B
The Effect of Capital Structure on Firm Performance Measures
Model IV – B & C
Tobin-Qit = α0 + 0 Ln (D/E)it + 1 MSOit + 2 MSO2it + 3 EBOit + 4 (D*EBOit) + 5 SIZEit
+ 6 INDit + 7 GROWTHit + 8 PROFit + 9 FCFit +10 INTAit + 11 NDTSit + eit
ROEit = α0 + 0 Ln (D/E)it + 1 MSOit + 2 MSO2it + 3 EBOit + 4 (D*EBOit) + 5 SIZEit
+ 6 INDit + 7 GROWTHit + 8 PROFit + 9 FCFit +10 INTAit + 11 NDTSit + eit
* = significant at α level = 1% (t>2.575 or t<-2.575)
** = significant at α level = 5% (t>1.959 or t<-1.959)
*** = significant at α level = 10% (t>1.644 or t<-1.644)
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Like in Model IV-A (the effect of performance measures on capital structure), the regression
model using return on equity (ROE) as endogenous variable in determining the effect of leverage
on firm performance is excluded from the analysis because all explanatory variables do not have
any significant value in the estimation that is positively and significant related. In addition, the F-
value and its R-square are invalid and not significant.
A positively and significantly relation between leverage and Tobin’s Q is consistent with the
incentive signaling approach, which debt can be used to signal the fact that firm has prospect
and equity issues may be interpreted as a negative signal. Ross [1977] argues that a firm with
better prospects can issue more debt than one with lower prospects, because the issue of debt
by the latter will result in a higher probability of bankruptcy because of debt-servicing costs,
which is a costly outcome to management. This result is also consistent with the resource
constraints approach,6 which argues, that in the situation, where an entrepreneur has limited
resources, then the question of should capital be raised as equity or debt becomes an issue. The
placement of equity dilutes an owner-manager’s share of profits, and thereby entrepreneurial
incentives, motivating on-the-job consumption. Raising debt avoids the sacrifice of incentive
intensity since the entrepreneur can internalize to a greater degree the benefits of superior
profitability.7
The regression results for this reverse causality that are presented in Table 7.10B, support the
sixth hypothesis that proposes firm with higher debt ratio are to have a higher performance. This
result is different from Krishnan/Moyer [1997] who found a negative and significant impact of
total debt to total equity (TD/TE) on firm performance. Otherwise another study by Gleason,
Mathur, and Mathur [2000] found that firm’s capital structure has a negative and significant
impact on firm’s performance measures return on assets (ROA), growth in sales (Gsales), and
pre-tax income (Ptax).
The variable for outside block ownership, EBO, has a positive sign and is statistically significant in
Tobin’s Q regression. This finding suggests that an increase in outside block ownership increase
firm performance, which is consistent with the hypothesis of increased monitoring incentives
from more concentrated outside ownership.
6 See Jensen/Meckling [1976]
7 See Grossman/Hart [1986]
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The SIZE dummy variables have negative and significant coefficients, suggesting that larger firms
tend to be less efficient, everything else equal. It is also consistent with the conventional wisdom
that larger firms are better diversified and they can thus hold less capital to buffer against losses.
It can be said that the significance of firm size indicates that large firms earn higher returns
compared to smaller firms, presumably as a result of diversification of investment and economies
of scale. This result is consistent with previous findings including Gleason, Mathur, and Mathur
[2000], among others.
The significance of the variable NDTS (or tax system) suggests that the better performance of
East Asian companies is related to the higher corporate income tax payment, and to other factors
such as the firm’s risk, size, and debt ratio. This result indicates that firms with high tax
payments have a higher performance rate.
Meanwhile, other control variables, such as Industry and GROWTH, become insignificant when
they are regressed to performance measure (Tobin’s Q). It means that these variables loose its
power and its influence to determine firm performance as they are modeled together with
leverage and ownership structure. FCF and INTA do not have any significant coefficient that can
support prior investigations and these control variables’ results are consistent with three previous
models (Model I, II, III and IV-A).
7.7 THE EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON FIRM PERFORMANCE
AND ITS NON-MONOTONIC RELATIONSHIP
The following section presents the empirical studies on ownership and performance. The
analyzed equations system is aligned with the model of hypothesized effects.8 To first analyze the
relation of each ownership measure and performance separately, the model is decomposed in
two groups that contain eight equations systems A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H as demonstrated in
Table 7.11 (A-D). The first of the two models elaborates on ownership concentration; and the
second model focuses on insider ownership (managerial ownership).
Each model contains the relation of performance to one of the ownership forms and thus includes
two equations, one covering the effects of the ownership aspect on performance and a second
with performance determining ownership. In addition, leverage (debt ratio) is included in the
ownership equations to reflect the possibility that creditors can act as external monitors, which
8 For an overview over the model see Figure 6.4, p. 120.
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might affect the likelihood of observing ownership structures that facilitate managerial
entrenchment. Therefore, there are four hypotheses that are tested in this section as follows:
Ho7 : 1 = 0 Firms with a higher level of external block holdings and a higher debt ratio are
not likely to have higher firm performance, ceteris paribus.
Ha7 : 1  0 Firms with a higher level of external block holdings and a higher debt ratio are
likely to have higher firm performance, ceteris paribus.
Ho8 : 1 = 0 Firms with low levels of managerial share ownership and higher debt are not
likely to have a higher firm performance, ceteris paribus.
Ha8 : 1  0 Firms with low levels of managerial share ownership and higher debt are likely to
have a higher firm performance, ceteris paribus.
Ho9 : 1 = 0 Firms with higher debt and higher firm performance are not likely to have a
higher level of external block holdings, ceteris paribus.
Ha9 : 1  0 Firms with higher debt and higher firm performance are likely to have a higher
level of external block holdings, ceteris paribus.
Ho10 : 1 = 0 Firms with higher debt and higher firm performance are not likely to have low
levels of managerial share ownership, ceteris paribus.
Ha10 : 1  0 Firms with higher debt and higher firm performance are likely to have low levels
of managerial share ownership, ceteris paribus.
As first ownership aspect, general ownership concentration, i.e., the existence and strength of a
controlling shareholder, is analyzed. Like in section 7.6 that tests the effect of firm performance
on capital structure, the regression model using return on equity (ROE) is excluded from the
analysis because the ROE measure does not have any significant variable in the estimation. In
addition, F-Value (0.315) and R-Square (0.006) are not sufficient to give a base of good model.
These results make Tobin’s Q the most powerful measures of performance in the East Asian
countries case. Therefore, the discussion will concentrate on this measure of performance beside
the other control variables.
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A positively and significantly relation between EBO and Tobin’s Q can be interpreted that the East
Asian companies large owners are more capable of monitoring and controlling the management,
thereby contributing to corporate performance. It means that ownership concentration has been
able to increase the cost-efficiency of monitoring in the post-crisis period and due to this higher
incentive has enhanced its usage. Accordingly, the controlling shareholder prefers to increase his
utility rather by monitoring than by private benefits. This result is consistent with the monitoring
model that is theoretically proven by the models of Grossman [1976], Grossman/Hart [1980],
Shleifer/Vishny [1986] and others as Bolton/von Thadden [1998], Burkart et al. [1997], Huddart
[1993], Leech [2001] and Maug [1998].
Table 7.11A
The Effect of External Block holder Ownership on Firm Performance Measures
Model V – A & B
Tobin-Qit = α0 + 0 Ln (D/E)it + 1 EBOit + 2 (D*EBOit) + 3 SIZEit + 4 INDit + 5 GROWTHit
+ 6 PROFit + 7 FCFit +8 INTAit + 9 NDTSit + eit
ROEit = α0 + 0 Ln (D/E)it + 1 EBOit + 2 (D*EBOit) + 3 SIZEit + 4 INDit + 5 GROWTHit
+ 6 PROFit + 7 FCFit +8 INTAit + 9 NDTSit + eit
* = significant at α level = 1% (t>2.575 or t<-2.575)
** = significant at α level = 5% (t>1.959 or t<-1.959)
*** = significant at α level = 10% (t>1.644 or t<-1.644)
Regarding the control variables, most of the variables’ coefficients are not significant, except the
debt ratio that supports the seventh hypothesis and NDTS. A positively and significantly relation
between leverage and firm performance means that the argument of reduced agency costs by
Kim/Sorensen [1986] and Jensen [1986] prevails over the pecking order argument by
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Myers/Majluf [1984] and Jensen et al. [1992]. According to the tax substitution theory, an
increase in a firm’s non-debt tax shield should be associated with decrease in debt
[Hughes/Trezevant 1997]. They argue that firms can use other interest item, such as
depreciation, tax credit, and pension fund to reduce corporate tax expense, and this action is
followed by a decreasing in interest expense, an increasing firm’s earning, and provides
alternatives in shielding profits from tax. Based on this argument, NDTS (non-debt tax shield) has
positively influenced firm performance and it supports the pecking order argument.9
After the effect of external block holder ownership was assessed, the next analysis is to measure
the effect of managerial share ownership on firm performance. Like in section 7.6 that tests the
effect of firm performance on capital structure, the regression model that measures the effect of
managerial ownership on firm performance by using return on equity (ROE) is excluded from the
analysis because the ROE measure does not have any significant variables in the estimation. In
addition, F-Value (0.355) and R-Square (0.007) are not sufficient to give a base of good model.
These results make Tobin’s Q the most powerful measures of performance in the East Asian
countries case.
A negatively and significantly influence of managerial ownership at low-level supports the
entrenchment argument. It confirms that managerial ownership at low-level has a strong and
negative effect on performance and hence should not be promoted as agency device. Meanwhile
a positively and significantly influence of managerial ownership at high-level supports the
incentive alignment argument. It means that managerial ownership at high-level reduces conflict
of interest between shareholder and manager. These findings are consistent with Morck et al.
[1998]’s combined argument that suggests a non-monotonous relationship between managerial
ownership and firm performance.
This non-linear relationship is also consistent with previous studies, such as Short/Keasey [1999],
McConnel/Servaes [1990], and Han/Suk [1998], which strongly confirm the existence of such
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. At low levels of ownership,
management has the incentive to pursue the firm’s value maximization activities. However, at
high levels of ownership, self-serving behavior detrimental to the firm’s value declines as
management owns a higher fraction of the firm’s equity, and hence cannot externalize the costs
of their moral hazard. Consequently, this result supports the eighth hypothesis.
9 Myers [1984] suggest that managers have a pecking order in which retained earnings represent the first choice,
followed by debt financing, then equity.
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Table 7.11B
The Effect of Managerial Share Ownership on Firm Performance Measures
Model V – C & D
Tobin-Qit = α0 + 0 Ln (D/E)it + 1 MSOit + 2 MSO2it + 3 SIZEit + 4 INDit + 5 GROWTHit
+ 6 PROFit + 7 FCFit +8 INTAit + 9 NDTSit + eit
ROEit = α0 + 0 Ln (D/E)it + 1 MSOit + 2 MSO2it + 3 SIZEit + 4 INDit + 5 GROWTHit
+ 6 PROFit + 7 FCFit +8 INTAit + 9 NDTSit + eit
* = significant at α level = 1% (t>2.575 or t<-2.575)
** = significant at α level = 5% (t>1.959 or t<-1.959)
*** = significant at α level = 10% (t>1.644 or t<-1.644)
The negative and significant effect of size for all companies in this study does not suits the
hypotheses of Himmelberg et al. [1999] and Gugler et al. [2003b] arguing for greater scope of
moral hazard in large firms. An additional reason for a positive relation of size and insider
ownership is that larger firms are likely to employ a more skilled and probably wealthier
management. Thus, the wealth constraint argument is moderate.10 In addition, Gugler et al.
[2003b] note that the costly acquisition of a large share might not only reduce ownership
concentration, but also increase the entrenchment effect of existing managerial ownership and
therefore its advantages.11 Meanwhile the effect of other control variable, NDTS, is consistent
with the argument of reduced agency costs by Kim/Sorensen [1986] and Jensen [1986] that
prevails over the pecking order argument by Myers/Majluf [1984] and Jensen et al. [1992], as
showed above in Model V – A & B. In addition, other control variables are not significant.
10 See Himmelberg et al. [1999, p. 364].
11 See Gugler et al. [2003b, p. 5].
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The reverse effects of Tobin’s Q on the ownership variables are stated in Table 7.11C (Model V –
E & F) and Table 7.11D (Model V – G & H). A positively and significantly influence of Tobin’s Q on
EBO can be interpreted that the East Asian companies large owners are better informed than
minority shareholders or potential investors, therefore, they use their knowledge about the firm’s
prospects to maximize his wealth.12 This finding is also consistent with the profit-debt-ownership
argument [Demzetz/Lehn 1985]. Since leverage controls the agency conflicts between
shareholders and managers, the need for external capital to mediate the conflict decreases.
Consequently, performance decreases the leverage, which increases the ownership
concentration.
Table 7.11C
The Effect of Firm Performance Measures on External Blockholder Ownership
Model V – E & F
EBOit = α0 + 0 Ln (D/E)it + 1 Tobin-Qit + 2 SIZEit + 3 INDit + 4 GROWTHit
+ 5 PROFit + 6 FCFit +7 INTAit + 8 NDTSit + eit
EBOit = α0 + 0 Ln (D/E)it + 1 ROEit + 2 SIZEit + 3 INDit + 4 GROWTHit
+ 5 PROFit + 6 FCFit +7 INTAit + 8 NDTSit + eit
* = significant at α level = 1% (t>2.575 or t<-2.575)
** = significant at α level = 5% (t>1.959 or t<-1.959)
*** = significant at α level = 10% (t>1.644 or t<-1.644)
The study of Lins [2002] show the same result, that is, a positive relation between large non-
management block holders and firm value could indicate that monitoring of managers by large
external block holders has lessened actual or expected managerial agency problems. Conversely,
12 See Anderson/Reeb [2003, p. 1303], Chang [2003], Demsetz/Lehn [1985], Lemmon/Lins [2003, p. 1446],
Loderer/Martin [1997, p. 237], and Thompson II [1976, p. 2].
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it could be the case that high firm values lead to increased ownership by these blocks holders.13
The result is also consistent with Grosfeld [2006] that found a positively and significantly relation
between Tobin’s Q with ownership concentration in privatized firms and new firms. Hence, this
result of this thesis also supports the ninth hypothesis.
The zero coefficient of GROWTH variable could not be interpreted, even though significant
statistically. Normally growth is positively related to performance, because higher growth reflects
better future growth opportunities and so higher firm valuation. Even though there is little
empirical support that found a positively and significantly influence of leverage on ownership
concentration, in this study the result is consistent with the study of Miwa/Ramseyer [2001] that
measured the effect of leverage on ownership structure in post-war era 1950s in Japan.
Reflecting to the Japan’s experience in post-war that gave an opportunity to Japanese firms to
re-concentrate their ownership, it can be interpreted that leveraged firms has pushed large
shareholders to increase its portion as they saw a affordable business environment that indicates
a better prospect for their firms. On the other side, the effect of leverage on ownership
concentration in this thesis is different from the study of Welch [2003] that found a negatively
and significantly relationship between leverage and ownership concentration in case of Australian
firms. Since other control variables (SIZE, Industry, PROF, FCF, INTA, and NDTS) do not yield
any significant results, hence, the analysis of the results is not further considered in this study.
Finally, this section analyses the influence of firm performance on insider ownership and its
definition of insider is limited on managerial share ownership. In this regression model, even
though both model (Model V – G & H) have a significant F-value that indicates a valid model;
unfortunately, both exogenous variables of firm performance (Tobin’s Q and ROE) are far from
statistically significant results (t-statistic: 0.173 and -0.231, respectively). However, the sign of
performance’s coefficient is consistent with some previous studies, such as Kole [1996] provided
related evidence for this conjecture by showing that managers prefer equity compensation only
when they expect their firms to perform well, suggesting that managerial ownership might be
endogenous to compensation contracting practices. Similarly, Rajagopalan [1996] showed the
relationship between executive compensation and performance is contingent upon the firm’s
strategic context. More recently, Cho [1998] used the simultaneous equations estimation
technique to show, for his sample, that corporate value affected ownership structure, while the
reverse relationship did not hold. Loderer/Martin [1997] found that acquisition performance and
13 See Rouwenhorst [1999], Chui, Titman, and Wei [2000].
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firm value affected the size of managers’ stockholdings but not vice versa in their sample of
acquisitions. Relatively this regression result supports the tenth hypothesis.
Table 7.11D
The Effect of Firm Performance Measures on Managerial Share Ownership
Model V – G & H
MSOit = α0 + 0 Ln (D/E)it + 1 Tobin-Qit + 2 SIZEit + 3 INDit + 4 GROWTHit
+ 5 PROFit + 6 FCFit +7 INTAit + 8 NDTSit + eit
MSOit = α0 + 0 Ln (D/E)it + 1 ROEit + 2 SIZEit + 3 INDit + 4 GROWTHit
+ 5 PROFit + 6 FCFit +7 INTAit + 8 NDTSit + eit
* = significant at α level = 1% (t>2.575 or t<-2.575)
** = significant at α level = 5% (t>1.959 or t<-1.959)
*** = significant at α level = 10% (t>1.644 or t<-1.644)
A positively and significant result of PROF is consistent with the study of Demsetz/Lehn [1985]
that produced the first in a series of papers that examine this issue, impose a linear model on the
data and find that firm profitability is independent of insider ownership. After controlling for firm-
fixed effects using panel data, similar findings are reported in more recent work by Himmelberg
et al. [1999] for a random sample of 600 US firms over 1982–1984, and Lee/Ryu [2003] among
firms trading on the Korean market. It can be interpreted that East Asian firms apply insider-
investment reason, which insider may capitalize on their insights by increasing their ownership
when they expect the firm profitability to improve and decrease their ownership when it happens
reversely.
A negatively and significantly result of SIZE is consistent with the study of Bathala [1996] and
Pedersen/Thomsen [1999] that state two reasons for a negative effect of size on general
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ownership.14 First, due to personal wealth constraints a large share is easier to hold in a small
firm.15 Second, non-diversification costs and liquidity costs increase with size.16 Meanwhile, the
statistically significant coefficient of INTA is different from previous studies, such as Pindado/de la
Torre [2004], that use INTA as a measure for discretionary power of management that will
favorably influence the extent of insider ownership. This result can be interpreted that the level
of intangible assets discloses information about a firm's growth opportunities and, according to
Myers [1977], growth opportunities can be viewed as call options whose value depends on
discretionary future investment. As a result, potential external investors cannot easily assess
intangible assets and, consequently, these assets exacerbate the asymmetric information
problem by sending a signal that is perceived as negative by potential bondholders. In other
words, bondholders' reluctance to lend to a firm with high level of intangible assets increases
when a higher insider ownership seems not to guarantee the efficient use of such assets.
7.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Generally, the multivariate regression results support the prior researches. As the thesis has
predicted it before, the external block ownership affects companies’ capital structure in East Asia
countries after the crisis. Firms with a higher level of external block holdings are likely to have a
higher debt ratio, ceteris paribus, and it is statistically significant. In other words, the study
rejects H0 and accepts Ha stating that a higher level of external block holdings creates a higher
leverage.
In the effect of managerial share ownership on financing decision, the result has the same
direction of influence with some previous studies, such as research is done by Brailsford et al
(2002). The signs on MSO and MSO2 parallel the alignment of interests and entrenchment effects
of managerial share ownership put forward by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen
(1983) respectively. Specifically, when the level of managerial share ownership is low, an
increase in managerial share ownership has the effect of aligning management and shareholders’
interests. Consequently, as managerial share ownership increases from a low level, managers
have less incentive to reduce the debt level, resulting in a higher level of debt (but at a
decreasing rate). One thing that cannot be reached in this research is the research’s results on
MSO and MSO2 are not statistically significant.
14 This relation is empirically supported by Bathala [1996], Bergstrom/Rydqvist [1990a], Crutchley/Hansen [1989],
Demsetz/Lehn [1985], and Pedersen/Thomsen [1999].
15 See Bathala [1996, p. 133], Demsetz/Lehn [1985], Edwards/Weichenrieder [2004, p. 156], and Fama/Jensen [1983a].
16 See Bathala [1996, p. 133] and Crutchley/Hansen [1989, p. 41]
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In the relationship between external block ownership and leverage at different levels of
managerial share ownership, the thesis indicates that the relationship between external block
ownership and leverage is different at high and low levels of managerial share ownership.
Specifically, the slope coefficient for the relationship between external block ownership and
leverage at high levels of managerial share ownership is approximately zero. It is argued that the
negative entrenchment effect arising from high levels of managerial share ownership is offset by
the positive monitoring effect of external block holders. The results of the joint model also retain
support for the curvilinear relationship between managerial share ownership and leverage.
In the relationship between leverage (as endogenous variable) and firm performance and the
probability of its non-monotonic relationship under the framework of agency theory, this thesis
find that the East Asian companies after the crisis apply the efficiency-risk hypothesis. It indicates
that higher profit efficiency has generated a higher expected return for those companies in a
given capital structure, and the higher efficiency has substituted to some degree for equity
capital in protecting the firm against future crises. At the same time, some control variables
demonstrate interesting results. In this study, it is obtained an inverse relationship between PROF
(profitability) and leverage. It can be interpreted that probably it exists the information cost
between external and internal finance. In case there is a significant information asymmetry
between insiders and outsiders, firms must depend on bank loans of external fund, and as a
result, debt to equity ratio becomes generally high. Furthermore, it may provide support for the
proposition that due to agency conflicts, companies over-leveraged themselves, thus affecting
their performance negatively.
Meanwhile, a positively and significantly relation between leverage and Tobin’s Q, which
performance measure is endogenous variable, is consistent with the incentive signaling approach,
which debt can be used to signal the fact that firm has prospect and equity issues may be
interpreted as a negative signal. It also indicates that a firm with better prospects can issue more
debt than one with lower prospects, because the issue of debt by the latter will result in a higher
probability of bankruptcy because of debt-servicing costs, which is a costly outcome to
management. This result is also consistent with the resource constraints approach, which argues
that in the situation, where an entrepreneur has limited resources, then the question of should
capital be raised as equity or debt becomes an issue. The placement of equity dilutes an owner-
manager’s share of profits, and thereby entrepreneurial incentives, motivating on-the-job
consumption. East Asian companies to avoid the sacrifice of incentive intensity since the
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entrepreneur can internalize to a greater degree the benefits of superior profitability use raising
debt.
Finally, in the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance, a positively
and significantly relation between EBO and Tobin’s Q can be interpreted that the East Asian
companies large owners are more capable of monitoring and controlling the management,
thereby contributing to corporate performance. It indicates that ownership concentration has
been able to increase the cost-efficiency of monitoring in the post-crisis period and due to this
higher incentive has enhanced its usage. Accordingly, the controlling shareholder prefers to in-
crease his utility rather by monitoring than by private benefits.
On the other side, a negatively and significantly influence of managerial ownership at low-level
bears the entrenchment argument. It corroborates that managerial ownership at low-level has a
strong and negative effect on performance and hence should not be promoted as agency device.
Meanwhile a positively and significantly influence of managerial ownership at high-level supports
the incentive alignment argument. It implies that managerial ownership at high-level reduces
conflict of interest between shareholder and manager.
Regarding the reverse causality, a positively and significantly influence of Tobin’s Q on EBO can
be interpreted that the East Asian companies large owners are better informed than minority
shareholders or potential investors, therefore, they use their knowledge about the firm’s
prospects to maximize his wealth. This finding is also consistent with the profit-debt-ownership
argument. Since leverage controls the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, the
need for external capital to mediate the conflict decreases. Consequently, performance decreases
the leverage, which increases the ownership concentration.
Meanwhile, in measuring the influence of firm performance on insider ownership, the regression
model shown statistically insignificant results, even though the model has a significant F-value
that indicates a valid model. What becomes an interesting result is the sign of performance’s
coefficient is consistent with some previous studies, such as Kole [1996], Rajagopalan [1996],
Cho [1998], and Loderer/Martin [1997] that showed the relationship between executive
compensation and performance is contingent upon the firm’s strategic context and those studies
supported the idea that corporate value affected ownership structure.
In general, all analysis in chapter 7 can be summarized in Table 7.12 below.
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Table 7.12
The Result Summary
Ownership Structures, Capital Structure, and Firm Value:
An Analysis of Post East Asian Financial Crisis
CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS OF
THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This chapter will focus on the summary of the empirical results derived from the multivariate
regression done on the analysis of ownership structure, capital structure, and firm value. It also
includes some implications and suggestions that are proposed to improve and amplify the
researches in the future.
Recent developments in agency theory suggest that the structure of corporate ownership can
affect firm performance by mitigating agency conflicts between management and shareholders.
In this thesis, I extend the agency framework and test hypotheses that concern the relationship
between ownership structure, capital structure, and corporate performance of East Asian
countries in term of post Asian Financial crisis. The results provide some interesting evidences,
such as the distribution of equity ownership among corporate managers and external block
holders has a significant relationship with leverage, the relation between capital structure and
performance is significant and reversely causality, and the positive influence of ownership
structure on performance that is not reversely causality in case of managerial ownership.
8.1 DOES EXTERNAL BLOCK OWNERSHIP HAVE INFLUENCE ON CAPITAL
STRUCTURE?
When analyzing the external block ownership and its impact on capital structure, it can be
concluded that leverage increases at the time of the proportion of firm’s external block ownership
also increase. In other words, the empirical results suggest that the level of external block
ownership is positively related to leverage.
This provides support for the active monitoring hypothesis that proposes that external block
holders have greater incentives and an ability to monitor management, thereby reducing
managerial opportunism that may otherwise reduce leverage to a sub-optimal level in order to
reduce management’s non-diversifiable employment risk. The results of external block ownership
and leverage relationship coincide with earlier research of these fields, which suggest that
positive relation is consistent with the active monitoring hypothesis. It suggests that large
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shareholders have greater incentives to monitor management due to their significant investment
in the firm. The increased monitoring by external block holders is believed to be able to decrease
managerial opportunism, leading to lower agency conflicts.
In general, the proportion of debt ratio has increased by 0.621 percent when external block
ownership’s proportion has also increased. It can be concluded that management consider firstly
using debt as a source of financing as the growing existence of external block holders.
This result restates and re-emphasizes prior researches of corporate governance and any kinds
related to it. It is related to this study’s contribution in giving more evidences about managers’
behavior. The results reflect managers’ intention and ability to manage optimally the companies
and explain how they react on special event, such as financial crisis, based on the situation faced.
The result reveals the condition of East Asian stock market, which is emerging, and gives insights
how to optimize it for the sake of corporate strategic decision and good corporate governance. At
the same time, the result encourages foreign investors to enter and use their presence as
external block holders in boosting the application of good corporate governance.
8.2 DOES MANAGERIAL SHARE OWNERSHIP AFFECT ON FINANCING
DECISION?
The results for the effect of managerial share ownership on financing decision indicate that
managerial share ownership parallels with the alignment of interests and entrenchment effects of
managerial share ownership put forward by Jensen/Meckling [1976] and Fama/Jensen [1983]
respectively.
The results also indicate a curvilinear relationship between the level of managerial share
ownership and leverage with the relationship reaching a maximum at 0.196% of management
share ownership. This result parallels the convergence-of-interests and entrenchment
hypotheses. In particular, at low levels of managerial share ownership, managerial share
ownership has the effect of aligning shareholder and management interests. However, when
managerial share ownership reaches a certain point (0.196% on average in this study sample)
the entrenchment effect dominates the convergence-of interest’s effect, leading to an increase
(decrease) in managerial opportunistic behavior (debt level).
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It can also explain when corporate managers hold a significant proportion of firm shares, the
entrenchment effect sets in, resulting in higher managerial opportunism and therefore a lower
debt ratio. In particular, with significant voting power and influence, it becomes more difficult to
control managerial behavior, resulting in fewer constraints on managers’ ability to adjust debt
ratios to their own self-interests.
8.3 IS THERE ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXTERNAL BLOCK
OWNERSHIP AND LEVERAGE AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF MANAGERIAL
SHARE OWNERSHIP?
Furthermore, this study tries to find the relationship between external block ownership and
leverage at different levels of managerial ownership. This implies that the debt ratio is a function
of both managerial share ownership and external block ownership.
Specifically, it was predicted and found that at low levels of managerial share ownership, the
“monitoring effect” of external block ownership is coupled with the “convergence-of-interests”
effect of managerial share ownership, resulting in a positive relationship between external block
ownership and leverage. However, at high levels of managerial share ownership, managerial
entrenchment competes with external block holders’ monitoring such that the significance of
external block ownership is substantially removed. It is argued that the negative entrenchment
effect arising from high levels of managerial share ownership is offset by the positive monitoring
effect of external block holders.
In a series of sensitivity tests, the thesis shows that the results are generally robust to model
specification. Overall, the regression results support the thesis proposition that the relationship
between external block ownership and leverage at low levels of managerial share ownership is
different from that at high levels, due to the interaction between managerial share ownership
and external block ownership.
8.4 DOES CAPITAL STRUCTURE AFFECT CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND
HAVE REVERSE CAUSALITY EFFECT?
The results for the effect of leverage on corporate performance indicate that the East Asian
companies after the crisis apply the efficiency-risk argument as hypothesized by Berger/di Patti
[2002]. It implies that higher profit efficiency has generated a higher expected return for those
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companies in a given capital structure, and the higher efficiency has substituted to some degree
for equity capital in protecting the firm against future crises.
It indicates that firms that are more efficient are considered from lenders as more solvent and
consequently they can be expected to be more leveraged than less efficient ones. Intuitively it
can be concluded that East Asian companies have recovered its financial performance after the
crisis and lenders view this prospect. At the same time, learning from the Asian financial crisis,
the disciplining role of debt has taken on effect and ownership, control structures of corporations
and institutional features of the country have significant bearing on debt governance. This result
is consistent with Sarkar/Sarkar [2005] that tested the effect of Tobin’s Q on leverage in Indian
companies post East Asian crisis. They found that the Tobin’s Q is related positively and
significantly to leverage in low and high growth firms.
In analyzing the reverse causation of capital structure and corporate performance relation, the
result confirms the incentive signaling approach, which debt can be used to signal the fact that
firm has prospect and equity issues may be interpreted as a negative signal. Investors view the
post-crisis situation is getting better and support this favorable environment by giving more
opportunities to finance some good and high-growth East Asian firms. This policy seems to be
applied in countries that have recovered its corporate governance system, such as Korea,
Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
8.5 DOES OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AFFECT CORPORATE PERFORMANCE
AND HAVE REVERSE CAUSALITY EFFECT?
In this study, the influence of the existence and strength of a controlling shareholder on
corporate performance is positive and significant. In other words, it shows a positive monitoring
effect of the share size of the largest owner on performance. In contrast, managerial ownership
at low level has a negative impact on performance due to the strategic-alignment-conflict of
interest and/or myopic investment goals. In addition, management entrenches by its share-
holdings against sanctioning actions which results in more managerial actions harming corporate
value. Meanwhile, at high-level of managerial ownership, it has a positive impact on performance
due to incentive-alignment argument. This could indicate a preference of stock-base
management remuneration and a spurious expectation of an interest alignment of the
management due to the shareholdings.
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The reverse effects of performance on ownership only apply in the part of ownership
concentration (or external block holder) and are not relevant in managerial ownership’s part. A
positively and significantly relation between ownership concentration and performance is
consistent with the profit-debt-ownership argument. At the same time, a positive relation
between firm value and large non-management block holders could indicate that monitoring of
managers by large external block holders has lessened actual or expected managerial agency
problems. Meanwhile, a negative effect of performance on managerial ownership indicates a
contradicting to the insider-investment argument. In general, these weak results can be
interpreted in four different ways. First, ownership structure is only marginally caused by
performance. Second, other important factors of influence are not included in the equations, i.e.
the liquidity situation and risk profile of shareholders. Thirdly, it may also be that no factors are
missing but the system still suffers from endogeneity of further variables modeled as exogenous.
For example, this might be the case for the financial leverage, as the endogeneity of the capital
structure to performance and ownership was implied by Jensen/Meckling [1976] and Jensen
[1986]. Thus, additional research has to be performed on the determinants and their effects on
ownership structure.
8.6 CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE
The results provide new evidences on the relationship between ownership structure and capital
structure of East Asian companies in term of post Asian Financial crisis analysis. This thesis
contributes to the literature in at least five important areas. First and most important, it is able to
contribute to the literature of determining effective corporate strategic decision, especially on
regarding the capital structure debate. By arguing for a link between the ownership structure and
capital structure and through empirical support, this thesis adds to an understanding of cross-
sectional, and possibly time-series, variation in capital structure. The practical import is that
ownership structure is related to the financial efficiency of a firm and hence decisions regarding
the issue of equity need to consider a range of implications. These results may also help further
explain the link between equity ownership, firm value, and leverage. However, further
developments on this link are left for future research.
Second, the study contributes to the literature on corporate governance fields by examining the
relationship between external block ownership and managerial share ownership whether it affects
the financing decision or not. Inline to the prior research, the thesis finds that both external block
ownership and managerial share ownership affect significantly capital structure, as the proxy of
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the presence of agency problem. It can give new insight about the effect of stock market status,
which is emerging and recovering from the last financial crisis.
Third, in practice, firm managers who are able to identify the optimal capital structure are
rewarded by minimizing the firm cost of finance thereby maximizing the firm’s revenue. If a firm’s
capital structure influences a firm’s performance, then it is reasonable to expect that the firm’s
capital structure would affect the firm’s health and its likelihood of default. From a creditor’s point
view, it is possible that the debt to equity ratio aids in understanding the banks’ risk management
strategies and how banks determine the likelihood of default associated with financially
distressed firms. In short, the issue regarding the capital structure and firm performance are
important for both academics and practitioners in analyzing the cause of Asian financial crisis and
the situation in post-crisis era.
Fourthly, the course of the analysis has also opened research questions on ownership structure
and performance, such as the need to explain the negative effect of performance and to examine
the timing issues. The determination of the ownership structure is an object for future research.
The consideration of differences in behavior of stock sales versus purchases can clarify the devel-
opment of ownership structures and their interaction with performance and corporate
governance. Furthermore, there are plenty of factors also assumed to be endogenous on the
relation of ownership and performance. Other corporate governance mechanisms and mediating
factors, such as capital structure could be included as endogenous variables in the simultaneous
equations system.
Fifthly, the study contributes to the literature of capital structure, ownership structure and
corporate performance debate in term of specific event and region by using data that covers
seven East Asian countries during the period from the 2000 – 2001 to examine those companies
and its capital structure, ownership structure and corporate performance after the Asian Financial
crisis. Prior researches in this field generally have relied upon the period of pre-crisis.
8.7 IMPLICATIONS FOR REAL LIFE
The study findings reveal no silver bullet that guarantees success on applying corporate
governance. As many companies have learned from experience, investors and securities markets
can be fickle, and even the most carefully crafted capital structure can meet with un-optimized
performance when it is formed. Nevertheless, the study does suggest that companies can
substantially improve their chances of success by pursuing to some extent control the level of
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managerial share ownership although control over the existence of external block holders is more
difficult.
If there is one lesson to be learnt from the last crisis, it is that these corporations have become
over-reliant on debt, this in part being a function of the prevailing ownership structures. One
must therefore question whether firms in these countries will be able to maintain their robust
patterns of recovery unless they reduce their leverage by going directly to capital markets rather
than to banks.
In the global context of ownership structure and in term of East Asian companies’ special
characteristics, maturing a corporate governance system (which normally uses protection of
minority shareholder as the proxy) in Asia are ultimately likely to develop to address their own
national, legal, and business customs. The purported importance of corporate governance,
however, can be seen as requiring expedience in reform. To this end, the adoption of
internationally recognized standards of good governance has been posited as an appropriate and
expedient method of reforming perceived problems and offers enterprises the chance to gain a
share of future investment capital. Using the benchmark provides the capacity to develop
domestic institutions quicker than would otherwise be possible through self-design — the quicker
the better. The adoption of the OECD Principles is a small step in this direction.
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Appendix 1
Page 1 of 9
No. Company Name Country D/E MSO EBO Total Assets Industry Growth TA FCF EBIT Intangibles Depreciation Ln D/E SIZE PROF INTA NDTS MSO (2) D(EBO) Tobin's Q ROE Ln Tobin's Q
1 Agis Indonesia 0.53908 0.00000 0.77570 25.49496 0.0000 -0.14780 4.14801 -0.15597 0.45643 0.67990 -0.61788 3.2385 -0.00612 0.01790 0.02667 0.00000 0 0.463926 -0.012995 -0.768031
2 Aqua Golden Mississippi Indonesia 0.26663 0.00000 0.53600 35.24735 0.0000 0.62808 -5.33344 6.06533 0.02803 2.64780 -1.32190 3.5624 0.17208 0.00080 0.07512 0.00000 0 0.739426 0.310763 -0.301881
3 Argha Karya Prima Industry Indonesia 1.29197 0.00000 0.89500 184.74269 0.0000 0.15534 3.12890 -30.07944 6.44116 0.66957 0.25617 5.2190 -0.16282 0.03487 0.00362 0.00000 0 1.123763 1.166685 0.116683
4 Astra Agro Lestari Indonesia 0.50572 0.00060 0.79750 240.99768 0.0000 0.09076 -18.41094 26.93279 5.83183 10.39637 -0.68177 5.4848 0.11176 0.02420 0.04314 0.00000 0 1.089338 0.065598 0.085570
5 Astra International Indonesia 0.91247 0.00000 0.81870 2,640.28325 1.0000 0.23607 35.21588 44.21112 34.82043 68.78339 -0.09160 7.8786 0.01674 0.01319 0.02605 0.00000 0 0.813507 -0.369922 -0.206401
6 Astra Otoparts Indonesia 0.49326 0.00040 0.65400 180.37635 1.0000 0.24621 9.63689 25.21941 0.78677 0.87700 -0.70672 5.1950 0.13982 0.00436 0.00486 0.00000 0 0.915536 0.188512 -0.088245
7 Bakrie & Brothers Indonesia 1.21297 0.00000 0.95030 889.11990 1.0000 0.01429 10.55792 -80.78266 84.58772 27.30281 0.19307 6.7902 -0.09086 0.09514 0.03071 0.00000 0 1.163876 0.717025 0.151755
8 Bakrie Sumatera Plantation Indonesia 0.98332 0.00000 0.82500 82.17015 0.0000 -0.05160 0.64434 -21.23130 0.35535 0.29705 -0.01682 4.4088 -0.25838 0.00432 0.00362 0.00000 0 1.103860 -14.299956 0.098813
9 Bakrieland Development Indonesia 0.38726 0.00000 0.31560 68.43135 0.0000 -0.40952 3.54263 -17.25280 1.01809 0.51018 -0.94865 4.2258 -0.25212 0.01488 0.00746 0.00000 0 0.550728 0.089720 -0.596515
10 BAT Indonesia Indonesia 0.33593 0.00000 0.46000 83.87878 0.0000 -0.07226 2.14284 11.00423 0.22408 2.19907 -1.09084 4.4294 0.13119 0.00267 0.02622 0.00000 0 1.392843 0.150619 0.331347
11 Bhakti Investama Indonesia 0.30759 0.00360 0.55560 85.81903 0.0000 1.09432 -11.61963 13.86459 0.02553 0.23897 -1.17899 4.4522 0.16156 0.00030 0.00278 0.00001 0 0.822228 0.235025 -0.195738
12 Branta Mulia Indonesia 0.73869 0.17310 0.60130 195.37148 0.0000 0.35610 21.77589 12.75337 2.99679 0.47442 -0.30288 5.2749 0.06528 0.01534 0.00243 0.02996 0 0.733095 0.029459 -0.310480
13 Centris Multi Persada Indonesia 0.02236 0.00000 0.32960 14.34345 1.0000 0.06245 0.75711 0.74005 0.07504 1.58336 -3.80034 2.6633 0.05160 0.00523 0.11039 0.00000 0 0.118186 0.019967 -2.135497
14 Dharmala Intiland Indonesia 1.00992 0.00000 0.86920 212.82314 0.0000 -0.05081 6.04506 -28.93113 3.83534 3.16785 0.00987 5.3605 -0.13594 0.01802 0.01488 0.00000 0 0.214422 0.158610 -1.539808
15 Duta Pertiwi Nusantara Indonesia 0.15209 0.01900 0.35900 14.10934 0.0000 0.26274 -0.23566 2.85281 0.61447 0.04641 -1.88329 2.6468 0.20219 0.04355 0.00329 0.00036 0 0.031111 0.164222 -3.470207
16 Duta Pertiwi Realty Indonesia 0.55433 0.00000 0.65290 385.86027 0.0000 0.13058 32.51387 19.18737 1.79566 2.33436 -0.58999 5.9555 0.04973 0.00465 0.00605 0.00000 0 1.006529 -0.094738 0.006508
17 Dynaplast Indonesia 0.33687 0.00540 0.43500 41.55765 0.0000 0.34618 4.58882 6.30256 1.43811 3.18511 -1.08806 3.7271 0.15166 0.03461 0.07664 0.00003 0 0.614093 0.135001 -0.487608
18 Enseval Putera Indonesia 0.81790 0.00000 0.86410 78.94741 1.0000 0.01522 4.35224 0.05612 0.00858 0.57819 -0.20101 4.3688 0.00071 0.00011 0.00732 0.00000 0 0.809046 -0.272138 -0.211900
19 Eterindo Indonesia 1.01172 0.00290 0.79920 287.53397 0.0000 0.12160 -9.15699 -37.76813 0.12289 0.48413 0.01165 5.6613 -0.13135 0.00043 0.00168 0.00001 0 0.967016 16.879720 -0.033540
20 Fast Food Indonesia Indonesia 0.28719 0.00000 0.80000 19.30479 1.0000 0.38507 5.63793 4.10335 1.57984 1.82997 -1.24762 2.9604 0.21256 0.08184 0.09479 0.00000 0 1.713766 0.314769 0.538693
21 Gudang Garam Indonesia 0.30894 0.01220 0.72640 1,120.74251 0.0000 0.34249 -336.79076 338.36099 0.41499 12.33280 -1.17461 7.0217 0.30191 0.00037 0.01100 0.00015 0 2.550179 0.367072 0.936163
22 HM Sampoerna Indonesia 0.41483 0.02020 0.38620 880.80239 0.0000 0.31275 -8.27420 191.98988 9.09580 7.60702 -0.87990 6.7808 0.21797 0.01033 0.00864 0.00041 0 2.000359 0.265289 0.693327
23 Indonesia Prima Property Indonesia 1.23410 0.00400 0.76700 121.82995 0.0000 -0.03555 0.27400 -8.52630 0.31680 1.33881 0.21034 4.8026 -0.06999 0.00260 0.01099 0.00002 0 0.724324 0.496623 -0.322516
24 Japfa Comfeed Indonesia Indonesia 1.75600 0.00000 0.81060 308.02697 0.0000 0.07831 -20.14654 -103.58118 1.82067 11.13198 0.56304 5.7302 -0.33627 0.00591 0.03614 0.00000 0 1.377093 0.577452 0.319975
25 Kalbe Farma Indonesia 0.86753 0.00000 0.77700 172.38018 1.0000 -0.14016 0.79183 17.32350 7.92030 1.53705 -0.14211 5.1497 0.10050 0.04595 0.00892 0.00000 0 1.241107 -0.150450 0.216004
26 Kedaung Indah Can Indonesia 0.23277 0.00000 0.30930 21.82861 1.0000 0.22098 1.79080 2.79121 0.67783 0.09044 -1.45771 3.0832 0.12787 0.03105 0.00414 0.00000 0 0.496482 0.139841 -0.700208
27 Lautan Luas Indonesia 0.38794 0.01750 0.44920 72.18359 0.0000 0.17516 -0.30863 7.24578 0.00486 2.83411 -0.94690 4.2792 0.10038 0.00007 0.03926 0.00031 0 0.464483 0.075083 -0.766831
28 Metro Supermarket Realty Indonesia 0.60859 0.00000 0.69040 13.74459 1.0000 -0.07851 1.66315 -0.51039 0.00744 0.20155 -0.49661 2.6206 -0.03713 0.00054 0.01466 0.00000 0 0.837622 -0.340672 -0.177189
29 Modern Photo Indonesia 0.71619 0.00000 0.56930 95.79339 1.0000 0.01526 1.02253 -3.70274 3.22418 5.79855 -0.33381 4.5622 -0.03865 0.03366 0.06053 0.00000 0 0.889290 -0.288151 -0.117332
30 Nipress Indonesia 0.92215 0.12400 0.69060 9.12348 1.0000 0.07171 -1.94730 -0.76498 0.02108 0.78411 -0.08104 2.2109 -0.08385 0.00231 0.08594 0.01538 0 1.067976 -1.440807 0.065766
31 Pioneerindo Gourmet International Indonesia 1.04174 0.00000 0.97330 10.49353 1.0000 0.02254 0.82935 0.13406 0.04124 0.63307 0.04089 2.3508 0.01278 0.00393 0.06033 0.00000 0 1.408016 0.315217 0.342182
32 PT Smart TBK Indonesia 1.00703 0.00000 0.81000 404.08289 0.0000 0.41308 -36.08410 -33.63779 4.36754 1.85457 0.00700 6.0016 -0.08324 0.01081 0.00459 0.00000 0 0.721660 44.418689 -0.326200
33 Resource Alam Indonesia Indonesia 0.40359 0.00000 0.37000 26.77765 0.0000 0.14171 1.47752 2.83173 0.16537 0.10987 -0.90734 3.2876 0.10575 0.00618 0.00410 0.00000 0 0.256128 0.081312 -1.362080
34 Sumalindo Lestari Jaya Indonesia 0.85876 0.00000 0.83000 185.15443 1.0000 -0.01949 1.43442 -29.30064 0.95710 9.85570 -0.15227 5.2212 -0.15825 0.00517 0.05323 0.00000 0 0.886685 -1.449539 -0.120266
35 Surya Dumai Industri Indonesia 1.22735 0.04670 0.71000 155.30481 1.0000 -0.17844 0.24232 -38.49602 0.48447 3.40447 0.20486 5.0454 -0.24787 0.00312 0.02192 0.00218 0 1.507186 2.044813 0.410244
36 Surya Semesta Indonesia 0.64198 0.04010 0.59000 157.24356 1.0000 0.07134 -1.12465 -8.79513 4.72196 2.42274 -0.44319 5.0578 -0.05593 0.03003 0.01541 0.00161 0 0.723466 -0.327184 -0.323702
37 Tempo Scan Pacific Indonesia 0.05808 0.00000 0.36280 147.37804 1.0000 0.31716 31.95986 45.49143 15.62768 2.05726 -2.84585 4.9930 0.30867 0.10604 0.01396 0.00000 0 0.661410 0.330191 -0.413381
38 Voksel Electric Indonesia 1.24395 0.02770 0.82000 50.26713 1.0000 0.18372 2.57798 -7.87358 0.26842 2.23493 0.21829 3.9174 -0.15663 0.00534 0.04446 0.00077 0 0.953386 1.236796 -0.047735
39 Wicaksana Overseas International Indonesia 1.22536 0.00003 0.83300 92.69117 1.0000 0.01437 -0.98367 -24.31966 0.54191 2.54811 0.20324 4.5293 -0.26237 0.00585 0.02749 0.00000 0 1.324709 1.593300 0.281193
40 Asia Cement Manufacturing CompaKorea 0.51417 0.17200 0.39800 907.27115 1.0000 26.73878 29.24822 22.10277 38.13360 6.61028 -0.66520 6.8104 0.02436 0.04203 0.00729 0.02958 0 0.275184 0.017090 -1.290314
41 Asiana Airline Inc Korea 0.75166 0.00005 0.45190 2,899.28063 1.0000 10.18188 255.93281 67.37391 12.50830 126.27905 -0.28547 7.9722 0.02324 0.00431 0.04356 0.00000 0 0.771049 -0.182821 -0.260004
42 AUK Korea 0.36645 0.18840 0.26250 92.94387 1.0000 27.71621 62.62213 16.86798 0.04585 21.02530 -1.00390 4.5320 0.18149 0.00049 0.22621 0.03549 0 0.806219 0.267516 -0.215399
43 Bing-Grae Company Limited Korea 0.44781 0.30520 0.10050 339.10959 0.0000 -0.96454 6.23862 22.90455 2.21316 7.50392 -0.80340 5.8263 0.06754 0.00653 0.02213 0.09315 1 0.477185 0.067063 -0.739850
44 Bo LAK Company Korea 0.39375 0.00180 0.30310 33.00223 0.0000 -6.38167 -1.07922 -2.23886 0.61895 2.45389 -0.93204 3.4966 -0.06784 0.01875 0.07436 0.00000 0 0.571759 -0.140213 -0.559037
45 Boryung Pharmaceutical Company Korea 0.30591 0.00140 0.47760 97.84272 1.0000 -0.99069 5.43077 10.17971 0.24909 3.41656 -1.18447 4.5834 0.10404 0.00255 0.03492 0.00000 0 0.156340 0.080874 -1.855721
46 Bukwang Pharmaceutical Company Korea 0.15348 0.36000 0.16020 89.84154 1.0000 1.26994 19.57714 15.89340 0.90816 2.02864 -1.87418 4.4980 0.17690 0.01011 0.02258 0.12960 1 1.203762 0.211962 0.185452
47 Byucksan Corp. Korea 0.57925 0.14960 0.71550 169.91896 1.0000 -5.99578 9.48949 13.19201 0.63124 0.67491 -0.54602 5.1353 0.07764 0.00371 0.00397 0.02238 0 0.291130 0.055199 -1.233986
48 Cambridge Members Korea 0.15258 0.23890 0.30750 83.12944 1.0000 2.17372 5.61466 14.32382 0.01084 1.78331 -1.88006 4.4204 0.17231 0.00013 0.02145 0.05707 1 0.220387 0.169003 -1.512370
49 Cheil Industries Inc Korea 0.46817 0.00001 0.39180 1,271.06324 0.0000 -5.25420 72.83557 136.53043 59.22451 56.50988 -0.75892 7.1476 0.10741 0.04659 0.04446 0.00000 0 0.453997 0.073806 -0.789664
50 Cho Kwang Leather Company Ltd Korea 0.55532 0.15700 0.34890 118.05370 1.0000 7.14227 10.90117 7.80796 0.15113 1.80697 -0.58820 4.7711 0.06614 0.00128 0.01531 0.02465 0 0.263041 0.021212 -1.335445
51 Chong Kun Dang Pharmaceutical Korea 0.57347 0.17810 0.68490 459.73676 1.0000 2.74436 -20.96126 35.37233 14.40474 18.46482 -0.55605 6.1307 0.07694 0.03133 0.04016 0.03172 0 0.329916 0.015938 -1.108919
52 Choong Nam Spinning Company Li Korea 0.64677 0.00000 0.04970 360.38024 0.0000 -4.87120 -5.85296 -4.54545 0.09723 14.27668 -0.43576 5.8872 -0.01261 0.00027 0.03962 0.00000 0 0.557024 -0.221497 -0.585147
53 Chosun Fire Brick Industry CompanyKorea 0.46686 0.33040 0.15540 262.50565 0.0000 -8.51877 21.27551 28.10913 3.27494 16.25606 -0.76173 5.5703 0.10708 0.01248 0.06193 0.10916 1 0.418594 0.126211 -0.870853
54 Chung Ho Comnet Company Korea 0.11948 0.24180 0.06990 134.95178 1.0000 9.05392 8.20237 11.87747 2.84743 2.90277 -2.12457 4.9049 0.08801 0.02110 0.02151 0.05847 1 0.398387 0.096112 -0.920331
55 CJ Home Shopping Korea 0.02966 0.00000 0.25060 131.27905 1.0000 15.41958 9.01502 13.21028 0.00711 3.03320 -3.51795 4.8773 0.10063 0.00005 0.02310 0.00000 0 0.874867 0.111732 -0.133683
56 Crown Confectionary Korea 0.75692 0.26300 0.36920 305.32411 0.0000 -2.80858 22.64427 21.01897 1.63636 18.36917 -0.27849 5.7214 0.06884 0.00536 0.06016 0.06917 1 0.497063 -0.011278 -0.699039
57 Dae Hyun Company Korea 0.72057 0.24280 0.50560 103.93992 1.0000 -16.60711 0.09960 8.01028 0.07589 3.31146 -0.32771 4.6438 0.07707 0.00073 0.03186 0.05895 1 0.432262 0.059574 -0.838724
58 Daedong Industrial Company Limit Korea 0.22610 0.17560 0.11700 215.34545 1.0000 -4.34670 10.47273 12.44980 0.49802 2.68063 -1.48679 5.3722 0.05781 0.00231 0.01245 0.03084 0 0.224447 0.049095 -1.494116
59 Daeduck Electronics Limited Korea 0.14406 0.16840 0.02970 320.99572 1.0000 1.50683 63.19763 67.08570 0.11260 38.82926 -1.93754 5.7714 0.20899 0.00035 0.12097 0.02836 0 0.836090 0.198964 -0.179019
60 Daehan City Gas Korea 0.12015 0.06380 0.57560 361.78824 0.0000 12.23874 -1.00934 26.45221 1.53442 14.04345 -2.11897 5.8911 0.07312 0.00424 0.03882 0.00407 0 0.405040 0.079882 -0.903770
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61 Daehan Flour Mills Company Korea 0.43564 0.14560 0.11240 431.98411 0.0000 3.24511 21.87019 46.71621 3.74892 10.33016 -0.83094 6.0684 0.10814 0.00868 0.02391 0.02120 0 0.086325 0.111155 -2.449632
62 Daehan Pulp Company Limited Korea 0.74329 0.24000 0.53610 405.79209 0.0000 -11.09029 -25.78419 32.41581 0.21028 0.78893 -0.29666 6.0058 0.07988 0.00052 0.00194 0.05760 1 0.593849 -0.033561 -0.521130
63 Daelim Industrial Company Ltd Korea 0.41487 0.00000 0.33550 3,230.09249 1.0000 -11.56025 461.99368 178.25217 52.68775 7.57391 -0.87979 8.0803 0.05518 0.01631 0.00234 0.00000 0 0.158848 0.022903 -1.839811
64 Daerim Corp. Korea 0.73762 0.00000 0.66960 286.07560 0.0000 -7.96911 -38.53066 44.87854 0.33839 8.52206 -0.30433 5.6563 0.15688 0.00118 0.02979 0.00000 0 0.287088 0.291473 -1.247968
65 Daesang Farmsco Korea 0.41437 0.01000 0.38570 78.37405 0.0000 -0.94577 1.14977 3.28582 0.20518 2.20098 -0.88100 4.3615 0.04192 0.00262 0.02808 0.00010 0 0.250506 0.019684 -1.384273
66 Daesung Industrial Company Limite Korea 0.49778 0.27870 0.33000 843.88952 0.0000 -6.46675 -69.82617 43.27423 6.51850 4.61460 -0.69760 6.7380 0.05128 0.00772 0.00547 0.07767 1 0.343995 0.034738 -1.067129
67 Daewon Chemical Korea 0.37147 0.27160 0.20360 62.47255 0.0000 -27.21508 -9.99899 3.82820 0.46145 3.20545 -0.99030 4.1347 0.06128 0.00739 0.05131 0.07377 1 0.313705 0.032598 -1.159303
68 Daewoo Motor Sales Korea 0.44358 0.02000 0.24800 1,396.17075 1.0000 -1.89412 62.31542 153.04664 0.01423 9.19051 -0.81288 7.2415 0.10962 0.00001 0.00658 0.00040 0 0.292693 0.097752 -1.228630
69 Danam Communications Inc Korea 0.43243 0.17740 0.16180 60.43991 1.0000 61.69487 -3.78829 9.20645 0.00258 1.42543 -0.83834 4.1016 0.15232 0.00004 0.02358 0.03147 0 0.949456 0.276307 -0.051866
70 Daou Technology Korea 0.07138 0.14960 0.31790 174.03320 1.0000 -7.52145 -30.06482 -18.32174 0.09170 0.67510 -2.63970 5.1592 -0.10528 0.00053 0.00388 0.02238 0 0.430116 -0.086710 -0.843699
71 Digital Power Communications Korea 0.13470 0.14150 0.03170 70.95731 1.0000 5.75919 1.30751 10.36759 0.40553 2.00474 -2.00470 4.2621 0.14611 0.00572 0.02825 0.02002 0 0.210203 0.147056 -1.559683
72 Dong IL Rubber Belt Company Korea 0.28757 0.47820 0.10500 90.89328 0.0000 -3.53395 7.68775 12.03399 0.36206 4.08696 -1.24630 4.5097 0.13240 0.00398 0.04496 0.22868 1 0.351305 0.144107 -1.046102
73 Dong WHA Pharmaceutical Compa Korea 0.39854 0.05130 0.26970 206.98924 1.0000 -14.79687 11.90986 1.31826 0.26460 3.10179 -0.91994 5.3327 0.00637 0.00128 0.01499 0.00263 0 0.137291 -0.060039 -1.985655
74 Donga Pharmaceutical Company Korea 0.54932 0.10000 0.83620 429.32490 1.0000 -4.91336 15.01186 40.97945 2.28379 3.02213 -0.59908 6.0622 0.09545 0.00532 0.00704 0.01000 0 0.466414 0.111969 -0.762682
75 Dongbu Steel Company Limited Korea 0.65303 0.05760 0.41900 2,476.94308 0.0000 19.55056 -46.31542 115.63320 22.64585 1.85850 -0.42613 7.8148 0.04668 0.00914 0.00075 0.00332 0 0.584994 -0.003363 -0.536154
76 Dongjin Semichem Company Limite Korea 0.51106 0.24320 0.26820 149.79083 0.0000 15.22472 -15.15473 6.90259 3.94060 6.55535 -0.67127 5.0092 0.04608 0.02631 0.04376 0.05915 1 0.611742 0.017858 -0.491444
77 Dongsung Chemical Company Limit Korea 0.40518 0.21460 0.31500 201.24111 0.0000 -6.69995 -5.08032 13.30119 0.15731 3.60769 -0.90343 5.3045 0.06610 0.00078 0.01793 0.04605 1 0.196166 0.047786 -1.628796
78 Dongwha Holdings Korea 0.22446 0.50610 0.14910 237.45771 1.0000 9.72575 3.78902 12.60353 1.12727 7.66395 -1.49405 5.4700 0.05308 0.00475 0.03227 0.25614 1 0.383321 0.032240 -0.958883
79 Dongwon Industries Company Limit Korea 0.72389 0.00000 0.57390 218.73992 0.0000 -59.76046 -32.74783 20.92332 0.68775 13.59368 -0.32311 5.3879 0.09565 0.00314 0.06215 0.00000 0 0.674862 0.050008 -0.393247
80 Dongwon Metal Korea 0.55947 0.24170 0.05710 105.32189 0.0000 9.58428 -1.67383 10.43927 2.41303 5.73626 -0.58077 4.6570 0.09912 0.02291 0.05446 0.05842 1 0.538902 0.164473 -0.618222
81 Dongyang Mechatronic Korea 0.45821 0.30800 0.37970 89.60079 1.0000 -11.77526 -5.15810 -1.99763 0.08617 4.64111 -0.78044 4.4954 -0.02229 0.00096 0.05180 0.09486 1 0.338504 -0.146893 -1.083220
82 Doosan Heavy Industries And Cons Korea 0.36658 0.00000 0.35970 2,989.37224 1.0000 -8.93720 139.73232 51.58744 55.00661 86.92719 -1.00355 8.0028 0.01726 0.01840 0.02908 0.00000 0 0.174049 -1.675496 -1.748416
83 Duck Yang Industry Korea 0.26758 0.06800 0.22710 91.77470 1.0000 25.09105 -5.93913 4.70830 7.53281 5.01265 -1.31835 4.5193 0.05130 0.08208 0.05462 0.00462 0 0.715717 0.076392 -0.334470
84 Duzon Digital Ware Korea 0.02200 0.05270 0.14040 19.02436 1.0000 415.80586 2.25132 4.17138 1.36934 0.51076 -3.81681 2.9457 0.21927 0.07198 0.02685 0.00278 0 0.774549 0.215046 -0.255474
85 E1 Corp. Korea 0.58343 0.11860 0.62570 527.16885 0.0000 25.04523 17.13089 34.22164 9.50789 29.96893 -0.53883 6.2675 0.06492 0.01804 0.05685 0.01407 0 0.483330 0.067503 -0.727055
86 Enex Korea 0.40907 0.13820 0.39340 95.93597 0.0000 -14.70178 -7.80158 0.33281 1.40791 2.31383 -0.89388 4.5637 0.00347 0.01468 0.02412 0.01910 0 0.293725 -0.063706 -1.225111
87 F & F Korea 0.23439 0.37820 0.12000 104.34387 1.0000 26.51076 3.04427 17.24743 0.90593 2.40791 -1.45078 4.6477 0.16529 0.00868 0.02308 0.14304 1 0.202474 0.184832 -1.597143
88 FNC Kolon Korea 0.55199 0.00940 0.51660 638.38330 1.0000 -18.05752 -70.75623 34.95271 1.67849 5.67907 -0.59423 6.4589 0.05475 0.00263 0.00890 0.00009 0 0.287560 -0.014693 -1.246324
89 Green Cross Holdings Corp. Korea 0.21379 0.16860 0.29180 342.28416 1.0000 42.90783 24.87619 60.15592 1.23902 8.98836 -1.54275 5.8356 0.17575 0.00362 0.02626 0.02843 0 0.351824 0.195930 -1.044624
90 Haansoft Inc Korea 0.54510 0.00820 0.13350 102.21806 1.0000 57.67210 -24.00590 -15.11143 7.50360 1.36409 -0.60679 4.6271 -0.14784 0.07341 0.01334 0.00007 0 1.142620 -0.370950 0.133324
91 Halla Climate Control Korea 0.40137 0.00000 0.69990 495.12411 1.0000 16.17388 55.26324 84.63794 0.32648 33.77708 -0.91287 6.2048 0.17094 0.00066 0.06822 0.00000 0 0.505725 0.263181 -0.681763
92 Halla Engineering & Construction C Korea 0.57092 0.16470 0.12040 579.69486 1.0000 -7.61255 -27.65692 2.54466 0.26245 4.17154 -0.56051 6.3625 0.00439 0.00045 0.00720 0.02713 0 0.353363 -0.165894 -1.040259
93 Han DOK Pharmaceutical Korea 0.37021 0.06620 0.54910 172.46008 1.0000 20.87862 -1.41818 11.57708 2.25534 5.90751 -0.99367 5.1502 0.06713 0.01308 0.03425 0.00438 0 0.214533 0.034486 -1.539291
94 Handsome Korea 0.33409 0.24280 0.05210 170.29752 1.0000 20.23087 16.06185 33.18739 2.13456 3.72976 -1.09635 5.1375 0.19488 0.01253 0.02190 0.05895 1 0.077919 0.228084 -2.552086
95 Hanil E-WHA Company Korea 0.55215 0.23390 0.35400 142.31383 1.0000 8.09623 19.28142 3.55731 0.95968 12.00632 -0.59394 4.9580 0.02500 0.00674 0.08437 0.05471 1 0.474325 0.059189 -0.745863
96 Hanil Iron And Steel Ltd Korea 0.25097 0.00000 0.53950 122.96917 0.0000 139.82383 -9.30198 6.76126 0.00079 3.52806 -1.38244 4.8119 0.05498 0.00001 0.02869 0.00000 0 0.163841 0.050779 -1.808859
97 Hanjin Transportation Company LimKorea 0.45544 0.05910 0.11780 617.78972 1.0000 7.18029 -8.32095 26.85455 18.49012 14.32885 -0.78648 6.4261 0.04347 0.02993 0.02319 0.00349 0 0.389695 0.020187 -0.942390
98 Hankook Tire Company Limited Korea 0.54446 0.21720 0.71890 1,987.18103 0.0000 4.55094 -233.42213 104.16206 21.11067 118.30988 -0.60797 7.5945 0.05242 0.01062 0.05954 0.04718 1 0.526681 0.025941 -0.641160
99 Hankuk Electric Glass Company Korea 0.01242 0.00000 0.37800 430.65375 1.0000 14.99268 163.35336 201.61265 0.02688 46.16285 -4.38820 6.0653 0.46815 0.00006 0.10719 0.00000 0 0.652870 0.429517 -0.426378
100 Hankuk Paper Manufacturing Com Korea 0.28408 0.18910 0.23150 246.96206 0.0000 -5.93756 -43.18103 6.29249 3.75494 0.94466 -1.25850 5.5092 0.02548 0.01520 0.00383 0.03576 0 0.079981 0.005494 -2.525968
101 Hanmi Pharmaceutical Industry ComKorea 0.55189 0.19820 0.35290 192.80968 1.0000 5.74323 5.17270 19.11661 9.05993 4.78965 -0.59441 5.2617 0.09915 0.04699 0.02484 0.03928 0 0.294027 0.120889 -1.224085
102 Hansol Chemical Company Limited Korea 0.50032 0.11920 0.17600 215.58735 0.0000 -11.95330 -10.14229 15.31383 1.97787 4.98340 -0.69251 5.3734 0.07103 0.00917 0.02312 0.01421 0 0.462455 0.026033 -0.771206
103 Hansol LCD Korea 0.65718 0.00000 0.11490 189.93360 1.0000 2.55813 -40.03636 8.37391 10.13992 10.69565 -0.41979 5.2467 0.04409 0.05339 0.05631 0.00000 0 0.477581 0.004462 -0.739021
104 Hansol Paper Company Limited Korea 0.74246 0.03310 0.35290 3,342.83636 0.0000 15.66054 -74.60711 205.25138 181.54704 47.73755 -0.29779 8.1146 0.06140 0.05431 0.01428 0.00110 0 0.453153 0.013392 -0.791526
105 Hanssem Company Korea 0.49013 0.23440 0.23230 143.63320 1.0000 0.18085 -5.72885 11.76443 5.65059 4.63320 -0.71309 4.9673 0.08191 0.03934 0.03226 0.05494 1 0.406896 0.011397 -0.899198
106 Hanwha Chemical Korea 0.61834 0.00000 0.38300 3,735.97549 0.0000 11.34688 143.58814 273.65375 96.53281 129.06245 -0.48071 8.2258 0.07325 0.02584 0.03455 0.00000 0 0.561193 0.001184 -0.577690
107 Hanwha Corp. Korea 0.82494 0.00000 0.30720 6,692.81344 1.0000 113.60396 -6.60949 268.54941 209.70040 56.56126 -0.19245 8.8088 0.04013 0.03133 0.00845 0.00000 0 0.600166 0.124401 -0.510548
108 Hite Brewery Company Limited Korea 0.51957 0.21770 0.40220 1,411.63874 0.0000 6.84667 254.88775 154.08775 28.16047 42.51146 -0.65475 7.2525 0.10916 0.01995 0.03011 0.04739 1 0.675617 0.110383 -0.392128
109 Honam Petrochemicals Corp. Korea 0.14901 0.00000 0.57280 1,058.97573 0.0000 1.05375 114.84558 45.77466 2.73389 85.38410 -1.90373 6.9651 0.04323 0.00258 0.08063 0.00000 0 0.331035 0.041992 -1.105531
110 Hotel Shilla Korea 0.33477 0.00000 0.17700 553.33142 1.0000 1.16649 2.02612 47.74443 0.03989 10.72363 -1.09431 6.3160 0.08629 0.00007 0.01938 0.00000 0 0.454087 0.036282 -0.789466
111 Huneed Technology Company Korea 0.79545 0.27300 0.08700 123.08746 1.0000 -19.35609 0.16107 -24.03829 7.10276 10.13391 -0.22885 4.8129 -0.19529 0.05771 0.08233 0.07453 1 0.784095 -1.558878 -0.243225
112 Hwa Sung Industrial Company Limi Korea 0.70731 0.18370 0.08140 649.76917 1.0000 -9.10158 43.69644 37.50593 0.10751 9.85613 -0.34628 6.4766 0.05772 0.00017 0.01517 0.03375 0 0.512617 0.026565 -0.668225
113 Hwacheon Machine Tool Korea 0.34114 0.37670 0.14320 94.19210 1.0000 42.33215 0.27935 6.64327 1.89479 3.44423 -1.07545 4.5453 0.07053 0.02012 0.03657 0.14190 1 0.240967 0.048615 -1.423093
114 Hyosung Corporation Korea 0.62833 0.00000 0.36480 4,597.33360 0.0000 -9.98042 -273.61265 322.90593 5.96601 182.46561 -0.46469 8.4332 0.07024 0.00130 0.03969 0.00000 0 0.400223 0.027229 -0.915733
115 Hyundai Corp. Korea 0.73669 0.00000 0.52230 1,412.87036 1.0000 -15.85599 113.02688 17.54308 3.60395 3.21502 -0.30558 7.2534 0.01242 0.00255 0.00228 0.00000 0 0.312001 -0.252086 -1.164749
116 Hyundai Elevator Korea 0.52787 0.03910 0.40800 223.03162 1.0000 -30.38459 15.69644 21.02055 1.99051 6.85455 -0.63891 5.4073 0.09425 0.00892 0.03073 0.00153 0 0.357110 0.106802 -1.029711
117 Hyundai Engineering & Constructio Korea 1.24489 0.00000 0.84300 5,742.41107 1.0000 -21.96281 497.38577 -1924.97233 2.26561 64.73992 0.21904 8.6556 -0.33522 0.00039 0.01127 0.00000 0 0.591048 3.290758 -0.525858
118 Hyundai Heavy Industries Korea 0.67539 0.00000 0.24650 10,593.96996 1.0000 -8.46526 1071.57708 248.10119 128.41186 399.40079 -0.39246 9.2680 0.02342 0.01212 0.03770 0.00000 0 0.549057 -0.058003 -0.599552
119 Hyundai Hysco Company Ltd Korea 0.47678 0.00000 0.74700 1,653.03004 0.0000 -7.78557 72.89170 54.73676 28.62688 68.55178 -0.74070 7.4104 0.03311 0.01732 0.04147 0.00000 0 0.472140 -0.096002 -0.750480
120 Hyundai Merchant Marine Korea 0.84094 0.01500 0.50280 6,067.20777 1.0000 5.82770 -590.87226 8.30571 184.70877 177.41745 -0.17323 8.7107 0.00137 0.03044 0.02924 0.00023 0 0.309586 -0.491965 -1.172519
121 Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co Korea 0.52050 0.00000 0.48230 858.20711 1.0000 42.45489 -82.97708 27.30672 8.67668 24.33992 -0.65296 6.7548 0.03182 0.01011 0.02836 0.00000 0 0.388622 0.029452 -0.945147
122 Hyundai Motor Company Limited Korea 0.61342 0.04950 0.25160 24,580.29565 1.0000 26.11088 -2.61739 1463.73992 1549.95731 1101.68142 -0.48870 10.1097 0.05955 0.06306 0.04482 0.00245 0 0.545988 0.083267 -0.605158
123 IL Dong Pharmaceutical Company Korea 0.62370 0.10430 0.25090 170.83287 1.0000 36.17651 8.08324 16.96901 1.28478 0.79168 -0.47209 5.1407 0.09933 0.00752 0.00463 0.01088 0 0.073577 0.115668 -2.609424
124 IL Jin Electric Korea 0.66871 0.17630 0.04460 197.06920 1.0000 48.07279 -16.92506 8.46897 2.04970 9.39898 -0.40240 5.2836 0.04297 0.01040 0.04769 0.03108 0 0.308699 0.082493 -1.175387
Appendix 1
Page 3 of 9
No. Company Name Country D/E MSO EBO Total Assets Industry Growth TA FCF EBIT Intangibles Depreciation Ln D/E SIZE PROF INTA NDTS MSO (2) D(EBO) Tobin's Q ROE Ln Tobin's Q
125 Ilyang Pharmaceutical Company Li Korea 0.35657 0.25810 0.24460 182.35489 1.0000 -4.49343 -1.06124 12.64983 0.93828 2.59316 -1.03123 5.2060 0.06937 0.00515 0.01422 0.06662 1 0.709336 0.029995 -0.343426
126 Insung Information Company Korea 0.04880 0.30950 0.06630 79.20436 1.0000 53.37488 1.02307 4.19213 4.62650 1.66352 -3.01994 4.3720 0.05293 0.05841 0.02100 0.09579 1 0.608210 0.017888 -0.497236
127 Intelligent Digital Integrated Secur Korea 0.01374 0.19030 0.25820 9.24980 1.0000 159.78074 0.35810 2.88538 0.00158 0.12885 -4.28762 2.2246 0.31194 0.00017 0.01393 0.03621 0 2.030408 0.045879 0.708237
128 ISU Chemical Company Limited Korea 0.38405 0.00100 0.51700 354.53360 0.0000 6.19341 21.65613 25.81344 4.21265 16.68458 -0.95697 5.8708 0.07281 0.01188 0.04706 0.00000 0 0.062178 0.172297 -2.777753
129 Jahwa Electronics Korea 0.15802 0.31470 0.07670 81.97708 1.0000 15.35900 8.04032 14.89802 1.06403 0.46640 -1.84502 4.4064 0.18173 0.01298 0.00569 0.09904 1 1.146490 0.057294 0.136705
130 Jusung Engineering Company Korea 0.00327 0.28520 0.02790 158.76601 1.0000 18.61785 -22.68617 7.12174 13.50119 5.73043 -5.72235 5.0674 0.04486 0.08504 0.03609 0.08134 1 0.509428 0.198193 -0.674467
131 Kangwong Land Korea 0.08587 0.00000 0.42610 267.26719 1.0000 45.17906 16.16206 45.87352 4.18419 5.41818 -2.45491 5.5882 0.17164 0.01566 0.02027 0.00000 0 0.054009 0.044948 -2.918606
132 KC Technology Corp. Korea 0.00809 0.35840 0.07960 63.33327 1.0000 39.09958 -1.20114 4.13557 3.10607 1.37876 -4.81672 4.1484 0.06530 0.04904 0.02177 0.12845 1 0.085513 0.131069 -2.459088
133 Kctc Korea 0.15237 0.10970 0.16680 109.05455 1.0000 87.17972 -1.65138 2.76838 10.88617 4.84111 -1.88146 4.6918 0.02539 0.09982 0.04439 0.01203 0 0.120333 0.059005 -2.117495
134 Kedcom Korea 0.51153 0.11260 0.31890 65.02530 1.0000 9.97312 -5.02213 3.03320 1.89091 1.76047 -0.67035 4.1748 0.04665 0.02908 0.02707 0.01268 0 0.257474 0.009294 -1.356838
135 Keyang Electric Machinery Compa Korea 0.10093 0.17820 0.21470 94.79921 1.0000 -4.25734 2.20316 10.15731 0.06403 5.29407 -2.29335 4.5518 0.10715 0.00068 0.05585 0.03176 0 0.255949 0.006503 -1.362776
136 Kia Motors Corporation Korea 0.45740 0.00000 0.53470 6,579.89328 1.0000 5.47943 -768.89486 291.46719 71.07668 26.55099 -0.78219 8.7918 0.04430 0.01080 0.00404 0.00000 0 0.003316 0.095090 -5.709030
137 Kiswire Korea 0.17013 0.22820 0.46610 562.86640 0.0000 45.31805 -7.06008 20.34704 0.69091 18.98577 -1.77118 6.3330 0.03615 0.00123 0.03373 0.05208 1 9.708464 0.047972 2.272998
138 KMW Korea 0.52699 0.38150 0.25770 155.53123 1.0000 131.82161 -31.67352 4.23320 12.51542 9.78024 -0.64057 5.0468 0.02722 0.08047 0.06288 0.14554 1 0.952147 0.037224 -0.049036
139 Knowledge On Korea 0.15027 0.24660 0.22310 53.16768 1.0000 114.94600 -9.94360 4.41569 2.34285 2.27293 -1.89531 3.9735 0.08305 0.04407 0.04275 0.06081 1 2.284264 0.016545 0.826044
140 Kodenshi Korea Corp. Korea 0.47366 0.25940 0.36650 89.50556 1.0000 25.90942 -12.70663 5.81950 0.01629 0.20176 -0.74727 4.4943 0.06502 0.00018 0.00225 0.06729 1 0.356753 0.089393 -1.030711
141 Kodicom Korea 0.05112 0.00000 0.22500 9.75719 1.0000 287.57287 -5.28724 0.66855 0.29186 0.11193 -2.97353 2.2780 0.06852 0.02991 0.01147 0.00000 0 4.764405 0.088597 1.561173
142 Kolon Engineering & Construction C Korea 0.64492 0.00761 0.28530 787.94941 1.0000 16.85669 -30.72885 17.67036 0.95257 8.38182 -0.43863 6.6694 0.02243 0.00121 0.01064 0.00006 0 0.546317 0.008544 -0.604556
143 Kolon Industries Company Limited Korea 0.58677 0.17420 0.13450 1,900.82609 0.0000 8.56381 -86.60395 78.39289 6.53281 80.53439 -0.53311 7.5500 0.04124 0.00344 0.04237 0.03035 0 0.374911 -0.021948 -0.981066
144 Korea Circuit Company Korea 0.40875 0.19320 0.01790 176.18541 1.0000 25.49972 -18.83443 22.91226 1.44882 19.82454 -0.89465 5.1715 0.13005 0.00822 0.11252 0.03733 0 0.241808 0.154909 -1.419612
145 Korea Cottrell Korea 0.23908 0.20300 0.21210 45.70770 1.0000 -9.99761 -1.90501 -4.79539 0.08373 1.65934 -1.43098 3.8223 -0.10491 0.00183 0.03630 0.04121 1 0.142638 -0.214714 -1.947445
146 Korea Data Systems Korea 0.59636 0.00000 0.33500 581.61186 1.0000 25.63933 -97.38656 39.87826 6.97866 9.36601 -0.51691 6.3658 0.06857 0.01200 0.01610 0.00000 0 0.143964 0.039945 -1.938193
147 Korea Electric Power Corp. Korea 0.45226 0.00000 0.69960 51,738.38656 0.0000 1.99744 -2787.51146 2835.15178 471.20553 4037.50435 -0.79349 10.8540 0.05480 0.00911 0.07804 0.00000 0 0.646408 0.046396 -0.436325
148 Korea Electric Terminal Korea 0.04107 0.21670 0.22910 99.61711 1.0000 14.62508 -0.40466 19.28187 0.01872 0.76888 -3.19241 4.6013 0.19356 0.00019 0.00772 0.04696 1 0.716608 0.196193 -0.333226
149 Korea Express Company Limited Korea 0.37822 0.00000 0.26460 962.97787 1.0000 -4.92177 34.13043 52.90672 8.03636 31.69723 -0.97228 6.8700 0.05494 0.00835 0.03292 0.00000 0 0.265317 0.032914 -1.326828
150 Korea Fine Chemicals Korea 0.13310 0.08980 0.47090 141.49814 0.0000 10.02711 10.52883 24.16869 0.35176 12.28338 -2.01662 4.9523 0.17081 0.00249 0.08681 0.00806 0 0.554877 0.164923 -0.589009
151 Korea Flange Company Limited Korea 0.85361 0.23490 0.32300 1,081.57549 1.0000 7.24491 -23.16601 69.88696 9.47036 50.72648 -0.15828 6.9862 0.06462 0.00876 0.04690 0.05518 1 0.437497 0.066549 -0.826686
152 Korea Gas Corp. Korea 0.69550 0.00000 0.51320 6,678.09170 0.0000 20.47498 -1079.23953 354.58893 49.27194 296.75889 -0.36313 8.8066 0.05310 0.00738 0.04444 0.00000 0 0.651261 0.041878 -0.428845
153 Korea Iron & Steel Company Limite Korea 0.40880 0.26920 0.16640 503.60316 0.0000 -5.54708 -8.99209 8.56126 0.04980 14.91937 -0.89452 6.2218 0.01700 0.00010 0.02963 0.07247 1 0.350704 -0.029991 -1.047812
154 Korea Kumho Petrochemicals Korea 0.90932 0.51950 0.13470 7,887.11858 0.0000 4.23771 115.24980 282.86324 180.06640 341.47668 -0.09506 8.9730 0.03586 0.02283 0.04330 0.26988 1 0.448091 -0.234805 -0.802758
155 Korea Line Corp. Korea 0.82598 0.00830 0.52030 947.58972 1.0000 69.48911 -346.29249 -21.76364 0.15652 39.04111 -0.19118 6.8539 -0.02297 0.00017 0.04120 0.00007 0 0.190813 -1.396792 -1.656460
156 Korea Petroleum Industrial Compa Korea 0.41506 0.08800 0.17790 33.01128 0.0000 3.27401 -2.14465 2.89379 0.24071 1.56986 -0.87934 3.4968 0.08766 0.00729 0.04756 0.00774 0 0.291653 0.068517 -1.232190
157 Korea Polyol Korea 0.12132 0.23210 0.37850 141.72038 0.0000 0.25611 9.39866 24.62812 0.15777 4.24631 -2.10935 4.9539 0.17378 0.00111 0.02996 0.05387 1 0.137676 0.155185 -1.982850
158 Korea Refractories Korea 0.23180 0.00000 0.67050 25.47209 1.0000 -7.13665 -1.60818 0.51805 0.08893 0.20074 -1.46189 3.2376 0.02034 0.00349 0.00788 0.00000 0 0.591113 0.013098 -0.525749
159 Korea Zinc Company Limited Korea 0.60471 0.04330 0.25530 1,358.65771 0.0000 6.93060 39.80791 31.79684 16.05455 52.26008 -0.50301 7.2143 0.02340 0.01182 0.03846 0.00187 0 0.596804 0.001438 -0.516166
160 Korean Air Lines Company Limited Korea 0.57967 0.10940 0.56040 10,496.07668 1.0000 5.96013 -774.88142 -219.62925 31.09091 525.43399 -0.54529 9.2588 -0.02092 0.00296 0.05006 0.01197 0 0.452594 -0.126915 -0.792760
161 KT Corp. Korea 0.42497 0.00000 0.03740 21,813.61897 0.0000 8.80024 -1602.58261 1567.95731 1569.34466 2745.13518 -0.85574 9.9903 0.07188 0.07194 0.12585 0.00000 0 1.074706 0.087142 0.072047
162 KT Freetel Limited Korea 0.58460 0.00000 0.48700 2,468.35968 0.0000 38.98131 -289.05692 201.05771 9.83162 198.08933 -0.53682 7.8113 0.08145 0.00398 0.08025 0.00000 0 1.987899 0.104727 0.687078
163 Kukje Preferred Korea 0.13313 0.00000 0.49120 266.16032 1.0000 -21.55595 4.60394 212.75239 0.44197 4.35277 -2.01642 5.5841 0.79934 0.00166 0.01635 0.00000 0 0.080708 0.042887 -2.516914
164 Kunsul Chemical Industry Company Korea 0.38223 0.47090 0.11200 220.31937 0.0000 -4.40642 8.58577 12.92411 0.29881 14.38972 -0.96173 5.3951 0.05866 0.00136 0.06531 0.22175 1 0.290173 0.035430 -1.237279
165 Kwang Dong Pharmaceutical Comp Korea 0.29163 0.00000 0.09100 125.20079 1.0000 -27.97983 -26.00000 -40.06087 0.09881 2.32806 -1.23228 4.8299 -0.31997 0.00079 0.01859 0.00000 0 0.049064 -0.563449 -3.014622
166 Kyung Dong City Gas Korea 0.22189 0.00000 0.10750 181.69539 0.0000 17.99796 1.75883 16.47938 1.57891 11.78023 -1.50559 5.2023 0.09070 0.00869 0.06484 0.00000 0 0.275003 0.111358 -1.290973
167 Kyungbang Korea 0.30154 0.22270 0.30030 512.57866 0.0000 131.00863 -0.30909 16.02925 4.54545 15.18814 -1.19884 6.2395 0.03127 0.00887 0.02963 0.04960 1 0.322660 0.002866 -1.131156
168 Kyungin Synthetics Korea 0.17139 0.34490 0.31840 55.08827 0.0000 13.97653 -0.73832 3.39704 0.04817 2.58199 -1.76380 4.0089 0.06167 0.00087 0.04687 0.11896 1 0.426586 0.054954 -0.851942
169 Kyungnam Energy Company Korea 0.22838 0.01340 0.40480 102.64612 0.0000 16.01295 10.63138 13.34504 0.09328 9.22170 -1.47676 4.6313 0.13001 0.00091 0.08984 0.00018 0 0.336571 0.138070 -1.088946
170 Leadcorp Korea 0.36962 0.00396 0.41000 65.49012 0.0000 15.29790 -9.40237 -2.39763 0.04190 1.95652 -0.99528 4.1819 -0.03661 0.00064 0.02988 0.00002 0 0.583407 -0.139157 -0.538870
171 LG Chem Korea 0.63197 0.00000 0.30000 3,495.92648 1.0000 9.66771 106.56601 460.99842 54.47115 213.18498 -0.45892 8.1594 0.13187 0.01558 0.06098 0.00000 0 0.005835 0.151230 -5.143897
172 LG Corp. Korea 0.59036 0.10160 0.47340 5,959.75494 0.0000 17.23751 203.74229 694.26957 106.35178 274.14941 -0.52702 8.6928 0.11649 0.01784 0.04600 0.01032 0 0.622371 0.134476 -0.474220
173 LG International Corp. Korea 0.77475 0.00000 0.06080 2,855.68854 1.0000 20.60506 141.22925 158.95099 5.62372 13.52174 -0.25522 7.9571 0.05566 0.00197 0.00474 0.00000 0 0.414179 0.070921 -0.881457
174 LG Micron Korea 0.56803 0.00141 0.47300 356.44585 1.0000 18.62242 -31.58972 27.38340 2.74862 39.47194 -0.56558 5.8762 0.07682 0.00771 0.11074 0.00000 0 4.014223 -0.150279 1.389844
175 LG Telecom Korea 0.88036 0.00000 0.52090 1,642.51398 0.0000 7.38437 -237.81451 -163.56386 8.69114 290.28707 -0.12742 7.4040 -0.09958 0.00529 0.17673 0.00000 0 1.109337 -2.203221 0.103763
176 Lotte Chilsung Beverage Company Korea 0.18364 0.12569 0.41250 610.51779 0.0000 6.25277 45.95257 91.72806 0.44901 36.64585 -1.69478 6.4143 0.15025 0.00074 0.06002 0.01580 0 0.542132 0.190573 -0.612245
177 Lotte Confectionary Company Ltd Korea 0.27562 0.00010 0.33420 633.41423 0.0000 -1.49840 40.54466 62.79842 0.90040 49.69565 -1.28871 6.4511 0.09914 0.00142 0.07846 0.00000 0 0.357446 0.106429 -1.028770
178 Lotte Midopa Korea 0.95554 0.00000 0.79010 546.93425 1.0000 -0.66169 18.03248 37.61925 3.36147 6.82877 -0.04548 6.3043 0.06878 0.00615 0.01249 0.00000 0 0.801039 -1.248687 -0.221846
179 Lotte Samkang Company Limited Korea 0.23851 0.00000 0.44890 141.85375 0.0000 3.98914 23.80158 27.51779 0.16443 9.64269 -1.43335 4.9548 0.19399 0.00116 0.06798 0.00000 0 0.378121 0.212963 -0.972542
180 Manho Rope & Wire Company Korea 0.23176 0.10560 0.16160 192.46937 0.0000 78.97633 -1.34172 9.24225 0.01973 0.38027 -1.46206 5.2599 0.04802 0.00010 0.00198 0.01115 0 0.314798 0.028824 -1.155824
181 Michang Oil Industry Company Korea 0.26492 0.24230 0.24380 41.36371 0.0000 -6.81293 -1.07712 3.84040 0.19352 1.43591 -1.32834 3.7224 0.09284 0.00468 0.03471 0.05871 1 0.209300 0.091265 -1.563988
182 Micronix Company Korea 0.48275 0.34800 0.10790 98.69486 0.0000 35.38517 -6.03241 1.88538 3.29091 2.38182 -0.72826 4.5920 0.01910 0.03334 0.02413 0.12110 1 0.455544 -0.021411 -0.786263
183 Motonic Corp. Korea 0.01510 0.40000 0.00600 74.12660 1.0000 24.43630 23.05235 6.85364 0.10216 8.06306 -4.19331 4.3058 0.09246 0.00138 0.10877 0.16000 1 0.166375 0.116724 -1.793513
184 Namyeung Korea 0.18927 0.34330 0.32330 115.04521 0.0000 -0.55046 7.83058 8.02251 0.05919 1.35248 -1.66461 4.7453 0.06973 0.00051 0.01176 0.11785 1 0.159947 0.054506 -1.832915
185 Nexen Korea 0.52208 0.19200 0.10700 319.05457 0.0000 14.01537 -7.99278 20.36318 0.14600 11.44128 -0.64994 5.7654 0.06382 0.00046 0.03586 0.03686 0 0.231870 -0.010982 -1.461579
186 Nong Shim Company Limited Korea 0.32400 0.09950 0.45870 1,082.65222 0.0000 -8.48931 46.75836 118.43628 1.55697 10.23957 -1.12702 6.9872 0.10939 0.00144 0.00946 0.00990 0 0.368311 0.135808 -0.998827
187 Orientbio Inc Korea 0.29794 0.28890 0.21340 121.94528 1.0000 17.26016 -2.67089 4.83601 0.35286 1.74440 -1.21086 4.8036 0.03966 0.00289 0.01430 0.08346 1 0.201891 0.036093 -1.600030
188 Orion Corp. Korea 0.59498 0.31650 0.10060 598.02846 0.0000 40.97977 0.58261 46.87194 46.81581 30.98261 -0.51923 6.3936 0.07838 0.07828 0.05181 0.10017 1 0.417423 0.125286 -0.873655
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189 Ottogi Korea 0.36641 0.34040 0.14660 319.77943 0.0000 10.45096 -17.12785 16.95608 0.27684 4.83006 -1.00402 5.7676 0.05302 0.00087 0.01510 0.11587 1 0.349628 0.072128 -1.050885
190 Oyang Korea 0.45766 0.06950 0.35190 116.60433 0.0000 19.64529 8.86597 6.17094 0.00236 5.97642 -0.78162 4.7588 0.05292 0.00002 0.05125 0.00483 0 0.407813 0.026740 -0.896946
191 Pacific Pharmaceutical Company Li Korea 0.27274 0.00390 0.69300 36.92083 1.0000 -0.16695 6.88262 4.78370 0.31103 1.34209 -1.29922 3.6088 0.12957 0.00842 0.03635 0.00002 0 0.458158 0.121974 -0.780541
192 Pang Rim Company Korea 0.59370 0.37350 0.02530 309.53570 0.0000 -4.79720 -24.83193 35.36849 0.88427 0.47626 -0.52138 5.7351 0.11426 0.00286 0.00154 0.13950 1 0.467479 0.158412 -0.760401
193 Papercorea Income Korea 1.44048 0.02900 0.78100 222.69960 0.0000 -20.24528 1.42925 51.32411 0.97628 10.73360 0.36498 5.4058 0.23046 0.00438 0.04820 0.00084 0 1.205943 -0.255822 0.187262
194 Poonglim Industrial Company Korea 0.62808 0.23970 0.03350 672.03636 1.0000 -11.68550 106.38103 54.61107 57.46798 12.54545 -0.46508 6.5103 0.08126 0.08551 0.01867 0.05746 1 0.252783 0.024997 -1.375225
195 Poongsan Corp. Korea 0.52600 0.13660 0.13930 1,394.65059 0.0000 6.89374 29.14387 146.04585 6.43399 59.35336 -0.64244 7.2404 0.10472 0.00461 0.04256 0.01866 0 0.506156 0.102306 -0.680909
196 Posco Korea 0.42504 0.00000 0.33540 15,834.31700 0.0000 2.39897 743.48221 2209.24506 423.17391 980.29249 -0.85558 9.6699 0.13952 0.02673 0.06191 0.00000 0 0.566218 0.173819 -0.568777
197 Pum Yang Construction Company L Korea 0.47510 0.13450 0.07380 144.02759 1.0000 10.48680 -9.20544 8.51464 0.20890 0.93498 -0.74422 4.9700 0.05912 0.00145 0.00649 0.01809 0 0.221463 0.042610 -1.507498
198 Radix Korea 0.68015 0.00000 0.79960 137.06403 1.0000 -13.40324 -4.50198 -1.74150 3.24427 6.72332 -0.38544 4.9204 -0.01271 0.02367 0.04905 0.00000 0 0.406613 -0.200268 -0.899894
199 Raygen Korea 0.22426 0.30240 0.03970 19.31131 1.0000 81.94486 0.69042 2.32405 1.12743 1.15232 -1.49495 2.9607 0.12035 0.05838 0.05967 0.09145 1 0.855748 -0.082331 -0.155779
200 Rifa Industrial Company Limited Korea 0.24014 0.24970 0.22880 89.03866 0.0000 -7.15587 -12.76220 4.89966 0.01993 0.21797 -1.42655 4.4891 0.05503 0.00022 0.00245 0.06235 1 0.175041 0.029071 -1.742733
201 Rocket Electric Company Limited Korea 0.91725 0.15010 0.02200 119.87905 1.0000 -7.83401 -11.31858 -22.74941 12.49486 5.33755 -0.08637 4.7865 -0.18977 0.10423 0.04452 0.02253 0 0.500464 -16.780542 -0.692220
202 S Net Systems Inc Korea 0.11403 0.09280 0.07780 59.52414 1.0000 221.43956 -12.68380 9.62627 0.00293 0.50254 -2.17133 4.0864 0.16172 0.00005 0.00844 0.00861 0 0.576049 0.222679 -0.551563
203 Saehan Industries Korea 0.80940 0.00000 0.08790 1,307.56126 0.0000 -26.20377 -257.72095 -434.71542 3.64585 16.91462 -0.21146 7.1759 -0.33246 0.00279 0.01294 0.00000 0 0.651884 -2.692750 -0.427889
204 Saehan Media Corp. Korea 1.01478 0.00000 0.26000 487.80992 1.0000 -28.53990 -38.07790 -190.88371 3.21265 26.60699 0.01467 6.1899 -0.39131 0.00659 0.05454 0.00000 0 0.764772 43.917164 -0.268177
205 Sajo Industries Company Korea 0.71700 0.29150 0.61320 222.74783 0.0000 18.53206 -38.81265 9.62767 0.00949 8.21186 -0.33269 5.4060 0.04322 0.00004 0.03687 0.08497 1 0.523295 -0.061066 -0.647610
206 Sam Hwa Paints Industrial Korea 0.33311 0.00000 0.62160 116.63808 0.0000 7.90054 -8.61870 7.44614 0.40981 5.01949 -1.09929 4.7591 0.06384 0.00351 0.04303 0.00000 0 0.251602 0.049883 -1.379908
207 Sam WHA Electronics Korea 0.47811 0.08080 0.38810 77.87510 1.0000 18.25419 -18.54308 7.81976 1.66166 7.46798 -0.73792 4.3551 0.10041 0.02134 0.09590 0.00653 0 0.952853 0.118342 -0.048295
208 Sam Whan Camus Company Korea 0.41823 0.00000 0.49640 145.54941 1.0000 -2.36188 3.45375 7.43636 0.00079 1.13518 -0.87173 4.9805 0.05109 0.00001 0.00780 0.00000 0 0.287375 0.002997 -1.246966
209 Sam Whan Corp. Korea 0.41706 0.09030 0.25550 687.35020 1.0000 -7.27215 94.95652 34.53755 0.00079 3.25138 -0.87452 6.5328 0.05025 0.00000 0.00473 0.00815 0 0.120889 0.015925 -2.112885
210 Sam Yang Company Korea 0.48233 0.12370 0.01660 1,068.68545 0.0000 3.10171 48.15679 67.79096 12.56763 64.04422 -0.72914 6.9742 0.06343 0.01176 0.05993 0.01530 0 0.429618 0.066985 -0.844859
211 Sam Yang Heavy Machinery Comp Korea 0.00542 0.00000 0.16990 25.77069 1.0000 -15.58730 -3.48345 -3.16147 0.05919 0.04484 -5.21818 3.2492 -0.12268 0.00230 0.00174 0.00000 0 0.057745 -0.232195 -2.851715
212 Sam Young Electronics Company Li Korea 0.24400 0.14590 0.38400 351.02530 1.0000 8.06535 -7.70830 39.56759 1.37391 17.80237 -1.41058 5.8609 0.11272 0.00391 0.05072 0.02129 0 0.413884 0.104404 -0.882169
213 Sam Yung Trading Company Limite Korea 0.06367 0.21020 0.20660 71.31225 1.0000 -1.15393 0.63874 7.35257 0.26640 0.52806 -2.75403 4.2671 0.10310 0.00374 0.00740 0.04418 1 0.015903 0.082090 -4.141258
214 Sambu Construction Company Limit Korea 0.49383 0.08130 0.05830 559.04269 1.0000 2.16984 8.36601 26.48854 0.67747 5.86087 -0.70557 6.3262 0.04738 0.00121 0.01048 0.00661 0 0.189705 -0.004802 -1.662284
215 Samchully Company Limited Korea 0.20355 0.14540 0.19000 515.14466 0.0000 14.42342 14.55810 35.51621 0.00316 27.13518 -1.59182 6.2444 0.06894 0.00001 0.05267 0.02114 0 0.341091 0.085034 -1.075605
216 Samhwa Crown & Closure Compan Korea 0.26445 0.00000 0.58790 103.67090 0.0000 6.67557 3.42266 11.88274 2.28506 3.94298 -1.33011 4.6412 0.11462 0.02204 0.03803 0.00000 0 0.402949 0.097226 -0.908945
217 Samick Musical Instrument Compan Korea 1.09786 0.00000 0.75330 266.39526 1.0000 0.40222 -1.90988 13.01344 0.29723 3.28696 0.09336 5.5850 0.04885 0.00112 0.01234 0.00000 0 0.158424 1.508224 -1.842480
218 Samil Pharmaceutical Company Lim Korea 0.24243 0.00000 0.94930 34.13450 1.0000 10.96845 5.00986 9.98131 0.03996 1.26489 -1.41706 3.5303 0.29241 0.00117 0.03706 0.00000 0 0.178218 0.338646 -1.724749
219 Sampyo Foods Company Limited Korea 0.45071 0.17510 0.16600 181.27374 0.0000 7.01895 -22.24060 7.67452 0.20718 0.35785 -0.79692 5.2000 0.04234 0.00114 0.00197 0.03066 0 0.466710 -0.728867 -0.762047
220 Samsung Corp. Korea 0.69445 0.14160 0.43000 10,333.15889 1.0000 -7.47103 758.47589 822.50356 102.29960 208.75020 -0.36464 9.2431 0.07960 0.00990 0.02020 0.02005 0 0.336976 0.014640 -1.087743
221 Samsung Electro Mechanical Comp Korea 0.49765 0.00000 0.23690 3,141.39842 1.0000 13.10136 -193.15573 479.74783 25.88854 232.31858 -0.69785 8.0524 0.15272 0.00824 0.07395 0.00000 0 1.011633 0.213978 0.011566
222 Samsung Electronics Company Limit Korea 0.55092 0.01940 0.18100 36,493.87984 1.0000 64.46153 -4733.51542 7238.57945 195.24427 2400.89091 -0.59617 10.5049 0.19835 0.00535 0.06579 0.00038 0 0.913623 0.322141 -0.090338
223 Samsung Fine Chemical Korea 0.20574 0.00000 0.31300 596.27905 0.0000 -2.11749 11.01660 44.03083 9.19447 44.75020 -1.58115 6.3907 0.07384 0.01542 0.07505 0.00000 0 0.438803 0.057929 -0.823705
224 Samsung Heavy Industries Compan Korea 0.53538 0.00000 0.37610 4,464.64980 1.0000 -13.76358 717.76917 -22.78419 28.93439 95.18261 -0.62477 8.4039 -0.00510 0.00648 0.02132 0.00000 0 0.471790 -0.137372 -0.751220
225 Samsung SDI Preferred Korea 0.44367 0.00000 0.26580 4,477.12648 1.0000 10.15624 -27.31067 722.14545 51.78814 363.77708 -0.81268 8.4067 0.16130 0.01157 0.08125 0.00000 0 0.592281 0.235947 -0.523775
226 Samsung Techwin Limited Korea 0.66076 0.00000 0.45500 1,706.26245 1.0000 -1.33491 193.09091 150.14941 160.27826 88.35099 -0.41437 7.4421 0.08800 0.09394 0.05178 0.00000 0 0.625455 0.036510 -0.469276
227 Samyang Genex Preferred Korea 0.18465 0.00000 0.31580 209.38884 0.0000 -5.96968 30.66043 34.03983 0.11121 1.26190 -1.68931 5.3442 0.16257 0.00053 0.00603 0.00000 0 0.314542 0.151316 -1.156639
228 Seah Besteel Corp. Korea 0.59440 0.00304 0.81440 958.32095 0.0000 -0.86469 23.95257 -7.04822 1.33360 63.52806 -0.52021 6.8652 -0.00735 0.00139 0.06629 0.00001 0 0.430589 -0.234613 -0.842602
229 Seah Steel Corporation Korea 0.41062 0.14310 0.41870 885.51146 0.0000 24.80705 -22.12806 42.56759 3.40079 46.53834 -0.89009 6.7862 0.04807 0.00384 0.05256 0.02048 0 0.210815 0.017766 -1.556775
230 Sejong Industry Korea 0.03682 0.50400 0.16800 112.57628 1.0000 16.81582 -13.48933 10.08617 0.00870 9.88696 -3.30184 4.7236 0.08959 0.00008 0.08782 0.25402 1 0.049392 0.116804 -3.007968
231 Seong An Korea 0.76438 0.19770 0.35880 287.02372 0.0000 4.17641 -11.96680 12.50988 0.77312 9.93202 -0.26869 5.6596 0.04358 0.00269 0.03460 0.03909 0 0.571703 0.015982 -0.559135
232 Seoul Broadcasting System Korea 0.12948 0.00000 0.65250 390.00158 1.0000 11.37488 39.17708 85.72095 0.81976 15.49565 -2.04419 5.9662 0.21980 0.00210 0.03973 0.00000 0 0.974812 0.211936 -0.025510
233 Seoul City Gas Korea 0.39649 0.11480 0.47870 471.04054 0.0000 4.48383 -1.97797 29.06458 1.53806 21.33290 -0.92511 6.1549 0.06170 0.00327 0.04529 0.01318 0 0.443728 0.103352 -0.812544
234 Shin Won Corp. Korea 0.73870 0.00000 0.50990 339.10830 1.0000 -0.28638 31.31542 14.23241 1.23162 6.49328 -0.30286 5.8263 0.04197 0.00363 0.01915 0.00000 0 0.604971 -0.261038 -0.502575
235 Shinsung English Korea 0.47668 0.13000 0.31640 97.73597 1.0000 16.76115 -14.26957 -1.99447 2.27905 2.75494 -0.74091 4.5823 -0.02041 0.02332 0.02819 0.01690 0 0.469532 -0.090936 -0.756020
236 Shinsung Tongsang Company Ltd Korea 4.54243 0.21840 0.44350 175.88265 1.0000 -55.45139 -4.86104 -193.47566 0.06099 1.42244 1.51346 5.1698 -1.10003 0.00035 0.00809 0.04770 1 1.450414 1.635774 0.371849
237 Shinyoung Wacoal Korea 0.18406 0.10250 0.40400 154.75628 1.0000 12.78343 6.09223 11.26889 0.03579 1.77188 -1.69251 5.0419 0.07282 0.00023 0.01145 0.01051 0 0.074352 0.057606 -2.598949
238 SK Chemicals Company Limited Korea 0.86931 0.12000 0.26730 2,672.23557 0.0000 42.35508 102.29407 132.66877 59.08300 85.73755 -0.14005 7.8907 0.04965 0.02211 0.03208 0.01440 0 0.420457 0.037100 -0.866413
239 SK Gas Company Korea 0.61624 0.00000 0.58050 568.01581 0.0000 3.03348 -36.09565 50.42292 0.90751 13.93123 -0.48411 6.3421 0.08877 0.00160 0.02453 0.00000 0 0.544780 0.076093 -0.607373
240 SK Networks Company Limited Pre Korea 0.60093 0.00000 0.70250 10,315.84585 1.0000 70.66735 -269.21818 283.43478 76.61186 16.34308 -0.50928 9.2414 0.02748 0.00743 0.00158 0.00000 0 0.176757 0.016905 -1.732978
241 SK Telecom Company Korea 0.33351 0.00000 0.51380 8,492.96522 0.0000 74.52893 622.14229 1186.76047 2026.21028 1151.33597 -1.09808 9.0470 0.13973 0.23858 0.13556 0.00000 0 2.286095 0.163058 0.826845
242 SKC Company Korea 0.77595 0.00320 0.48240 1,251.21581 1.0000 10.25473 -165.58182 71.76364 42.92490 34.63320 -0.25367 7.1319 0.05736 0.03431 0.02768 0.00001 0 0.637695 0.017206 -0.449895
243 Solborn Inc Korea 0.14020 0.13850 0.08620 341.56311 1.0000 1287.75714 -12.28981 -16.04341 5.89201 3.22567 -1.96470 5.8335 -0.04697 0.01725 0.00944 0.01918 0 0.063579 -0.059656 -2.755470
244 Soosan Heavy Industrial Preferred Korea 1.32318 0.29700 0.52440 68.31937 1.0000 -14.94039 4.63478 -0.46561 0.11542 1.79368 0.28004 4.2242 -0.00682 0.00169 0.02625 0.08821 1 0.782755 0.417393 -0.244935
245 Ssangyong Cement Industry CompaKorea 1.10195 0.00000 0.64680 3,715.67115 1.0000 -23.57990 -54.28221 -330.93755 87.44427 180.44585 0.09708 8.2203 -0.08907 0.02353 0.04856 0.00000 0 0.880608 1.937151 -0.127143
246 Ssangyong Corporation Korea 0.99388 0.00000 0.81360 748.92174 1.0000 -1.89492 3.96522 -8.39921 10.55810 13.08538 -0.00614 6.6186 -0.01122 0.01410 0.01747 0.00000 0 0.355512 -20.854453 -1.034197
247 Ssangyong Information & Commun Korea 0.30349 0.00000 0.78220 149.97529 1.0000 10.72396 5.74905 40.68998 0.89716 3.34571 -1.19239 5.0105 0.27131 0.00598 0.02231 0.00000 0 0.160948 0.153298 -1.826676
248 Ssangyong Motors Company Limite Korea 1.82819 0.00000 0.71960 1,654.72964 1.0000 -29.82258 88.09644 -635.17628 40.76838 155.27905 0.60333 7.4114 -0.38386 0.02464 0.09384 0.00000 0 1.181019 1.024242 0.166378
249 Sungchang Enterprise Company LimKorea 0.65444 0.18620 0.41340 234.63176 1.0000 -4.37344 3.66445 31.45040 0.00517 0.27755 -0.42397 5.4580 0.13404 0.00002 0.00118 0.03467 0 0.629102 0.174326 -0.463461
250 Taegu Department Store Company Korea 0.60306 0.08450 0.09820 479.25365 1.0000 -4.17703 33.15450 58.07556 0.13934 5.28025 -0.50574 6.1722 0.12118 0.00029 0.01102 0.00714 0 0.554388 0.206235 -0.589890
251 Taekwang Industrial Company Limi Korea 0.09014 0.00000 0.38260 1,539.26087 0.0000 52.89510 -98.94625 44.72411 0.01739 188.63715 -2.40640 7.3391 0.02906 0.00001 0.12255 0.00000 0 0.077295 0.021049 -2.560125
252 Taeyoung Engineering & Constructi Korea 0.21307 0.26190 0.11030 427.61028 1.0000 -6.30914 20.33518 55.85375 0.00474 3.53281 -1.54611 6.0582 0.13062 0.00001 0.00826 0.06859 1 0.364705 0.165308 -1.008665
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253 Taihan Electric Wire Company Limi Korea 0.54775 0.00000 0.59260 1,028.58024 0.0000 -25.47802 11.22846 79.21265 1.50593 18.27194 -0.60193 6.9359 0.07701 0.00146 0.01776 0.00000 0 0.282613 0.062320 -1.263677
254 The Willbes Company Korea 0.56566 0.00000 0.11470 302.36126 1.0000 11.42194 -12.25375 18.92885 10.24822 3.98972 -0.56977 5.7116 0.06260 0.03389 0.01320 0.00000 0 0.520826 0.026571 -0.652339
255 Timo Technology Company Limited Korea 0.00602 0.00000 0.00080 12.66585 1.0000 231.62232 0.23237 0.68320 0.20850 0.39347 -5.11303 2.5389 0.05394 0.01646 0.03107 0.00000 0 0.490142 0.042017 -0.713060
256 Tong Yang Moolsan Company Ltd Korea 0.28722 0.15230 0.41330 174.21512 1.0000 0.96124 -2.68445 11.27972 0.20469 5.41792 -1.24752 5.1603 0.06475 0.00117 0.03110 0.02320 0 0.294538 0.054322 -1.222349
257 Turbotek Company Limited Korea 0.07020 0.19420 0.07810 133.51542 1.0000 104.86021 -10.26719 7.01581 7.20000 2.87589 -2.65640 4.8942 0.05255 0.05393 0.02154 0.03771 0 0.003291 0.043318 -5.716513
258 Union Steel Company Limited Korea 0.39424 0.00000 0.74910 840.88379 0.0000 -9.41828 25.98893 55.73518 5.74545 30.38340 -0.93079 6.7345 0.06628 0.00683 0.03613 0.00000 0 0.351176 0.058288 -1.046468
259 Wiscom Korea 0.08245 0.04810 0.14180 71.57438 0.0000 -1.13192 -2.04116 24.80979 0.00146 3.72229 -2.49558 4.2707 0.34663 0.00002 0.05201 0.00231 0 0.268711 0.340716 -1.314117
260 Woo Sung Feed Korea 0.23233 0.22120 0.31450 151.58261 0.0000 0.95664 7.44032 12.80553 0.01818 5.61660 -1.45958 5.0211 0.08448 0.00012 0.03705 0.04893 1 0.089159 0.072257 -2.417329
261 Wooshin Systems Korea 0.43331 0.00000 0.34090 28.30338 1.0000 42.41091 -8.77952 1.79613 0.43933 0.76344 -0.83630 3.3430 0.06346 0.01552 0.02697 0.00000 0 1.604988 0.094317 0.473116
262 Wooyoung Company Limited Korea 0.69736 0.16080 0.07040 182.49257 1.0000 76.39681 -15.50204 16.80827 6.19456 11.87312 -0.36045 5.2067 0.09210 0.03394 0.06506 0.02586 0 0.576931 0.176326 -0.550033
263 Yeong Hwa Metal Korea 0.68629 0.11610 0.07670 41.34064 1.0000 11.47260 -10.40021 1.29968 1.05111 2.95077 -0.37645 3.7218 0.03144 0.02543 0.07138 0.01348 0 0.809686 -0.043892 -0.211109
264 Youlchon Chemical Company Limite Korea 0.26559 0.00000 0.59810 183.42657 0.0000 2.56485 18.41275 28.63250 0.59831 4.90932 -1.32580 5.2118 0.15610 0.00326 0.02676 0.00000 0 0.542419 0.163878 -0.611717
265 Youngbo Chemical Korea 0.19944 0.01460 0.31000 52.28140 0.0000 0.65377 -2.96447 3.81077 0.00914 2.16872 -1.61224 3.9566 0.07289 0.00017 0.04148 0.00021 0 0.373024 0.081092 -0.986111
266 Youngone Corp. Korea 0.15498 0.09150 0.24890 200.30722 1.0000 6.64775 -14.95839 29.41082 0.89627 1.72873 -1.86449 5.2999 0.14683 0.00447 0.00863 0.00837 0 0.438014 0.109559 -0.825505
267 Youngpoong Korea 0.35745 0.06190 0.47590 797.07036 0.0000 25.70207 -1.97866 22.80632 3.12411 28.61976 -1.02875 6.6809 0.02861 0.00392 0.03591 0.00383 0 0.353375 0.016846 -1.040225
268 Yuhan Corp. Korea 0.28108 0.00000 0.23590 439.63320 1.0000 5.66520 10.36285 50.30435 0.12490 5.96996 -1.26913 6.0859 0.11442 0.00028 0.01358 0.00000 0 0.359741 0.102301 -1.022370
269 Yuhwa Corp. Korea 0.59027 0.30270 0.19930 51.15731 1.0000 -2.02351 -1.68933 3.09656 0.00237 0.54862 -0.52718 3.9349 0.06053 0.00005 0.01072 0.09163 1 0.619770 0.043419 -0.478407
270 Yungjin Pharmaceutical Company L Korea 0.59402 0.00090 0.57340 65.96364 1.0000 -45.15026 -1.66482 -24.51858 0.51067 2.29486 -0.52085 4.1891 -0.37170 0.00774 0.03479 0.00000 0 0.140927 -4.739709 -1.959514
271 Yuyang Information & Communicat Korea 0.38613 0.20920 0.03230 76.91383 1.0000 13.65691 -4.26719 -1.85850 0.44269 1.20079 -0.95157 4.3427 -0.02416 0.00576 0.01561 0.04376 1 0.313140 -0.073968 -1.161106
272 A & M Realty Berhad Malaysia 0.03727 0.49110 0.45360 173.70843 1.0000 37.45364 0.47289 2.88997 4.53890 0.94104 -3.28966 5.1574 0.01664 0.02613 0.00542 0.24118 1 0.348314 0.146392 -1.054651
273 Advance Synergy Berhad Malaysia 0.51164 0.08950 0.19130 370.22161 1.0000 -81.73162 87.22776 6.16941 25.47184 4.55600 -0.67014 5.9141 0.01666 0.06880 0.01231 0.00801 0 0.402030 -0.187168 -0.911228
274 AIC Corporation Berhad Malaysia 0.40355 0.24240 0.57880 119.05006 1.0000 6.15564 5.12205 14.73932 9.58121 6.29572 -0.90747 4.7795 0.12381 0.08048 0.05288 0.05876 1 0.956657 0.166058 -0.044310
275 Aluminium Company Of Malaysia Malaysia 0.00373 0.00110 0.50230 76.39446 0.0000 1.89503 0.65736 4.03917 0.17131 3.52602 -5.59178 4.3359 0.05287 0.00224 0.04616 0.00000 0 3.143573 -0.062789 1.145360
276 Amalgamated Containers Berhad Malaysia 0.75325 0.07380 0.45110 159.85070 0.0000 -6.43893 -6.56303 -11.81156 7.49226 3.32639 -0.28335 5.0742 -0.07389 0.04687 0.02081 0.00545 0 0.111731 0.020466 -2.191661
277 Amsteel Corporation Berhad Malaysia 0.97588 0.47250 0.52060 3,492.71943 1.0000 -7.30206 96.71465 12.95843 62.79394 86.42996 -0.02441 8.1584 0.00371 0.01798 0.02475 0.22326 1 0.844277 -3.272418 -0.169275
278 Ancom Berhad Malaysia 0.49207 0.25970 0.36590 241.65583 0.0000 136.29542 2.36490 4.55828 14.35138 9.07926 -0.70912 5.4875 0.01886 0.05939 0.03757 0.06744 1 0.020257 0.004358 -3.899249
279 Ann JOO Resources Berhad Malaysia 0.25315 0.63790 0.08230 159.83305 1.0000 67.25745 3.21918 9.34411 0.02710 2.92918 -1.37376 5.0741 0.05846 0.00017 0.01833 0.40692 1 1.185948 0.056567 0.170543
280 Asas Dunia Berhad Malaysia 0.00150 0.39810 0.53300 87.66328 1.0000 -2.20865 -1.43341 0.80525 0.52499 0.34973 -6.50172 4.4735 0.00919 0.00599 0.00399 0.15848 1 0.182753 0.006417 -1.699621
281 Asia Pacific Land Berhad Malaysia 0.37831 0.32180 0.25850 423.50158 1.0000 -1.58629 1.75577 9.02043 1.40999 1.49551 -0.97205 6.0486 0.02130 0.00333 0.00353 0.10356 1 0.018118 0.149336 -4.010854
282 Autoair Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.12020 0.35270 0.37190 14.92610 1.0000 9.30640 -0.82396 1.29713 0.00289 0.85660 -2.11857 2.7031 0.08690 0.00019 0.05739 0.12440 1 0.910215 0.085250 -0.094074
283 Berjaya Land 'A' Berhad Malaysia 0.37439 0.00410 0.29460 1,805.25382 1.0000 5.16214 -9.38838 124.61636 401.54524 12.75083 -0.98245 7.4985 0.06903 0.22243 0.00706 0.00002 0 0.457768 0.017244 -0.781393
284 Bolton Berhad Malaysia 0.27071 0.10990 0.43710 266.09377 1.0000 -7.34213 -7.67781 -5.64178 16.66640 1.20157 -1.30671 5.5838 -0.02120 0.06263 0.00452 0.01208 0 4.729785 0.066346 1.553880
285 Brem Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.17291 0.19530 0.42890 120.29235 1.0000 13.64109 -3.89227 7.39236 4.03274 2.02403 -1.75499 4.7899 0.06145 0.03352 0.01683 0.03814 0 0.545705 0.046210 -0.605677
286 British American Tobacco (M) Berha Malaysia 0.67132 0.00000 0.67190 499.46183 0.0000 107.43554 29.90468 199.09474 137.62118 18.32165 -0.39851 6.2135 0.39862 0.27554 0.03668 0.00000 0 5.933158 1.377859 1.780557
287 Cahya Mata Sarawak Berhad Malaysia 0.88037 0.17860 0.55590 2,302.88908 1.0000 3.54144 2.27734 52.36813 68.75217 17.10877 -0.12742 7.7419 0.02274 0.02985 0.00743 0.03190 0 0.655445 0.082060 -0.422441
288 Cement Industries Of Malaysia Ber Malaysia 0.41002 0.00460 0.73840 332.08123 1.0000 74.99886 18.31665 9.96726 11.30278 13.71407 -0.89155 5.8054 0.03001 0.03404 0.04130 0.00002 0 0.425688 0.005734 -0.854049
289 Chase Perdana Berhad Malaysia 3.20161 0.24210 0.67870 127.68760 1.0000 -23.36095 -5.12100 -69.48821 0.68157 0.61210 1.16365 4.8496 -0.54420 0.00534 0.00479 0.05861 1 0.831965 1.137808 -0.183964
290 Chee Wah Corp. Berhad Malaysia 0.38833 0.28790 0.41620 18.71468 0.0000 12.51816 -0.63580 1.93436 0.74794 0.74368 -0.94589 2.9293 0.10336 0.03997 0.03974 0.08289 1 0.613384 0.114851 -0.488764
291 CI Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.05564 0.23740 0.75500 91.73533 1.0000 2.59167 -12.86553 -1.12792 5.64301 2.03978 -2.88879 4.5189 -0.01230 0.06151 0.02224 0.05636 1 0.633882 -0.030492 -0.455893
292 CME Group Berhad Malaysia 0.18572 0.00000 0.43720 15.95483 1.0000 13.12436 -3.32339 -0.62315 0.01421 0.18868 -1.68350 2.7698 -0.03906 0.00089 0.01183 0.00000 0 0.685285 -0.088909 -0.377921
293 CN Asia Corporation Berhad Malaysia 0.30618 0.32220 0.41630 19.39521 0.0000 -5.71380 1.25622 -0.52250 0.29436 0.53555 -1.18357 2.9650 -0.02694 0.01518 0.02761 0.10381 1 0.496235 -0.083438 -0.700706
294 Computer Forms Malaysia Berhad Malaysia 0.51999 0.00000 0.61200 28.99461 0.0000 0.22074 -1.15890 0.95756 0.48240 0.89694 -0.65395 3.3671 0.03303 0.01664 0.03093 0.00000 0 1.145647 -0.021711 0.135969
295 Country Heights Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.46529 0.08340 0.62080 562.49248 1.0000 41.61048 -44.13453 20.02531 1.68525 8.06176 -0.76510 6.3324 0.03560 0.00300 0.01433 0.00696 0 0.037953 -0.683762 -3.271396
296 Dijaya Corporation Berhad Malaysia 0.33450 0.29000 0.55660 345.05030 1.0000 -4.37213 23.18581 4.54179 7.77571 1.84972 -1.09513 5.8437 0.01316 0.02253 0.00536 0.08410 1 0.088629 0.096445 -2.423292
297 E & O Property Development Berh Malaysia 0.48520 0.45100 0.50430 174.55117 1.0000 -4.75629 -0.68868 31.88100 7.87229 2.92444 -0.72319 5.1622 0.18265 0.04510 0.01675 0.20340 1 0.803354 0.265423 -0.218960
298 Ekovest Berhad Malaysia 0.14366 0.10500 0.53380 71.29955 1.0000 15.69901 -1.27587 7.66833 1.32342 1.77626 -1.94029 4.2669 0.10755 0.01856 0.02491 0.01103 0 0.854835 0.153836 -0.156846
299 Eng Teknologi Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.14493 0.15720 0.39340 59.24227 1.0000 23.79197 -1.75446 10.95883 6.86387 3.50207 -1.93149 4.0816 0.18498 0.11586 0.05911 0.02471 0 0.532790 0.225395 -0.629628
300 FA Peninsular Berhad Malaysia 0.53596 0.00000 0.51270 25.35372 0.0000 16.47815 0.19714 1.04629 7.61467 1.23694 -0.62369 3.2329 0.04127 0.30034 0.04879 0.00000 0 1.317992 -0.048424 0.276109
301 Faber Group Berhad Malaysia 0.87988 0.00000 0.50220 536.11934 1.0000 1.83529 5.68117 4.11140 0.06658 8.72123 -0.12797 6.2844 0.00767 0.00012 0.01627 0.00000 0 0.752570 -0.939310 -0.284261
302 FACB Industries Inc Berhad Malaysia 0.21870 0.11680 0.55730 83.95422 0.0000 9.81752 -0.04364 8.15748 0.06432 2.15333 -1.52008 4.4303 0.09717 0.00077 0.02565 0.01364 0 0.293254 0.105432 -1.226717
303 Farlim Group (Malaysia) Berhad Malaysia 0.49980 0.01920 0.34190 150.65929 1.0000 -2.02812 -1.21880 -3.00865 9.49437 2.72746 -0.69355 5.0150 -0.01997 0.06302 0.01810 0.00037 0 0.151274 -0.006443 -1.888662
304 FCW Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.14363 0.10020 0.23280 64.69688 0.0000 -20.77044 -5.46090 -8.47412 18.16933 1.30950 -1.94051 4.1697 -0.13098 0.28084 0.02024 0.01004 0 1.232538 -0.263702 0.209075
305 Fututech Berhad Malaysia 0.16879 0.17100 0.30780 20.87767 0.0000 8.49813 -0.69920 1.12815 3.69470 0.72657 -1.77908 3.0387 0.05404 0.17697 0.03480 0.02924 0 0.344761 0.035336 -1.064905
306 Gamuda Berhad Malaysia 0.10489 0.10920 0.34720 369.11432 1.0000 20.79236 11.01557 34.92914 1.37135 2.73955 -2.25484 5.9111 0.09463 0.00372 0.00742 0.01192 0 0.559204 0.136876 -0.581241
307 Glenealy Plantations Berhad Malaysia 0.61490 0.51200 0.36210 396.08510 0.0000 -1.27845 -1.53766 11.08628 27.43794 7.78148 -0.48629 5.9816 0.02799 0.06927 0.01965 0.26214 1 0.652509 0.108528 -0.426931
308 Globetronics Technology Berhad Malaysia 0.03946 0.01800 0.61360 50.88078 1.0000 30.33421 -0.14631 9.13411 0.03421 1.25367 -3.23259 3.9295 0.17952 0.00067 0.02464 0.00032 0 1.395558 0.293117 0.333294
309 Goh Ban Huat Berhad Malaysia 0.47611 0.10060 0.50880 52.31195 1.0000 4.03400 -4.39707 -0.53544 0.06990 1.44115 -0.74211 3.9572 -0.01024 0.00134 0.02755 0.01012 0 0.903847 -0.090143 -0.101095
310 Golden Pharos Berhad Malaysia 0.36724 0.00000 0.63180 44.70847 1.0000 -11.62723 -4.07285 -4.61811 0.07237 1.94761 -1.00174 3.8002 -0.10329 0.00162 0.04356 0.00000 0 0.755888 -0.284383 -0.279862
311 Gopeng Berhad Malaysia 0.56095 0.32360 0.66330 130.23099 1.0000 -0.25966 1.16762 2.87365 0.08816 0.35052 -0.57812 4.8693 0.02207 0.00068 0.00269 0.10472 1 0.742409 0.003729 -0.297855
312 Halim Mazmin Berhad Malaysia 0.87745 0.53350 0.28060 152.08102 1.0000 84.74153 -57.39281 9.88069 0.05737 4.48601 -0.13073 5.0244 0.06497 0.00038 0.02950 0.28462 1 0.589405 0.174115 -0.528642
313 Hexza Corporation Berhad Malaysia 0.10711 0.02180 0.30520 41.01369 0.0000 5.43599 2.61610 4.54325 0.25106 1.23476 -2.23390 3.7139 0.11077 0.00612 0.03011 0.00048 0 0.557484 0.094570 -0.584322
314 Highlands & Lowlands Berhad Malaysia 0.02336 0.00010 0.78840 693.70504 0.0000 2.64455 19.50006 54.25758 0.03921 7.82229 -3.75665 6.5420 0.07821 0.00006 0.01128 0.00000 0 0.017653 0.038701 -4.036823
315 Hing Yiap Knitting Industries Berha Malaysia 0.31945 0.07040 0.52540 24.23423 0.0000 10.49593 -1.43821 2.78470 0.94839 0.64519 -1.14115 3.1878 0.11491 0.03913 0.02662 0.00496 0 0.591156 0.123087 -0.525675
316 Hirotako Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.14847 0.06470 0.54930 43.84243 1.0000 105.09851 6.42256 3.72838 2.83655 1.72919 -1.90735 3.7806 0.08504 0.06470 0.03944 0.00419 0 0.057263 0.117707 -2.860094
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317 Ho Wah Genting Berhad Malaysia 0.86059 0.00150 0.25960 61.28804 0.0000 123.72269 1.72235 20.98609 3.52286 1.71972 -0.15013 4.1156 0.34242 0.05748 0.02806 0.00000 0 1.113047 2.704647 0.107102
318 Hong Leong Industries Berhad Malaysia 0.66905 0.01870 0.64490 1,207.88546 1.0000 6.86660 16.23534 173.95468 118.85853 65.24268 -0.40190 7.0966 0.14402 0.09840 0.05401 0.00035 0 0.962599 0.179724 -0.038118
319 Hume Industries Malaysia Berhad Malaysia 0.75834 0.63890 0.28580 1,177.82799 1.0000 -8.50477 32.73437 85.32731 143.79405 45.20121 -0.27663 7.0714 0.07244 0.12208 0.03838 0.40819 1 1.072348 0.113036 0.069850
320 Hunza Consolidated Berhad Malaysia 0.33031 0.00870 0.64890 39.67984 0.0000 21.32684 0.38607 1.53232 0.41697 1.46570 -1.10772 3.6808 0.03862 0.01051 0.03694 0.00008 0 0.831119 0.024821 -0.184983
321 IJM Corporation Berhad Malaysia 0.30942 0.11020 0.47090 595.25976 1.0000 11.95575 -5.84178 23.35633 0.81499 6.11204 -1.17305 6.3890 0.03924 0.00137 0.01027 0.01214 0 0.589603 0.064342 -0.528305
322 Industronics Berhad Malaysia 0.13009 0.21030 0.56300 30.44941 1.0000 9.63625 -1.98551 3.47233 0.30237 0.50605 -2.03954 3.4161 0.11404 0.00993 0.01662 0.04423 1 0.431840 0.081155 -0.839700
323 Insas Berhad Malaysia 0.22470 0.07910 0.31900 303.68897 1.0000 -8.50670 33.62412 11.80919 1.05055 3.76718 -1.49298 5.7160 0.03889 0.00346 0.01240 0.00626 0 0.052827 0.011396 -2.940729
324 Intergrated Logistics Berhad Malaysia 0.49031 0.08560 0.34170 111.25546 1.0000 -1.91027 -0.05103 4.58471 0.07870 3.76040 -0.71272 4.7118 0.04121 0.00071 0.03380 0.00733 0 0.399290 0.011788 -0.918067
325 Ioi Corporation Berhad Malaysia 0.29996 0.01130 0.44500 1,143.46754 0.0000 6.75719 54.60377 134.59412 13.56949 13.78581 -1.20410 7.0418 0.11771 0.01187 0.01206 0.00013 0 0.510651 0.137484 -0.672069
326 Ireka Corp. Berhad Malaysia 0.64553 0.11010 0.63140 93.12716 1.0000 10.76508 -9.73638 2.43526 3.65859 0.89577 -0.43768 4.5340 0.02615 0.03929 0.00962 0.01212 0 0.293797 0.023671 -1.224866
327 Jaya Tiasa Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.09340 0.00440 0.37080 344.12363 1.0000 10.96375 4.32300 38.02247 84.42751 17.29120 -2.37087 5.8410 0.11049 0.24534 0.05025 0.00002 0 1.372342 0.082704 0.316519
328 Johan Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.69772 0.11690 0.57220 315.19667 1.0000 -4.42057 -5.64300 3.61902 19.54406 3.98139 -0.35993 5.7532 0.01148 0.06201 0.01263 0.01367 0 0.635685 -0.272160 -0.453053
329 John Masters Industries Berhad Malaysia 0.53170 0.09520 0.52310 62.67201 1.0000 -5.22474 5.96178 -1.08946 3.72917 0.51499 -0.63167 4.1379 -0.01738 0.05950 0.00822 0.00906 0 0.686553 -0.100212 -0.376071
330 Keck Seng Malaysia Berhad Malaysia 0.15590 0.24030 0.36840 329.53599 0.0000 12.15281 1.30841 7.74202 0.83920 4.96311 -1.85851 5.7977 0.02349 0.00255 0.01506 0.05774 1 0.134412 0.019219 -2.006849
331 KFC Holdings (Malaysia) Berhad Malaysia 0.41927 0.00060 0.68590 225.14683 1.0000 3.57452 17.68350 26.46314 23.02844 13.95669 -0.86925 5.4168 0.11754 0.10228 0.06199 0.00000 0 1.064824 0.150912 0.062809
332 Kim Hin Industries Berhad Malaysia 0.01671 0.01060 0.59790 101.43077 1.0000 3.32819 6.51967 1.52972 2.73602 6.95493 -4.09198 4.6194 0.01508 0.02697 0.06857 0.00011 0 0.046025 0.023750 -3.078571
333 Konsortium Logistik Berhad Malaysia 0.35139 0.00880 0.49060 194.10611 1.0000 2.21230 3.79785 14.06406 5.26889 8.62886 -1.04585 5.2684 0.07246 0.02714 0.04445 0.00008 0 0.677071 0.074810 -0.389980
334 Kretam Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.94143 0.16250 0.53320 139.36563 0.0000 -10.77354 -4.68574 1.35183 1.33709 3.39996 -0.06036 4.9371 0.00970 0.00959 0.02440 0.02641 0 0.874876 -0.900202 -0.133673
335 Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad Malaysia 0.02793 0.00100 0.70050 987.22395 1.0000 -1.32666 -7.86053 55.98868 9.17289 23.75974 -3.57807 6.8949 0.05671 0.00929 0.02407 0.00000 0 0.492950 0.062099 -0.707348
336 KUB Malaysia Berhad Malaysia 0.18356 0.00170 0.65790 297.15002 1.0000 6.39151 -41.43798 -7.98834 0.46710 7.05861 -1.69522 5.6942 -0.02688 0.00157 0.02375 0.00000 0 0.353312 -0.069382 -1.040405
337 Kulim Malaysia Berhad Malaysia 0.30053 0.00460 0.74820 944.29344 0.0000 -5.17752 6.86282 17.34929 0.82394 14.41564 -1.20220 6.8504 0.01837 0.00087 0.01527 0.00002 0 0.087947 -0.026001 -2.431023
338 Kumpulan Fima Berhad Malaysia 0.78713 0.00040 0.74050 180.09980 1.0000 7.60499 7.33730 -2.42708 4.70495 5.38363 -0.23936 5.1935 -0.01348 0.02612 0.02989 0.00000 0 1.156184 -0.339290 0.145125
339 Kumpulan Jetson Berhad Malaysia 0.49898 0.11070 0.41360 43.46719 1.0000 21.76745 -5.50252 1.75801 0.01854 1.30416 -0.69520 3.7720 0.04044 0.00043 0.03000 0.01225 0 0.261228 0.033360 -1.342363
340 Kym Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.82332 0.03960 0.62360 78.79632 0.0000 1.98642 1.17079 0.08579 1.40395 2.31026 -0.19441 4.3669 0.00109 0.01782 0.02932 0.00157 0 1.034411 -0.307301 0.033833
341 Lafarge Malayan Cement Berhad Malaysia 0.24569 0.00030 0.75860 1,237.23824 1.0000 -3.68279 52.19945 52.37392 270.85451 45.73136 -1.40368 7.1206 0.04233 0.21892 0.03696 0.00000 0 0.762296 0.026200 -0.271421
342 Latexx Partners Berhad Malaysia 0.55179 0.00010 0.26120 43.10081 1.0000 -18.03341 -8.69392 -10.03624 0.32943 2.66194 -0.59459 3.7635 -0.23286 0.00764 0.06176 0.00000 0 1.398787 -0.636000 0.335606
343 Leader Universal Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.65675 0.00650 0.33590 404.69309 1.0000 -13.06823 -3.06707 20.23189 1.95472 13.61407 -0.42045 6.0031 0.04999 0.00483 0.03364 0.00004 0 0.279442 0.000546 -1.274961
344 Leong Hup Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.60169 0.07300 0.55090 189.60500 0.0000 -2.89329 16.33824 15.41861 11.94590 6.43696 -0.50801 5.2449 0.08132 0.06300 0.03395 0.00533 0 0.732117 0.118237 -0.311815
345 Lion Corporation Berhad Malaysia 1.01719 0.00000 0.82070 937.91351 0.0000 21.30080 -54.85667 -12.83343 5.83538 7.06778 0.01704 6.8437 -0.01368 0.00622 0.00754 0.00000 0 0.383645 6.430775 -0.958037
346 Lityan Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.23762 0.08410 0.36080 86.55014 1.0000 1.37533 -9.28780 -7.74913 12.39382 1.50393 -1.43709 4.4607 -0.08953 0.14320 0.01738 0.00707 0 0.648685 -0.147485 -0.432808
347 Magnum Corporation Berhad Malaysia 0.13177 0.00060 0.35430 592.14637 1.0000 -9.68106 90.74957 75.92683 0.59999 4.30759 -2.02673 6.3838 0.12822 0.00101 0.00727 0.00000 0 0.934687 0.078283 -0.067543
348 Mah Sing Group Berhad Malaysia 0.61203 0.43210 0.47840 72.72502 1.0000 35.94420 -15.04695 0.80631 0.18947 2.08340 -0.49098 4.2867 0.01109 0.00261 0.02865 0.18671 1 6.043062 0.162480 1.798911
349 Malayan United Industries Berhad Malaysia 0.37247 0.00100 0.56960 1,468.00738 1.0000 -3.26210 -57.51966 52.76181 269.22873 8.82464 -0.98759 7.2917 0.03594 0.18340 0.00601 0.00000 0 0.050687 1.006174 -2.982080
350 Malaysia Aica Berhad Malaysia 0.05374 0.00000 0.79170 27.07447 1.0000 4.42744 0.79657 1.04420 0.24368 0.36394 -2.92368 3.2986 0.03857 0.00900 0.01344 0.00000 0 1.927944 0.027595 0.656454
351 Malaysian Mosaics Berhad Malaysia 0.49234 0.00100 0.81470 612.19877 1.0000 3.89710 4.11561 30.01506 3.34980 8.05410 -0.70859 6.4171 0.04903 0.00547 0.01316 0.00000 0 0.648663 0.067165 -0.432842
352 Malaysian Pacific Industries Berhad Malaysia 0.40451 0.00000 0.85080 523.61303 1.0000 22.32182 63.94739 142.43271 7.27515 50.93659 -0.90507 6.2608 0.27202 0.01389 0.09728 0.00000 0 4.213708 0.392574 1.438343
353 Malaysian Resources Corp. Berhad Malaysia 0.57311 0.00000 0.38440 921.33806 1.0000 -0.65127 -132.00504 26.20990 8.35899 3.63250 -0.55667 6.8258 0.02845 0.00907 0.00394 0.00000 0 0.915804 0.050528 -0.087953
354 Malpac Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.53463 0.07910 0.48460 65.69440 1.0000 -8.58836 14.37351 9.02178 0.29832 0.46494 -0.62619 4.1850 0.13733 0.00454 0.00708 0.00626 0 0.339171 0.051422 -1.081252
355 Mamee Double Decker Berhad Malaysia 0.34081 0.55810 0.25220 48.92027 0.0000 3.33467 1.80840 3.18286 0.13026 2.96076 -1.07643 3.8902 0.06506 0.00266 0.06052 0.31148 1 0.369890 0.090484 -0.994550
356 Mechmar Corp. (Malaysia) Berhad Malaysia 0.86858 0.14410 0.31620 269.07768 1.0000 15.82750 -12.05093 -1.46498 50.90209 1.13078 -0.14089 5.5950 -0.00544 0.18917 0.00420 0.02076 0 0.724177 -0.174697 -0.322719
357 Mega First Corp. Berhad Malaysia 0.61832 0.00390 0.43330 142.48087 1.0000 -15.59485 -1.59556 11.88209 0.49001 5.97986 -0.48075 4.9592 0.08339 0.00344 0.04197 0.00002 0 0.339300 0.129995 -1.080872
358 Mentiga Corporation Berhad Malaysia 1.09648 0.01250 0.62490 35.60331 1.0000 -13.60526 1.81866 -2.96207 0.91631 1.07920 0.09210 3.5724 -0.08320 0.02574 0.03031 0.00016 0 1.112258 3.364553 0.106392
359 Mesiniaga Berhad Malaysia 0.05191 0.09840 0.59220 45.24978 1.0000 29.67843 -3.08760 5.60784 0.30973 0.98052 -2.95817 3.8122 0.12393 0.00684 0.02167 0.00968 0 0.696199 0.152281 -0.362120
360 Metacorp Berhad Malaysia 0.16887 0.00120 0.84460 189.88093 1.0000 7.59649 9.02628 14.20706 68.19686 5.43903 -1.77865 5.2464 0.07482 0.35916 0.02864 0.00000 0 0.169044 0.074990 -1.777596
361 Metro Kajang Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.17904 0.01400 0.59440 97.63477 1.0000 14.35594 -0.89813 7.84776 0.13898 0.75160 -1.72017 4.5812 0.08038 0.00142 0.00770 0.00020 0 0.157907 0.061861 -1.845752
362 Minho (Malaysia) Berhad Malaysia 0.39114 0.00570 0.50470 110.04647 1.0000 -17.11786 10.01647 5.76994 16.98061 5.94731 -0.93868 4.7009 0.05243 0.15430 0.05404 0.00003 0 0.218355 0.004244 -1.521633
363 Mintye Industries Berhad Malaysia 0.02775 0.00000 0.85490 22.67044 1.0000 11.52163 1.08002 3.28296 0.46869 1.10107 -3.58441 3.1211 0.14481 0.02067 0.04857 0.00000 0 0.662410 0.126688 -0.411871
364 MTD Capital Berhad Malaysia 0.54578 0.01930 0.64890 331.17459 1.0000 6.13183 4.53187 12.85851 57.59301 5.66356 -0.60554 5.8026 0.03883 0.17391 0.01710 0.00037 0 0.141953 0.100355 -1.952261
365 Muhibbah Engineering (Malaysia) Malaysia 0.61639 0.24070 0.40100 217.70796 1.0000 0.59068 -4.47495 -5.73362 8.90122 4.65337 -0.48387 5.3832 -0.02634 0.04089 0.02137 0.05794 1 0.824198 -0.147929 -0.193345
366 Mui Properties Berhad Malaysia 0.20587 0.00000 0.76250 310.79487 1.0000 -3.92155 -0.30789 8.39544 1.95972 1.85314 -1.58051 5.7391 0.02701 0.00631 0.00596 0.00000 0 0.173938 0.870828 -1.749057
367 MWE Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.35827 0.04720 0.47690 166.83587 1.0000 4.15584 2.34208 4.46916 6.20730 4.65074 -1.02646 5.1170 0.02679 0.03721 0.02788 0.00223 0 0.425631 -0.040939 -0.854183
368 Nam Fatt Corp. Berhad Malaysia 0.50077 0.17380 0.54440 382.74648 1.0000 31.19659 8.02255 13.00986 76.82814 3.82391 -0.69161 5.9474 0.03399 0.20073 0.00999 0.03021 0 0.120813 0.011681 -2.113514
369 Nanyang Press Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.44066 0.00000 0.59520 87.14155 1.0000 -11.53775 11.85498 9.67573 0.23790 2.98980 -0.81948 4.4675 0.11103 0.00273 0.03431 0.00000 0 1.394423 0.143382 0.332481
370 Nestle (Malaysia) Berhad Malaysia 0.51385 0.00000 0.89390 316.35218 0.0000 -3.12827 31.79177 71.07583 24.97210 20.50820 -0.66583 5.7569 0.22467 0.07894 0.06483 0.00000 0 4.072726 0.586219 1.404313
371 New Straits Times Press Malaysia 0.62625 0.00000 0.66690 682.76812 1.0000 4.11015 -12.20518 18.93568 1.02319 13.21758 -0.46801 6.5262 0.02773 0.00150 0.01936 0.00000 0 1.227682 0.018447 0.205128
372 Pan Malaysia Corp. Berhad Malaysia 0.09920 0.00050 0.69300 590.81270 0.0000 1.68782 6.33467 23.92843 16.72535 1.52235 -2.31064 6.3815 0.04050 0.02831 0.00258 0.00000 0 0.157539 0.014546 -1.848084
373 Pan Malaysian Industries Berhad Malaysia 0.74189 0.00020 0.68870 471.95118 1.0000 1.39630 -18.27393 5.80588 15.90389 2.27498 -0.29856 6.1569 0.01230 0.03370 0.00482 0.00000 0 1.014360 -0.020911 0.014258
374 PDZ Holdings Berhad Malaysia 1.00962 0.22270 0.56100 29.30061 1.0000 -18.04256 1.62951 0.04263 0.25579 2.88559 0.00958 3.3776 0.00146 0.00873 0.09848 0.04960 1 0.768295 9.320341 -0.263581
375 Perak Corporation Berhad Malaysia 0.05045 0.00020 0.83160 168.98953 1.0000 6.92347 -5.12284 4.46495 9.64885 2.30182 -2.98671 5.1298 0.02642 0.05710 0.01362 0.00000 0 0.101355 0.010046 -2.289123
376 Pilecon Engineering Berhad Malaysia 0.41196 0.00000 0.26230 235.75672 1.0000 7.21227 -35.40515 -14.88774 11.71040 3.42786 -0.88682 5.4628 -0.06315 0.04967 0.01454 0.00000 0 0.665894 -0.152005 -0.406624
377 PJ Development Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.37296 0.03730 0.33810 265.18968 1.0000 -3.82856 -6.01945 6.81915 1.59092 3.17169 -0.98628 5.5804 0.02571 0.00600 0.01196 0.00139 0 0.174201 0.013115 -1.747546
378 PK Resources Berhad Malaysia 0.37919 0.03840 0.74080 290.98113 1.0000 -2.19520 -6.27467 5.87336 0.31315 3.81917 -0.96971 5.6733 0.02018 0.00108 0.01313 0.00147 0 0.469668 0.000911 -0.755730
379 Poly Glass Fibre (M) Berhad Malaysia 0.36128 0.01250 0.61920 80.24522 0.0000 -3.73788 0.06935 -0.66052 0.02918 1.27577 -1.01811 4.3851 -0.00823 0.00036 0.01590 0.00016 0 0.995897 -0.065238 -0.004111
380 Press Metal Berhad Malaysia 0.53521 0.23390 0.28440 88.46117 0.0000 16.09160 -7.89492 7.32045 1.06762 3.07707 -0.62510 4.4826 0.08275 0.01207 0.03478 0.05471 1 1.670840 0.100973 0.513326
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381 Prolexus Berhad Malaysia 0.44421 0.19980 0.41040 22.54062 1.0000 15.85358 0.42443 2.36610 0.23857 0.49205 -0.81146 3.1153 0.10497 0.01058 0.02183 0.03992 0 0.936081 0.177606 -0.066054
382 Public Packages Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.61962 0.06360 0.63040 69.03980 0.0000 2.36927 0.41815 4.37390 0.51210 1.84866 -0.47866 4.2347 0.06335 0.00742 0.02678 0.00404 0 0.563844 0.072976 -0.572977
383 Putera Capital Berhad Malaysia 0.23286 0.00000 0.55740 40.00314 1.0000 -1.00098 1.92814 0.90605 0.06289 1.34078 -1.45731 3.6890 0.02265 0.00157 0.03352 0.00000 0 1.529746 0.009957 0.425101
384 Ranhill Power Berhad Malaysia 0.85014 0.00050 0.86830 54.50040 1.0000 3.90739 -2.89467 0.62309 0.76372 1.36214 -0.16236 3.9982 0.01143 0.01401 0.02499 0.00000 0 0.223164 0.279620 -1.499848
385 RB Land Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.34393 0.00220 0.85760 163.24177 1.0000 -8.41591 -0.20835 -12.34750 0.29597 1.84361 -1.06732 5.0952 -0.07564 0.00181 0.01129 0.00000 0 1.287605 -0.188254 0.252784
386 Reliance Pacific Berhad Malaysia 0.57027 0.00220 0.58340 158.37847 1.0000 3.17080 -5.49303 3.25181 1.46011 1.54470 -0.56165 5.0650 0.02053 0.00922 0.00975 0.00000 0 0.720663 0.034079 -0.327584
387 Sino Hua-An International Berhad Malaysia 0.51044 0.00400 0.43430 352.11392 1.0000 -0.03310 -23.35417 -34.34151 9.42125 7.54042 -0.67248 5.8640 -0.09753 0.02676 0.02141 0.00002 0 0.810294 -0.335376 -0.210358
388 Southern Steel Berhad Malaysia 0.74932 0.00000 0.81110 514.07088 0.0000 4.43650 2.87023 15.35431 17.76376 23.10449 -0.28859 6.2424 0.02987 0.03456 0.04494 0.00000 0 0.519492 -0.029179 -0.654904
389 Sunway City Berhad Malaysia 0.52524 0.02800 0.68500 546.54343 1.0000 0.82123 7.81808 15.55799 2.43287 14.52564 -0.64390 6.3036 0.02847 0.00445 0.02658 0.00078 0 0.023328 0.064453 -3.758111
390 Sunway Holdings Income Berhad Malaysia 0.63684 0.01430 0.55430 495.48003 1.0000 11.62429 4.13469 10.24568 11.80251 11.36751 -0.45124 6.2055 0.02068 0.02382 0.02294 0.00020 0 0.182903 -0.008188 -1.698802
391 Talam Corporation Berhad Malaysia 0.46828 0.05680 0.55670 378.52211 1.0000 4.89447 -7.23935 14.30817 2.15531 1.74109 -0.75869 5.9363 0.03780 0.00569 0.00460 0.00323 0 0.056903 0.183763 -2.866415
392 Tamadam Bonded Warehouse Ber Malaysia 0.45882 0.29070 0.40320 21.77240 1.0000 -27.40164 -1.47025 -0.41210 0.71183 0.90894 -0.77910 3.0806 -0.01893 0.03269 0.04175 0.08451 1 0.806606 -0.133808 -0.214919
393 TDM Berhad Malaysia 0.64752 0.00000 0.79380 148.52659 0.0000 2.34386 -7.47887 -10.17437 1.83366 4.70811 -0.43460 5.0008 -0.06850 0.01235 0.03170 0.00000 0 0.532951 -0.395510 -0.629325
394 Tekala Corporation Berhad Malaysia 0.00001 0.04640 0.35190 46.42969 1.0000 -4.54172 1.58490 -1.65987 0.16021 2.96243 -11.55013 3.8379 -0.03575 0.00345 0.06380 0.00215 0 1.531329 -0.040297 0.426136
395 Teo Guan Lee Corp. Berhad Malaysia 1.00210 0.00410 0.77200 22.88643 1.0000 1.39515 1.00598 1.75745 0.33462 0.53995 0.00210 3.1305 0.07679 0.01462 0.02359 0.00002 0 1.021398 -10.348644 0.021172
396 TH Group Berhad Malaysia 0.18486 0.32490 0.31450 122.97686 0.0000 7.49360 -1.51130 6.80624 0.13895 4.63916 -1.68813 4.8120 0.05535 0.00113 0.03772 0.10556 1 0.741827 0.039469 -0.298639
397 The Store Corp. Berhad Malaysia 0.21490 0.06950 0.46930 123.77419 1.0000 51.93752 2.62637 5.86415 0.77963 3.54989 -1.53760 4.8185 0.04738 0.00630 0.02868 0.00483 0 0.194544 0.086014 -1.637095
398 Tradewinds (Malaysia) Berhad Malaysia 0.34353 0.00000 0.81130 434.75593 0.0000 19.61993 -27.86339 14.91247 15.06063 7.49308 -1.06849 6.0748 0.03430 0.03464 0.01724 0.00000 0 0.199509 0.036595 -1.611895
399 Tradewinds Corp. Berhad Malaysia 0.63617 0.00000 0.44920 1,259.77616 1.0000 1.38371 -63.83590 33.89701 3.61522 14.53800 -0.45229 7.1387 0.02691 0.00287 0.01154 0.00000 0 0.211872 0.004176 -1.551774
400 TSH Resources Berhad Malaysia 0.29129 0.27820 0.43060 77.63523 1.0000 27.48836 -2.15129 6.43730 0.02132 2.24340 -1.23344 4.3520 0.08292 0.00027 0.02890 0.07740 1 0.444971 0.086512 -0.809746
401 UMW Holdings Berhad Malaysia 0.14553 0.00000 0.36590 642.38005 1.0000 -1.71892 28.96206 46.77082 0.49026 22.63976 -1.92735 6.4652 0.07281 0.00076 0.03524 0.00000 0 0.616229 0.071911 -0.484137
402 Unico-Desa Plantations Berhad Malaysia 0.17565 0.00360 0.65920 87.69559 0.0000 3.40344 -2.75517 6.73511 0.01895 1.10834 -1.73928 4.4739 0.07680 0.00022 0.01264 0.00001 0 0.470567 0.064966 -0.753817
403 Utusan Melayu (Malaysia) Berhad Malaysia 0.59519 0.00000 0.78800 135.05041 1.0000 9.30892 -8.25860 4.02943 1.94314 7.39650 -0.51887 4.9056 0.02984 0.01439 0.05477 0.00000 0 0.617460 0.012786 -0.482142
404 Welli Multi Corp. Berhad Malaysia 0.45573 0.05580 0.31790 12.12750 0.0000 -11.12718 -0.48499 -1.11420 0.73999 0.65315 -0.78585 2.4955 -0.09187 0.06102 0.05386 0.00311 0 1.316708 -0.258902 0.275134
405 White Horse Berhad Malaysia 0.24698 0.37570 0.29750 114.64879 1.0000 16.47530 -12.00250 11.84303 0.17816 5.39889 -1.39846 4.7419 0.10330 0.00155 0.04709 0.14115 1 0.274391 0.124264 -1.293201
406 Wijaya Baru Global Berhad Malaysia 0.67610 0.32080 0.25880 314.92957 1.0000 4.97257 0.03368 -2.04708 30.58652 3.85680 -0.39142 5.7523 -0.00650 0.09712 0.01225 0.10291 1 1.134947 -0.143144 0.126586
407 Yee Lee Corp. Berhad Malaysia 0.42278 0.02580 0.74580 73.39817 0.0000 -0.09940 -2.43471 4.10996 0.67236 1.66893 -0.86090 4.2959 0.05600 0.00916 0.02274 0.00067 0 0.127908 0.047717 -2.056440
408 YTL Cement Berhad Malaysia 0.05631 0.00270 0.85490 107.99988 1.0000 -30.77604 17.40457 7.22120 0.23106 4.76220 -2.87691 4.6821 0.06686 0.00214 0.04409 0.00001 0 1.090288 0.076674 0.086442
409 YTL Corp. Berhad Malaysia 0.43905 0.02320 0.72680 2,659.90706 1.0000 6.87045 29.77246 248.55913 31.29223 41.01112 -0.82313 7.8860 0.09345 0.01176 0.01542 0.00054 0 0.120276 0.090845 -2.117965
410 YTL Power Berhad Malaysia 0.31264 0.00170 0.50320 1,663.13150 0.0000 11.52961 29.25526 173.91214 0.00804 33.08744 -1.16269 7.4165 0.10457 0.00000 0.01989 0.00000 0 0.080420 0.096202 -2.520490
411 Aboitiz Equity Ventures Inc Philippines 0.20760 0.05650 0.73520 410.65539 1.0000 32.81419 -19.38326 36.36558 14.64320 9.33617 -1.57215 6.0178 0.08855 0.03566 0.02273 0.00319 0 0.433789 0.084082 -0.835197
412 ABS-CBN Broadcasting Philippines 0.32169 0.00070 0.95890 420.73545 1.0000 31.17547 -50.84488 68.68844 11.26309 20.79633 -1.13417 6.0420 0.16326 0.02677 0.04943 0.00000 0 2.020607 0.190796 0.703398
413 Alliance Global Group Philippines 0.00000 0.00000 0.57890 82.75477 1.0000 47.11093 -0.08046 10.58091 8.45738 0.05990 -12.26796 4.4159 0.12786 0.10220 0.00072 0.00000 0 5.295086 0.125288 1.666779
414 Asian Terminals Inc Philippines 0.43696 0.06850 0.87580 151.18342 1.0000 4.06838 11.40245 21.00039 1.65040 5.44447 -0.82790 5.0185 0.13891 0.01092 0.03601 0.00469 0 0.599528 0.141294 -0.511612
415 Bacnotan Consolidated Industries In Philippines 0.60291 0.00540 0.92170 506.25947 1.0000 -4.67322 16.63408 10.46531 3.87468 28.19285 -0.50598 6.2270 0.02067 0.00765 0.05569 0.00003 0 0.351902 -0.045638 -1.044403
416 Benguet Corp. Philippines 0.78477 0.00160 0.36640 70.83991 0.0000 0.68221 -0.70000 -4.12000 4.25999 0.68000 -0.24236 4.2604 -0.05816 0.06014 0.00960 0.00000 0 33.410907 -0.792079 3.508882
417 Benpres Holdings Corp. Philippines 0.41539 0.00400 0.61410 1,046.81874 0.0000 17.35650 -36.27996 22.07997 271.77967 11.79999 -0.87854 6.9535 0.02109 0.25962 0.01127 0.00002 0 0.009798 -1.139494 -4.625610
418 Cosmos Bottling Corp. Philippines 0.30979 0.00000 0.68210 156.49831 0.0000 19.81159 1.14328 21.89219 8.73661 13.69794 -1.17187 5.0530 0.13989 0.05583 0.08753 0.00000 0 0.890934 0.150925 -0.115485
419 First Philippine Holdings Corp Philippines 0.71451 0.00750 0.88840 1,918.23769 0.0000 49.65906 -93.29989 100.15988 82.75990 2.72000 -0.33616 7.5592 0.05221 0.04314 0.00142 0.00006 0 0.555611 0.055260 -0.587687
420 Fortune Cement Corp. Philippines 0.42398 0.00000 0.98920 195.75552 1.0000 -9.67789 -4.49097 -15.11936 21.36979 7.16633 -0.85806 5.2769 -0.07724 0.10917 0.03661 0.00000 0 0.456220 -0.178158 -0.784781
421 Globe Telecom Inc Philippines 0.57502 0.00015 0.98120 1,269.30873 0.0000 74.05910 -183.14510 90.06377 5.27735 66.86626 -0.55334 7.1462 0.07095 0.00416 0.05268 0.00000 0 1.232391 0.079048 0.208957
422 House Of Investments Inc Philippines 0.79265 0.01120 0.90300 213.59146 1.0000 10.14001 5.40807 11.49663 7.76331 4.75797 -0.23238 5.3641 0.05383 0.03635 0.02228 0.00013 0 0.233266 0.016466 -1.455577
423 International Container Terminal Se Philippines 0.84692 0.03730 0.93710 517.81574 1.0000 29.44865 -17.75632 40.93957 75.61837 43.00201 -0.16615 6.2496 0.07906 0.14603 0.08305 0.00139 0 0.627563 0.009974 -0.465912
424 Keppel Philippines Marine Philippines 0.13627 0.02020 0.65190 64.28494 1.0000 -3.78635 3.04852 2.98874 0.71730 2.17564 -1.99309 4.1633 0.04649 0.01116 0.03384 0.00041 0 0.459775 0.032513 -0.777017
425 Liberty Telecoms Holdings Philippines 0.23153 0.00230 0.56860 51.43602 0.0000 18.50146 2.78698 1.50218 0.08224 2.75768 -1.46304 3.9403 0.02920 0.00160 0.05361 0.00001 0 0.265647 0.005933 -1.325585
426 Metro Pacific Corp. Philippines 0.32007 0.00081 0.97260 1,888.93638 1.0000 -5.42580 5.78609 -10.19375 0.39994 18.19926 -1.13921 7.5438 -0.00540 0.00021 0.00963 0.00000 0 0.134596 0.061886 -2.005479
427 Philippine National Construction Co Philippines 0.58580 0.00000 0.91910 137.55233 1.0000 -23.88878 -31.25970 -2.05840 71.48119 3.30494 -0.53477 4.9240 -0.01496 0.51967 0.02403 0.00000 0 0.583318 -0.272252 -0.539022
428 Picop Resources Inc Philippines 0.32452 0.00003 0.90800 108.85443 0.0000 -1.05531 -0.65880 0.16050 0.51538 6.51641 -1.12541 4.6900 0.00147 0.00473 0.05986 0.00000 0 0.515717 -0.084779 -0.662197
429 Prime Orion Philippines Inc Philippines 0.88184 0.00900 0.84050 230.32011 1.0000 -5.58116 -21.66917 -40.65363 2.78253 4.78875 -0.12575 5.4395 -0.17651 0.01208 0.02079 0.00008 0 0.831682 -0.486208 -0.184305
430 Pryce Corp. Philippines 0.45900 0.00010 0.96460 125.58910 0.0000 16.04004 -5.72645 5.98137 1.48389 2.98124 -0.77870 4.8330 0.04763 0.01182 0.02374 0.00000 0 0.539934 0.013607 -0.616309
431 RFM Corp. Philippines 0.59741 0.00160 0.80220 455.73945 0.0000 -4.27239 -42.79995 -20.03998 29.89996 20.45998 -0.51515 6.1219 -0.04397 0.06561 0.04489 0.00000 0 0.457157 -0.086591 -0.782729
432 Roxas Holdings Income Philippines 0.28843 0.05450 0.83300 126.42091 0.0000 -6.83600 -0.02313 14.04625 3.63185 6.10707 -1.24329 4.8396 0.11111 0.02873 0.04831 0.00297 0 0.385898 0.079854 -0.952182
433 San Miguel Corp. Philippines 0.42634 0.00018 0.59050 3,045.39633 0.0000 11.05196 -50.75994 181.71978 122.75985 58.41993 -0.85251 8.0214 0.05967 0.04031 0.01918 0.00000 0 0.819260 0.103835 -0.199354
434 South East Asia Cement Philippines 0.43341 0.00000 0.96860 217.23974 1.0000 -3.75638 -6.03999 -3.12000 59.55993 9.79999 -0.83607 5.3810 -0.01436 0.27417 0.04511 0.00000 0 0.518872 -0.136541 -0.656099
435 Universal Robina Corp. Philippines 0.22687 0.00150 0.69140 590.77844 0.0000 12.48793 -1.40692 31.32031 23.61469 28.09520 -1.48338 6.3814 0.05302 0.03997 0.04756 0.00000 0 0.265135 0.051707 -1.327515
436 Asia Hotel Public Company Limited Thailand 0.78567 0.01100 0.82930 163.32759 1.0000 36.39351 1.04006 -7.65251 0.92623 5.00179 -0.24122 5.0958 -0.04685 0.00567 0.03062 0.00012 0 0.520336 -0.658628 -0.653281
437 Bangchak Petroleum Public Compa Thailand 0.76116 0.00000 0.97330 667.05116 0.0000 0.07432 -88.71132 -7.21300 27.48269 26.35775 -0.27291 6.5029 -0.01081 0.04120 0.03951 0.00000 0 0.725693 -0.267780 -0.320628
438 Bangkok Expressway Thailand 0.75144 0.00000 0.45420 1,230.10980 1.0000 -1.68865 15.92127 80.38597 1110.98506 32.05807 -0.28576 7.1149 0.06535 0.90316 0.02606 0.00000 0 0.819560 0.013128 -0.198987
439 Bangkok Land Public Company Lim Thailand 0.78101 0.04280 0.90050 1,400.69217 1.0000 -11.22963 25.48504 258.88728 0.08049 5.90647 -0.24717 7.2447 0.18483 0.00006 0.00422 0.00183 0 0.847444 0.856881 -0.165531
440 Bangkok Rubber Company Limited Thailand 0.62330 0.00000 0.40730 193.76835 1.0000 -2.53443 1.39633 8.56781 2.93575 8.64748 -0.47272 5.2667 0.04422 0.01515 0.04463 0.00000 0 0.561875 0.016804 -0.576477
441 BEC World Thailand 0.00012 0.40890 0.24930 192.01423 1.0000 3.19261 30.16201 50.88300 0.02204 34.05894 -8.99418 5.2576 0.26500 0.00011 0.17738 0.16720 1 4.730462 0.209895 1.554023
442 Big C Supercentre Thailand 0.17158 0.03040 0.87480 399.77005 1.0000 25.33930 -12.04084 24.34085 2.36936 16.61509 -1.76273 5.9909 0.06089 0.00593 0.04156 0.00092 0 1.044959 0.094732 0.043978
443 Delta Electronics Thai PCL Thailand 0.04816 0.00000 0.64300 493.27641 1.0000 31.91387 24.72449 96.09394 0.24567 8.57424 -3.03331 6.2011 0.19481 0.00050 0.01738 0.00000 0 0.706269 0.298499 -0.347759
444 Eastern Water Resources DevelopmThailand 0.46588 0.00000 0.76150 134.11747 0.0000 0.87043 -16.90399 12.42793 0.03948 1.69271 -0.76383 4.8987 0.09266 0.00029 0.01262 0.00000 0 0.432720 0.080179 -0.837664
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445 GFPT Company Limited Thailand 0.45377 0.49680 0.15080 94.33050 0.0000 0.30929 -8.20094 6.49213 1.44765 4.72648 -0.79016 4.5468 0.06882 0.01535 0.05011 0.24681 1 0.477861 0.055330 -0.738435
446 GMM Grammy Public FB Thailand 0.00719 0.00000 0.40610 96.74230 1.0000 0.29274 -5.81344 12.46318 0.18947 3.89366 -4.93528 4.5721 0.12883 0.00196 0.04025 0.00000 0 0.455645 0.096042 -0.786042
447 Hemaraj Land & Development Pub Thailand 0.76013 0.01480 0.97560 154.19676 1.0000 -2.25324 -2.13183 -12.63063 0.02446 0.84244 -0.27426 5.0382 -0.08191 0.00016 0.00546 0.00022 0 0.349330 -0.751725 -1.051739
448 International Engineering Public Co Thailand 0.33744 0.00470 0.47460 54.38629 1.0000 -10.77969 2.01122 -1.44585 26.96363 3.75770 -1.08638 3.9961 -0.02658 0.49578 0.06909 0.00002 0 0.266558 -0.122137 -1.322163
449 Italian-Thai Development Public Co Thailand 0.85600 0.40620 0.15230 532.86571 1.0000 -19.17140 56.18728 -65.54719 0.56275 26.72621 -0.15549 6.2783 -0.12301 0.00106 0.05016 0.16500 1 0.601605 -1.899644 -0.508155
450 Jasmine International Public Compa Thailand 0.98494 0.00670 0.73170 456.72990 0.0000 -20.81016 52.73180 18.46497 1.03285 22.82225 -0.01518 6.1241 0.04043 0.00226 0.04997 0.00004 0 0.768970 -2.924464 -0.262703
451 Loxley FB Public Company Limited Thailand 1.28714 0.00000 0.74310 257.81067 1.0000 -9.47463 -13.35285 -32.58409 1.94407 5.60064 0.25242 5.5522 -0.12639 0.00754 0.02172 0.00000 0 0.877721 0.844327 -0.130427
452 Luckytex (Thailand) Public Compan Thailand 0.59555 0.23610 0.59000 122.08795 0.0000 -8.11329 17.29331 12.87776 1.18318 15.56112 -0.51827 4.8047 0.10548 0.00969 0.12746 0.05574 1 0.638667 0.189880 -0.448372
453 Malee Sampran Public Company L Thailand 0.60699 0.00000 0.99000 54.08827 0.0000 -2.83777 0.58518 -5.53833 0.04276 2.99306 -0.49925 3.9906 -0.10239 0.00079 0.05534 0.00000 0 0.564301 -0.914165 -0.572168
454 Matichon Thailand 0.02847 0.24350 0.66640 39.63243 1.0000 11.07495 -0.37190 5.58494 2.51053 1.75396 -3.55894 3.6796 0.14092 0.06335 0.04426 0.05929 1 0.260460 0.104691 -1.345305
455 MBK Thailand 0.19187 0.05080 0.35350 258.97366 0.0000 -5.79475 -4.08397 12.58795 0.26777 9.06557 -1.65094 5.5567 0.04861 0.00103 0.03501 0.00258 0 0.472618 0.053148 -0.749469
456 Modernform Group Company Limit Thailand 0.15815 0.09890 0.31090 58.82004 1.0000 -3.70788 1.37360 3.98026 0.13656 3.16185 -1.84422 4.0745 0.06767 0.00232 0.05375 0.00978 0 0.309481 0.061341 -1.172859
457 Nation Multimedia Thailand 0.59219 0.20160 0.38590 120.00243 1.0000 7.25425 -9.23337 4.94891 0.55136 2.04251 -0.52392 4.7875 0.04124 0.00459 0.01702 0.04064 1 0.741976 0.006067 -0.298439
458 Padaeng Industry Thailand 0.43571 0.00000 0.38830 118.03931 0.0000 4.78962 -0.36072 8.78289 0.39159 8.41240 -0.83077 4.7710 0.07441 0.00332 0.07127 0.00000 0 0.780321 0.057969 -0.248050
459 President Rice Thailand 0.46248 0.11820 0.49770 58.76812 0.0000 8.61554 1.15113 8.97685 0.22674 1.99820 -0.77115 4.0736 0.15275 0.00386 0.03400 0.01397 0 0.303707 0.222688 -1.191692
460 PTT Exploration And Production Pu Thailand 0.55536 0.00000 0.82240 1,469.42750 0.0000 20.81041 216.45075 263.11669 2.38174 67.79064 -0.58814 7.2926 0.17906 0.00162 0.04613 0.00000 0 1.254356 0.260356 0.226623
461 Regional Containers Thailand 0.70658 0.00860 0.70330 470.83952 1.0000 -1.12836 12.18623 11.31313 0.35065 16.26769 -0.34733 6.1545 0.02403 0.00074 0.03455 0.00007 0 0.632573 -0.085811 -0.457960
462 Samart Corporation Thailand 1.22386 0.08770 0.67850 259.01561 1.0000 -9.78599 -3.35537 60.33324 6.63174 20.55271 0.20201 5.5569 0.23293 0.02560 0.07935 0.00769 0 0.923889 -0.967103 -0.079163
463 Serm SUK Thailand 0.04192 0.00030 0.74650 171.61950 0.0000 7.03500 16.92929 16.27680 0.93232 14.20543 -3.17201 5.1453 0.09484 0.00543 0.08277 0.00000 0 0.443378 0.113927 -0.813334
464 Shin Corp. Thailand 0.35832 0.13710 0.46720 873.19210 1.0000 48.16185 -0.21208 82.86301 126.72882 36.58365 -1.02632 6.7722 0.09490 0.14513 0.04190 0.01880 0 1.469576 0.132586 0.384974
465 Shin Satellite Thailand 0.56345 0.00000 0.62600 272.75223 0.0000 6.17003 24.94235 27.70860 160.23502 22.54494 -0.57367 5.6086 0.10159 0.58747 0.08266 0.00000 0 1.528239 0.168723 0.424116
466 Siam Cement Thailand 0.76799 0.00110 0.49560 5,542.25056 1.0000 -4.69530 122.24519 354.28744 56.70812 275.44932 -0.26398 8.6202 0.06392 0.01023 0.04970 0.00000 0 0.864871 0.024255 -0.145174
467 Surapon Foods Public Company LimThailand 0.52512 0.59770 0.05330 67.99891 0.0000 26.75529 -2.00419 11.90135 0.23981 2.41464 -0.64412 4.2195 0.17502 0.00353 0.03551 0.35725 1 0.459734 0.231968 -0.777107
468 Tanayong Company Thailand 0.99920 0.05530 0.87260 1,928.23128 1.0000 15.85827 -47.83538 -24.19875 2.48268 5.40510 -0.00080 7.5644 -0.01255 0.00129 0.00280 0.00306 0 1.153011 1.693863 0.142376
469 Thai Carbon Black Thailand 0.30394 0.00030 0.73690 101.37720 0.0000 2.89102 5.59343 12.15873 0.20445 4.51482 -1.19093 4.6188 0.11994 0.00202 0.04453 0.00000 0 0.565985 0.117582 -0.569187
470 Thai Central Chemical Thailand 0.92711 0.00000 0.98420 196.86708 0.0000 -4.96637 23.06822 4.13324 2.03089 6.63900 -0.07569 5.2825 0.02100 0.01032 0.03372 0.00000 0 0.665226 -0.933384 -0.407628
471 Thai Plastic Chemical Thailand 0.63086 0.03790 0.85370 409.22516 0.0000 7.80982 3.05210 -4.60811 5.74458 36.69661 -0.46066 6.0143 -0.01126 0.01404 0.08967 0.00144 0 0.709668 -0.192017 -0.342957
472 Thai President Foods Thailand 0.00709 0.00000 0.38470 79.69054 0.0000 22.88867 7.37551 17.88526 0.26418 3.07289 -4.94897 4.3782 0.22443 0.00332 0.03856 0.00000 0 0.628482 0.261498 -0.464449
473 Thai Rubber Latex Thailand 0.50904 0.00000 0.54160 33.23446 0.0000 13.80523 -1.53089 3.80362 0.00168 1.98716 -0.67524 3.5036 0.11445 0.00005 0.05979 0.00000 0 0.440526 0.161783 -0.819787
474 Thai Textile Thailand 0.46831 0.00000 0.68900 70.18462 0.0000 17.92650 -9.60470 5.47664 0.28926 4.17201 -0.75863 4.2511 0.07803 0.00412 0.05944 0.00000 0 0.572334 0.091257 -0.558032
475 Thai Toray Textile Thailand 0.36823 0.00000 0.52070 31.69998 0.0000 -13.85075 4.45212 3.53743 0.51353 4.90415 -0.99904 3.4563 0.11159 0.01620 0.15471 0.00000 0 0.324974 0.149845 -1.124009
476 Thai Wah Foods Thailand 0.11255 0.14710 0.66250 18.07873 0.0000 3.48706 1.08412 1.32759 0.26888 0.87208 -2.18432 2.8947 0.07343 0.01487 0.04824 0.02164 0 0.088101 0.063340 -2.429277
477 The Aromatics Thailand Public Com Thailand 0.84589 0.00120 0.79520 729.21451 0.0000 0.39329 -13.77774 -61.04274 1.01072 35.86701 -0.16736 6.5920 -0.08371 0.00139 0.04919 0.00000 0 0.833815 -1.149587 -0.181744
478 Tropical Canning Thailand 0.10817 0.00000 0.44960 43.11689 0.0000 12.14284 -1.56632 3.44910 0.03183 0.96399 -2.22401 3.7639 0.07999 0.00074 0.02236 0.00000 0 0.110536 0.081498 -2.202413
479 True Corporation PLC Thailand 0.88976 0.00890 0.98160 2,025.63249 0.0000 -11.07507 35.36189 24.27384 11.82572 177.68544 -0.11680 7.6136 0.01198 0.00584 0.08772 0.00008 0 1.106268 -4.706679 0.100992
480 United Communications Thailand 0.65625 0.00000 0.83730 469.63616 0.0000 -71.68594 4.74905 94.13423 3.39753 12.51145 -0.42121 6.1520 0.20044 0.00723 0.02664 0.00000 0 1.248317 0.088303 0.221796
481 Univentures Public Company Limite Thailand 0.01778 0.11330 0.34830 11.66574 0.0000 0.45994 -0.17872 0.33509 0.29707 0.15989 -4.02965 2.4567 0.02872 0.02547 0.01371 0.01284 0 0.370830 0.028652 -0.992013
482 Cafe De Coral Holdings Limited Hong Kong 0.23011 0.03351 0.42244 211.18223 1.0000 -9.02844 19.29918 37.88854 8.05163 21.71435 -1.46919 5.3527 0.17941 0.03813 0.10282 0.00112 0 0.771216 0.200737 -0.259787
483 Cathay Pacific Airways Limited Hong Kong 0.66805 0.00001 0.71212 8,898.56846 1.0000 -18.49886 276.15716 981.16564 52.69294 944.80238 -0.40339 9.0936 0.11026 0.00592 0.10617 0.00000 0 0.908281 0.159782 -0.096202
484 Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holding Hong Kong 0.44196 0.14824 0.84828 4,686.85119 1.0000 32.13692 30.89781 143.71968 0.76924 7.69487 -0.81654 8.4525 0.03066 0.00016 0.00164 0.02197 0 1.028246 0.135278 0.027855
485 China Aerospace International HoldHong Kong 0.63268 0.00000 0.41860 571.57238 1.0000 -22.46239 -29.84228 -111.30736 8.85011 7.28461 -0.45779 6.3484 -0.19474 0.01548 0.01274 0.00000 0 0.475172 -0.519027 -0.744079
486 China Chengtong Development Gr Hong Kong 0.27754 0.00591 0.35783 243.34265 1.0000 16.45465 -0.34971 12.91505 60.10391 0.10568 -1.28181 5.4945 0.05307 0.24699 0.00043 0.00003 0 0.138259 0.047883 -1.978626
487 Chinney Investments Limited Hong Kong 0.41509 0.35672 0.55955 255.43088 1.0000 -53.70336 -21.91075 1.07609 1.06723 4.54440 -0.87926 5.5430 0.00421 0.00418 0.01779 0.12725 1 0.267769 0.007894 -1.317629
488 Dairy Farm International Holdings Hong Kong 1.41261 0.00164 0.75733 2,357.13766 0.0000 -12.01277 -76.33843 -158.87186 72.39809 123.35570 0.34544 7.7652 -0.06740 0.03071 0.05233 0.00000 0 0.670191 -0.334679 -0.400192
489 Eganagoldpfeil Limited Hong Kong 0.69162 0.01087 0.79925 361.34242 0.0000 4.96612 59.29353 25.38736 47.02608 14.28603 -0.36872 5.8898 0.07026 0.13014 0.03954 0.00012 0 0.750244 0.087982 -0.287357
490 Esprit Holdings Limited Hong Kong 0.23979 0.28388 0.58814 458.69583 0.0000 14.86704 48.40159 116.64852 95.24668 77.00274 -1.42801 6.1284 0.25430 0.20765 0.16787 0.08059 1 2.647165 0.266798 0.973489
491 Gold Peak Industries Holdings Limi Hong Kong 1.39476 0.35252 0.33115 424.92081 1.0000 9.40816 -4.51397 37.95904 9.40063 6.84520 0.33272 6.0519 0.08933 0.02212 0.01611 0.12427 1 0.534229 0.133520 -0.626931
492 Golden Resources Development Int Hong Kong 0.35182 0.10457 0.51217 146.66761 0.0000 3.18679 9.87543 11.94247 22.82207 1.35765 -1.04463 4.9882 0.08143 0.15560 0.00926 0.01093 0 0.068351 0.118561 -2.683094
493 Hanny Holdings Limited Hong Kong 0.47230 0.13953 0.21608 494.87755 1.0000 98.65553 -17.17036 47.25115 22.90735 1.58224 -0.75014 6.2043 0.09548 0.04629 0.00320 0.01947 0 0.838836 0.112287 -0.175740
494 Hongkong Catering Management L Hong Kong 0.37146 0.01462 0.72096 95.27428 0.0000 1.03362 -3.43287 7.55988 9.93566 2.69974 -0.99032 4.5568 0.07935 0.10428 0.02834 0.00021 0 0.401677 0.112275 -0.912106
495 I-Cable Communications Limited Hong Kong 1.40100 0.00053 0.79482 529.06802 1.0000 -15.15891 22.20552 11.81642 29.81113 47.00568 0.33719 6.2711 0.02233 0.05635 0.08885 0.00000 0 1.847563 0.015624 0.613868
496 IDT International Limited Hong Kong 0.26044 0.08509 0.53297 234.82958 1.0000 51.51641 -13.75458 62.44142 0.02569 13.94890 -1.34539 5.4589 0.26590 0.00011 0.05940 0.00724 0 0.672581 0.390303 -0.396633
497 Jardine Matheson Holdings Limited Hong Kong 0.93930 0.08893 0.23113 80,641.09830 1.0000 4.73409 258.74818 877.69206 393.88485 479.21637 -0.06262 11.2978 0.01088 0.00488 0.00594 0.00791 0 0.351029 0.279461 -1.046887
498 Jardine Strategic Holdings Limited Hong Kong 0.51371 0.00022 0.74035 7,760.89475 1.0000 12.25756 -117.70506 367.90325 122.79675 450.20327 -0.66609 8.9569 0.04740 0.01582 0.05801 0.00000 0 0.666464 0.134927 -0.405769
499 Kwoon Chung Bus Holdings Limited Hong Kong 0.23271 0.01591 0.59656 191.23154 1.0000 28.80418 -4.39081 8.04778 2.05009 26.34065 -1.45796 5.2535 0.04208 0.01072 0.13774 0.00025 0 0.421612 0.065245 -0.863671
500 Lai Sun Garments International Lim Hong Kong 0.23803 0.08670 0.42019 502.80321 1.0000 -84.91739 5.82851 -237.61539 16.46093 0.23153 -1.43536 6.2202 -0.47258 0.03274 0.00046 0.00752 0 0.100814 -0.323821 -2.294477
501 Lam Soon (Hong Kong) Limited Hong Kong 0.82677 0.08420 0.91433 336.19340 0.0000 -2.43649 15.05826 -6.40110 4.97557 8.51622 -0.19023 5.8177 -0.01904 0.01480 0.02533 0.00709 0 0.254926 -0.083774 -1.366780
502 Lenovo Group Limited Hong Kong 0.26587 0.00735 0.57669 1,037.73778 1.0000 48.93236 28.11302 67.60112 242.45175 215.31090 -1.32473 6.9448 0.06514 0.23363 0.20748 0.00005 0 11.040469 0.095411 2.401568
503 Mandarin Oriental International LimHong Kong 0.44653 0.00076 0.66788 1,502.96025 1.0000 22.91514 -18.38517 45.96293 24.49935 37.61698 -0.80626 7.3152 0.03058 0.01630 0.02503 0.00000 0 0.606252 0.018421 -0.500460
504 Ming Pao Enterprise Corp. Limited Hong Kong 0.20571 0.00538 0.64795 201.47980 1.0000 3.87417 12.15900 13.15649 82.83570 4.00180 -1.58130 5.3057 0.06530 0.41114 0.01986 0.00003 0 0.834863 0.071199 -0.180487
505 Nam Hing Holdings Limited Hong Kong 0.31824 0.18375 0.42340 45.56965 1.0000 -3.02225 2.38310 1.90612 0.27689 2.25128 -1.14495 3.8192 0.04183 0.00608 0.04940 0.03376 0 0.571892 0.013743 -0.558805
506 QPL International Holdings Limited Hong Kong 0.91130 0.60770 0.39889 183.07911 1.0000 -49.48155 -3.85159 158.42891 0.64193 5.62569 -0.09288 5.2099 0.86536 0.00351 0.03073 0.36930 1 4.122809 1.939130 1.416535
507 Sasa International Holdings Limited Hong Kong 0.20072 0.27855 0.67839 157.76746 1.0000 2.12750 24.64561 10.17171 0.43794 9.96310 -1.60587 5.0611 0.06447 0.00278 0.06315 0.07759 1 1.132826 0.068821 0.124715
508 Stelux Holdings International Limite Hong Kong 1.01518 0.12100 0.58907 236.17922 1.0000 -1.93636 5.37084 18.44886 3.80222 8.27784 0.01507 5.4646 0.07811 0.01610 0.03505 0.01464 0 0.616819 0.128752 -0.483180
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509 Stone Group Holdings Limited Hong Kong 0.27303 0.06857 0.38684 156.78150 1.0000 -16.52194 1.35938 -32.98796 1.05386 1.93288 -1.29817 5.0549 -0.21041 0.00672 0.01233 0.00470 0 0.803371 -0.268393 -0.218939
510 Texwinca Holdings Limited Hong Kong 0.28422 0.05243 0.69455 261.24595 0.0000 8.23320 28.76865 41.20993 5.88326 37.57028 -1.25802 5.5655 0.15774 0.02252 0.14381 0.00275 0 0.564543 0.230148 -0.571739
511 Tysan Holdings Limited Hong Kong 0.53915 0.21256 0.50725 228.56039 1.0000 -0.71393 6.63546 10.42112 1.36159 5.17875 -0.61775 5.4318 0.04559 0.00596 0.02266 0.04518 1 0.267895 0.019250 -1.317159
512 Van Shung Chong Holdings Limited Hong Kong 0.58229 0.00593 0.59316 156.56833 1.0000 52.91015 -1.58338 16.29654 0.48314 2.64530 -0.54079 5.0535 0.10409 0.00309 0.01690 0.00004 0 1.306197 0.158076 0.267120
513 Yangtzekiang Garment Limited Hong Kong 0.34865 0.12558 0.14001 90.57114 0.0000 -2.10998 12.61170 6.35151 0.27805 3.56785 -1.05369 4.5061 0.07013 0.00307 0.03939 0.01577 0 0.491111 0.158569 -0.711085
514 Amtran Technology Company Taiwan 0.20331 0.06623 0.22785 168.81846 1.0000 68.14064 -38.84251 16.20159 0.06433 2.08053 -1.59301 5.1288 0.09597 0.00038 0.01232 0.00439 1 0.366906 0.123607 -1.002650
515 Associated Industries China Taiwan 0.38444 0.23306 0.74940 86.15955 1.0000 -3.58491 2.49066 -10.65362 0.58476 1.73430 -0.95598 4.4562 -0.12365 0.00679 0.02013 0.05432 1 0.082265 -0.237188 -2.497815
516 Audix Corp. Taiwan 0.32753 0.27273 0.47495 67.47573 1.0000 33.36448 2.60924 11.98078 1.50224 1.65709 -1.11619 4.2118 0.17756 0.02226 0.02456 0.07438 1 1.007470 0.219994 0.007442
517 Cathay Real Estate Development CTaiwan 0.25535 0.18956 0.80432 706.07333 1.0000 -10.31760 99.95324 34.69787 0.05743 1.06306 -1.36512 6.5597 0.04914 0.00008 0.00151 0.03593 1 0.496903 0.042791 -0.699360
518 Chien Tai Cement Company LimitedTaiwan 1.01177 0.00000 0.86544 545.10240 1.0000 -18.80129 -19.54855 -61.90563 0.00145 20.38523 0.01170 6.3010 -0.11357 0.00000 0.03740 0.00000 1 0.514721 -0.340395 -0.664131
519 Chin-Poon Industrial Taiwan 0.20135 0.14280 0.22053 228.21369 1.0000 7.02301 10.86452 18.07170 3.46333 9.36670 -1.60269 5.4303 0.07919 0.01518 0.04104 0.02039 1 0.375770 0.089807 -0.978778
520 Gigamedia Limited Taiwan 0.20004 0.00802 0.60416 9,710.39800 1.0000 238.44257 -972.89600 -35.92458 948.00400 18.09099 -1.60922 9.1810 -0.00370 0.09763 0.00186 0.00006 1 0.774803 -0.128921 -0.255147
521 Goldsun Development & Constructi Taiwan 0.62478 0.09002 0.04677 711.23698 0.0000 6.38803 -26.36718 13.96261 4.12354 8.34272 -0.47035 6.5670 0.01963 0.00580 0.01173 0.00810 0 0.362645 0.000388 -1.014332
522 Helix Technology Inc Taiwan 0.56247 0.21135 0.41704 110.12261 1.0000 141.13763 -31.60767 5.82779 0.47485 2.19533 -0.57542 4.7016 0.05292 0.00431 0.01994 0.04467 1 0.398930 0.063749 -0.918969
523 Lucky Cement Corp. Taiwan 0.95628 0.05639 0.32023 291.75268 1.0000 -4.05059 -5.67182 -10.71229 0.27142 13.35929 -0.04471 5.6759 -0.03672 0.00093 0.04579 0.00318 1 0.514101 -0.100645 -0.665335
524 Macronix International Company L Taiwan 0.46931 0.50573 0.02970 2,141.84636 1.0000 42.50055 126.19280 361.73216 23.62919 182.82450 -0.75648 7.6694 0.16889 0.01103 0.08536 0.25576 0 1.447908 0.238098 0.370120
525 Nantex Industry Taiwan 0.11358 0.13647 0.31657 90.78941 1.0000 11.28330 3.08434 4.95544 0.06756 3.75923 -2.17525 4.5085 0.05458 0.00074 0.04141 0.01863 1 0.362071 0.059696 -1.015915
526 Promos Technologies Inc Taiwan 0.30978 0.00000 0.00320 1,711.76978 1.0000 8.02823 405.31323 267.58075 191.68455 198.08416 -1.17188 7.4453 0.15632 0.11198 0.11572 0.00000 0 1.386545 0.162426 0.326815
527 Sanyo Electric (Taiwan) Company LTaiwan 0.30741 0.31660 0.54467 180.53555 1.0000 2.60186 10.58134 9.33550 0.43377 4.31023 -1.17958 5.1959 0.05171 0.00240 0.02387 0.10023 1 0.127469 0.055329 -2.059883
528 Taiwan Semiconductor ManufacturiTaiwan 0.22604 0.30821 0.61618 11,010.70104 1.0000 131.78950 -271.32581 2019.37616 348.55814 1252.82635 -1.48705 9.3066 0.18340 0.03166 0.11378 0.09499 1 2.604390 0.261728 0.957198
529 Tecom Company Limited Taiwan 0.66903 0.52081 0.31164 234.49819 1.0000 28.27377 -2.26540 13.33695 1.35666 2.78266 -0.40193 5.4574 0.05687 0.00579 0.01187 0.27125 1 0.939745 0.086895 -0.062146
530 Usi Corp. Taiwan 0.05515 0.84101 0.02966 593.97472 1.0000 8.98931 -10.36978 7.80959 0.50245 6.31815 -2.89764 6.3868 0.01315 0.00085 0.01064 0.70730 0 0.586090 -0.008465 -0.534282
531 Vanguard International Semicondu Taiwan 0.60738 0.17985 0.54504 1,139.56563 1.0000 8.50357 62.40747 99.96736 46.40013 191.15000 -0.49861 7.0384 0.08772 0.04072 0.16774 0.03235 1 0.946386 0.116719 -0.055105
532 Yieh Phui Enterprise Taiwan 0.84303 0.06255 0.20795 630.26049 1.0000 21.33671 -13.99822 42.02814 0.28006 17.64053 -0.17075 6.4461 0.06668 0.00044 0.02799 0.00391 1 0.440012 0.068859 -0.820953
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Model I 
 
 
Variables introducidas/eliminadas b
NDTS, EBO,
FCF, INTA,
Industry,
GrowthTA,
SIZE, PROF
a
. Introducir
Modelo
1
Variables
introducidas
Variables
eliminadas Método
Todas las variables solicitadas introducidasa. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
 
Resumen del modelo b
,427a ,182 ,170 1,132966415 2,034
Modelo
1
R R cuadrado
R cuadrado
corregida
Error típ. de la
estimación
Durbin-
Watson
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, EBO, FCF, INTA, Industry,
GrowthTA, SIZE, PROF
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
 
ANOVAb
149,486 8 18,686 14,557 ,000a
671,330 523 1,284
820,815 531
Regresión
Residual
Total
Modelo
1
Suma de
cuadrados gl
Media
cuadrática F Sig.
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, EBO, FCF, INTA, Industry, GrowthTA,
SIZE, PROF
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
Estadísticos sobre los residuos a
-3,17985821 1,48043847 -1,0990958 ,530582029 532
-10,7462330 2,9356771 ,000000000 1,124399439 532
-3,922 4,862 ,000 1,000 532
-9,485 2,591 ,000 ,992 532
Valor pronosticado
Residuo bruto
Valor pronosticado tip.
Residuo tip.
Mínimo Máximo Media
Desviación
típ. N
Variable dependiente: LnDEa. 
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Model II 
 
Variables introducidas/eliminadas b
NDTS,
MSO2,
GrowthTA,
SIZE, INTA,
Industry,
FCF, PROF,
MSO
a
. Introducir
Modelo
1
Variables
introducidas
Variables
eliminadas Método
Todas las variables solicitadas introducidasa. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
Resumen del modelo b
,411a ,169 ,155 1,143051431 2,039
Modelo
1
R R cuadrado
R cuadrado
corregida
Error típ. de la
estimación
Durbin-
Watson
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, MSO2, GrowthTA, SIZE, INTA,
Industry, FCF, PROF, MSO
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
ANOVAb
138,787 9 15,421 11,803 ,000a
682,028 522 1,307
820,815 531
Regresión
Residual
Total
Modelo
1
Suma de
cuadrados gl
Media
cuadrática F Sig.
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, MSO2, GrowthTA, SIZE, INTA, Industry,
FCF, PROF, MSO
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
Estadísticos sobre los residuos a
-3,34942389 1,66555703 -1,0990958 ,511243591 532
-10,636331 3,2097595 ,000000000 1,133323157 532
-4,402 5,408 ,000 1,000 532
-9,305 2,808 ,000 ,991 532
Valor pronosticado
Residuo bruto
Valor pronosticado tip.
Residuo tip.
Mínimo Máximo Media
Desviación
típ. N
Variable dependiente: LnDEa. 
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Model III 
 
Variables introducidas/eliminadas b
NDTS, EBO,
FCF, INTA,
Industry,
GrowthTA,
SIZE, PROF,
DEBO,
MSO2, MSO
a
. Introducir
Modelo
1
Variables
introducidas
Variables
eliminadas Método
Todas las variables solicitadas introducidasa. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
Resumen del modelo b
,436a ,190 ,173 1,130574703 2,025
Modelo
1
R R cuadrado
R cuadrado
corregida
Error típ. de la
estimación
Durbin-
Watson
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, EBO, FCF, INTA, Industry,
GrowthTA, SIZE, PROF, DEBO, MSO2, MSO
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
ANOVAb
156,152 11 14,196 11,106 ,000a
664,664 520 1,278
820,815 531
Regresión
Residual
Total
Modelo
1
Suma de
cuadrados gl
Media
cuadrática F Sig.
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, EBO, FCF, INTA, Industry, GrowthTA,
SIZE, PROF, DEBO, MSO2, MSO
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
 
Estadísticos sobre los residuos a
-3,1162367 1,56622112 -1,0990958 ,542283072 532
-10,637478 3,01242304 ,000000000 1,118803136 532
-3,720 4,915 ,000 1,000 532
-9,409 2,665 ,000 ,990 532
Valor pronosticado
Residuo bruto
Valor pronosticado tip.
Residuo tip.
Mínimo Máximo Media
Desviación
típ. N
Variable dependiente: LnDEa. 
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Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Model A:  
Omitted GROWTH from the Joint Model 
 
Variables introducidas/eliminadas b
NDTS, EBO,
FCF, INTA,
Industry,
SIZE, PROF,
DEBO,
MSO2, MSO
a
. Introducir
Modelo
1
Variables
introducidas
Variables
eliminadas Método
Todas las variables solicitadas introducidasa. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
Resumen del modelo b
,427a ,182 ,167 1,134954714 2,040
Modelo
1
R R cuadrado
R cuadrado
corregida
Error típ. de la
estimación
Durbin-
Watson
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, EBO, FCF, INTA, Industry, SIZE,
PROF, DEBO, MSO2, MSO
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
ANOVA b
149,704 10 14,970 11,622 ,000a
671,112 521 1,288
820,815 531
Regresión
Residual
Total
Modelo
1
Suma de
cuadrados gl
Media
cuadrática F Sig.
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, EBO, FCF, INTA, Industry, SIZE, PROF,
DEBO, MSO2, MSO
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
 
Estadísticos sobre los residuos a
-3,2521577 1,53373051 -1,09909585 ,530968554 532
-10,679166 3,1592777 ,000000000 1,124216964 532
-4,055 4,959 ,000 1,000 532
-9,409 2,784 ,000 ,991 532
Valor pronosticado
Residuo bruto
Valor pronosticado tip.
Residuo tip.
Mínimo Máximo Media
Desviación
típ. N
Variable dependiente: LnDEa. 
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Model B:  
Omitted GROWTH and PROF from the Joint Model 
 
 
Variables introducidas/eliminadas b
NDTS, EBO,
FCF, INTA,
Industry,
SIZE, DEBO,
MSO2, MSO
a
. Introducir
Modelo
1
Variables
introducidas
Variables
eliminadas Método
Todas las variables solicitadas introducidasa. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
Resumen del modelo b
,357a ,128 ,113 1,171260881 1,995
Modelo
1
R R cuadrado
R cuadrado
corregida
Error típ. de la
estimación
Durbin-
Watson
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, EBO, FCF, INTA, Industry, SIZE,
DEBO, MSO2, MSO
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
 
ANOVAb
104,708 9 11,634 8,481 ,000a
716,107 522 1,372
820,815 531
Regresión
Residual
Total
Modelo
1
Suma de
cuadrados gl
Media
cuadrática F Sig.
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, EBO, FCF, INTA, Industry, SIZE, DEBO,
MSO2, MSO
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
 
Estadísticos sobre los residuos a
-2,472396 ,17369798 -1,099096 ,444062007 532
-10,93990 2,6013658 ,00000000 1,161292522 532
-3,093 2,866 ,000 1,000 532
-9,340 2,221 ,000 ,991 532
Valor pronosticado
Residuo bruto
Valor pronosticado tip.
Residuo tip.
Mínimo Máximo Media
Desviación
típ. N
Variable dependiente: LnDEa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A5 - 3 
Appendix 5 
 
 
 
 
1,00,80,60,40,20,0
Prob acum observada
1,0
0,8
0,6
0,4
0,2
0,0
Pr
ob
 a
cu
m
 e
sp
er
ad
a
Gráfico P-P normal de regresión Residuo tipificado
Variable dependiente: LnDE
 
 
 
 
A5 - 4 
Appendix 5 
 
 
 
Model C:  
Omitted SIZE, GROWTH, and PROF from the Joint Model 
 
 
Variables introducidas/eliminadas b
NDTS, EBO,
FCF, INTA,
Industry,
DEBO,
MSO2, MSO
a
. Introducir
Modelo
1
Variables
introducidas
Variables
eliminadas Método
Todas las variables solicitadas introducidasa. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
 
Resumen del modelo b
,220a ,049 ,034 1,221978700 1,961
Modelo
1
R R cuadrado
R cuadrado
corregida
Error típ. de la
estimación
Durbin-
Watson
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, EBO, FCF, INTA, Industry, DEBO,
MSO2, MSO
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
ANOVAb
39,855 8 4,982 3,336 ,001a
780,960 523 1,493
820,815 531
Regresión
Residual
Total
Modelo
1
Suma de
cuadrados gl
Media
cuadrática F Sig.
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, EBO, FCF, INTA, Industry, DEBO, MSO2,
MSO
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
Estadísticos sobre los residuos a
-1,965755 -,44774023 -1,099096 ,273964132 532
-11,25679 2,6263144 ,00000000 1,212738653 532
-3,163 2,378 ,000 1,000 532
-9,212 2,149 ,000 ,992 532
Valor pronosticado
Residuo bruto
Valor pronosticado tip.
Residuo tip.
Mínimo Máximo Media
Desviación
típ. N
Variable dependiente: LnDEa. 
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Model IV – A  
(Capital Structure & Firm Performance):  
Leverage as Endogenous Variable 
 
Variables introducidas/eliminadas b
NDTS, EBO,
ROE, FCF,
INTA,
Industry,
GrowthTA,
SIZE, PROF,
LnTobinQ,
DEBO,
MSO2, MSO
a
. Introducir
Modelo
1
Variables
introducidas
Variables
eliminadas Método
Todas las variables solicitadas introducidasa. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
Resumen del modelo b
,442a ,195 ,175 1,129108171 2,034
Modelo
1
R R cuadrado
R cuadrado
corregida
Error típ. de la
estimación
Durbin-
Watson
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, EBO, ROE, FCF, INTA, Industry,
GrowthTA, SIZE, PROF, LnTobinQ, DEBO, MSO2, MSO
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
ANOVAb
160,425 13 12,340 9,680 ,000a
660,391 518 1,275
820,815 531
Regresión
Residual
Total
Modelo
1
Suma de
cuadrados gl
Media
cuadrática F Sig.
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, EBO, ROE, FCF, INTA, Industry,
GrowthTA, SIZE, PROF, LnTobinQ, DEBO, MSO2, MSO
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnDEb. 
 
 
Estadísticos sobre los residuos a
-3,239111 1,69362009 -1,09909585 ,549652621 532
-10,87212 2,8541722 ,000000000 1,115201050 532
-3,893 5,081 ,000 1,000 532
-9,629 2,528 ,000 ,988 532
Valor pronosticado
Residuo bruto
Valor pronosticado tip.
Residuo tip.
Mínimo Máximo Media
Desviación
típ. N
Variable dependiente: LnDEa. 
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Model IV – B:  
(Capital Structure & Firm Performance):  
Performance as Endogenous Variable 
 
Variables introducidas/eliminadas b
NDTS, EBO,
FCF, INTA,
Industry,
GrowthTA,
SIZE, PROF,
DEBO, LnDE,
MSO2, MSO
a
. Introducir
Modelo
1
Variables
introducidas
Variables
eliminadas Método
Todas las variables solicitadas introducidasa. 
Variable dependiente: LnTobinQb. 
 
 
Resumen del modelo b
,322a ,104 ,083 ,968259002 2,081
Modelo
1
R R cuadrado
R cuadrado
corregida
Error típ. de la
estimación
Durbin-
Watson
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, EBO, FCF, INTA, Industry,
GrowthTA, SIZE, PROF, DEBO, LnDE, MSO2, MSO
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnTobinQb. 
 
ANOVAb
56,288 12 4,691 5,003 ,000a
486,576 519 ,938
542,864 531
Regresión
Residual
Total
Modelo
1
Suma de
cuadrados gl
Media
cuadrática F Sig.
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, EBO, FCF, INTA, Industry, GrowthTA,
SIZE, PROF, DEBO, LnDE, MSO2, MSO
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnTobinQb. 
 
Estadísticos sobre los residuos a
-1,577499 ,70707107 -,77403727 ,325583144 532
-4,656199 4,4248023 ,000000000 ,957255702 532
-2,468 4,549 ,000 1,000 532
-4,809 4,570 ,000 ,989 532
Valor pronosticado
Residuo bruto
Valor pronosticado tip.
Residuo tip.
Mínimo Máximo Media
Desviación
típ. N
Variable dependiente: LnTobinQa. 
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Model V - A:  
(Ownership Concentration & Firm Performance):  
Performance as Endogenous Variable 
 
 
Variables introducidas/eliminadas b
NDTS, EBO,
FCF, INTA,
Industry,
GrowthTA,
SIZE, PROF,
DEBO, LnDE
a
. Introducir
Modelo
1
Variables
introducidas
Variables
eliminadas Método
Todas las variables solicitadas introducidasa. 
Variable dependiente: LnTobinQb. 
 
Resumen del modelo b
,303a ,092 ,074 ,972929328 2,074
Modelo
1
R R cuadrado
R cuadrado
corregida
Error típ. de la
estimación
Durbin-
Watson
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, EBO, FCF, INTA, Industry,
GrowthTA, SIZE, PROF, DEBO, LnDE
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnTobinQb. 
 
ANOVAb
49,688 10 4,969 5,249 ,000a
493,174 521 ,947
542,862 531
Regresión
Residual
Total
Modelo
1
Suma de
cuadrados gl
Media
cuadrática F Sig.
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, EBO, FCF, INTA, Industry, GrowthTA,
SIZE, PROF, DEBO, LnDE
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnTobinQb. 
 
 
Estadísticos sobre los residuos a
-1,56580198 ,69878083 -,77403677 ,305898082 532
-4,63358736 4,494354725 ,000000000 ,963724491 532
-2,588 4,815 ,000 1,000 532
-4,763 4,619 ,000 ,991 532
Valor pronosticado
Residuo bruto
Valor pronosticado tip.
Residuo tip.
Mínimo Máximo Media
Desviación
típ. N
Variable dependiente: LnTobinQa. 
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Model V - B:  
(Ownership Concentration & Firm Performance):  
External Block Holder as Endogenous Variable 
 
 
Variables introducidas/eliminadas b
NNDTS,
NSIZE,
NGrowthTA,
NINTA,
NIndustry,
NFCF,
NPROF,
NLnTobinQ,
NLnDE
a
. Introducir
Modelo
1
Variables
introducidas
Variables
eliminadas Método
Todas las variables solicitadas introducidasa. 
Variable dependiente: NEBOb. 
 
 
Resumen del modelo b
,253a ,064 ,048 ,22732 2,041
Modelo
1
R R cuadrado
R cuadrado
corregida
Error típ. de la
estimación
Durbin-
Watson
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NNDTS, NSIZE, NGrowthTA, NINTA,
NIndustry, NFCF, NPROF, NLnTobinQ, NLnDE
a. 
Variable dependiente: NEBOb. 
 
ANOVA b
1,834 9 ,204 3,944 ,000a
26,922 521 ,052
28,756 530
Regresión
Residual
Total
Modelo
1
Suma de
cuadrados gl
Media
cuadrática F Sig.
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NNDTS, NSIZE, NGrowthTA, NINTA, NIndustry,
NFCF, NPROF, NLnTobinQ, NLnDE
a. 
Variable dependiente: NEBOb. 
 
 
Estadísticos sobre los residuos a
-,1548 ,5399 ,3314 ,05883 531
-,54970 ,47381 ,00000 ,22538 531
-8,265 3,545 ,000 1,000 531
-2,418 2,084 ,000 ,991 531
Valor pronosticado
Residuo bruto
Valor pronosticado tip.
Residuo tip.
Mínimo Máximo Media
Desviación
típ. N
Variable dependiente: NEBOa. 
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Model V - C:  
(Insider Ownership & Firm Performance):  
Performance as Endogenous Variable 
 
Variables introducidas/eliminadas b
NDTS,
MSO2,
GrowthTA,
SIZE, INTA,
Industry,
FCF, PROF,
LnDE, MSO
a
. Introducir
Modelo
1
Variables
introducidas
Variables
eliminadas Método
Todas las variables solicitadas introducidasa. 
Variable dependiente: LnTobinQb. 
 
Resumen del modelo b
,295a ,087 ,070 ,975281177 2,042
Modelo
1
R R cuadrado
R cuadrado
corregida
Error típ. de la
estimación
Durbin-
Watson
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, MSO2, GrowthTA, SIZE, INTA,
Industry, FCF, PROF, LnDE, MSO
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnTobinQb. 
 
ANOVAb
47,303 10 4,730 4,973 ,000a
495,561 521 ,951
542,864 531
Regresión
Residual
Total
Modelo
1
Suma de
cuadrados gl
Media
cuadrática F Sig.
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NDTS, MSO2, GrowthTA, SIZE, INTA, Industry,
FCF, PROF, LnDE, MSO
a. 
Variable dependiente: LnTobinQb. 
 
Estadísticos sobre los residuos a
-1,7748250 ,69055629 -,77403727 ,298466678 532
-4,6520700 4,279618740 ,00000000 ,966054090 532
-3,353 4,907 ,000 1,000 532
-4,770 4,388 ,000 ,991 532
Valor pronosticado
Residuo bruto
Valor pronosticado tip.
Residuo tip.
Mínimo Máximo Media
Desviación
típ. N
Variable dependiente: LnTobinQa. 
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Model V - D:  
(Insider Ownership & Firm Performance):  
Managerial Share Ownership as Endogenous Variable 
 
Variables introducidas/eliminadas b
NNDTS,
NSIZE,
NGrowthTA,
NINTA,
NIndustry,
NPROF,
NFCF,
NLnTobinQ,
NLnDE
a
. Introducir
Modelo
1
Variables
introducidas
Variables
eliminadas Método
Todas las variables solicitadas introducidasa. 
Variable dependiente: NMSOb. 
 
Resumen del modelo b
,192a ,037 ,020 ,13488 1,994
Modelo
1
R R cuadrado
R cuadrado
corregida
Error típ. de la
estimación
Durbin-
Watson
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NNDTS, NSIZE, NGrowthTA, NINTA,
NIndustry, NPROF, NFCF, NLnTobinQ, NLnDE
a. 
Variable dependiente: NMSOb. 
 
 
ANOVAb
,364 9 ,040 2,226 ,019a
9,478 521 ,018
9,843 530
Regresión
Residual
Total
Modelo
1
Suma de
cuadrados gl
Media
cuadrática F Sig.
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NNDTS, NSIZE, NGrowthTA, NINTA, NIndustry,
NPROF, NFCF, NLnTobinQ, NLnDE
a. 
Variable dependiente: NMSOb. 
 
 
Estadísticos sobre los residuos a
-,0646 ,1676 ,0869 ,02622 531
-,20125 ,67512 ,00000 ,13373 531
-5,778 3,078 ,000 1,000 531
-1,492 5,005 ,000 ,991 531
Valor pronosticado
Residuo bruto
Valor pronosticado tip.
Residuo tip.
Mínimo Máximo Media
Desviación
típ. N
Variable dependiente: NMSOa. 
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Corrected Autocorrelation Test (Model V – E, F, G, H) 
 
Resumen del modelo b
,175a ,031 ,024 ,18314 2,042
Modelo
1
R R cuadrado
R cuadrado
corregida
Error típ. de la
estimación
Durbin-
Watson
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NNDTS, NFCF, NLnDE, NIndustry, NINTA,
NTobinQ, NGrowthTA, NSIZE, NPROF
a. 
Variable dependiente: NEBOb. 
 
 
Resumen del modelo b
,150a ,022 ,016 ,18384 2,055
Modelo
1
R R cuadrado
R cuadrado
corregida
Error típ. de la
estimación
Durbin-
Watson
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NNDTS, NFCF, NROE, NLnDE, NIND,
NINTA, NGrowthTA, NPROF, NSIZE
a. 
Variable dependiente: NEBOb. 
 
Resumen del modelo b
,313a ,098 ,092 ,09849 2,002
Modelo
1
R R cuadrado
R cuadrado
corregida
Error típ. de la
estimación
Durbin-
Watson
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NNDTS, NFCF, NLnDE, NIND, NINTA,
NTobinQ, NGrowthTA, NPROF, NSIZE
a. 
Variable dependiente: NMSOb. 
 
Resumen del modelo b
,192a ,037 ,020 ,13487 2,001
Modelo
1
R R cuadrado
R cuadrado
corregida
Error típ. de la
estimación
Durbin-
Watson
Variables predictoras: (Constante), NNDTS, NROE, NGrowthTA, NSIZE,
NINTA, NIndustry, NFCF, NPROF, NLnDE
a. 
Variable dependiente: NMSOb. 
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